Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Marion Marsh v. Scott Allan Marsh : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kellie F. Williams; Attorney for Appellee.
Richard N. Bigelow; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Marsh v. Marsh, No. 970696 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1229

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

MARION MARSH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PIaintiff-Appellee,
MS.

Appeal No. 970696-CA
Civil No. 894891070 DA
Oral Argument Priority
No: 15

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant-Appellant

* * * * * * * *

Appeal from a Final Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

DOCKET NO.

Richard N. Bigelow (3991)
Attorney for Appellant
700 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6450

JL}®£k~m,

Kellie F. Williams (3493)
Attorney for Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 328-1162

^C^ofAopea/s

JON \i
c

t

' e * of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

MARION MARSH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Appeal No. 970696-CA
Civil No. 894891070 DA
Oral Argument Priority
No: 15

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant-Appellant

* * * * * * * *

Appeal from a Final Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

Richard N. Bigelow (3991)
Attorney for Appellant
700 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6450

Kellie F. Williams (3493)
Attorney for Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 328-1162

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

2

I
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES . . . .

3

DETERMINATIVE STATUTUES AND RULES

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

9

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

11

CONCLUSION

19

i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES
Arnold Machinery Co. v. Balls, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah
1981)
Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah App. 1990)
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . . . .
Faulkner v. Faulkner. 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). . .
Garris v. McDuffie, 344 SE.2d 186 (SC App. 1986). .
Gillmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 422 (Utah 1993)
Kane v. Kane. 391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964)
Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (CA 2nd,
Calif 1986)
Lake Philaas Service v. Valley Bank. 845 P.2d 955,
(Utah App. 1993)
Marchant v. Park Citv, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989)
Matter of Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885 (Utah
1989)
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.,
752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988)
Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985)
Wilson v. Wilson. 252 P.2d 197, (Idaho 1 9 5 3 ) . . . .

it

Woodward v. Woodward, 456 P.2d 431
STATUTES

12
PAGE

U.C.A. §78-2A-3(2)

1

U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (c)

4

U.S.C. §1174

5,6,9,10,
11,13,
14

U.S.C. §§627-1174 and 1408

5,13

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure No. 3(a)

iii

1

INDEX TO EXHIBITS
Relevant Provisions of 10 U.S.C. §627-1174 and 1408

Exhibit A

Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644, (Cal. App.
2Dist. 1986)

Exhibit B

Decree of Divorce

Exhibit C

Order and Order of Modification

Exhibit D

April 17, 1997 Transcript

Exhibit E

Petition for Modification of Divorce

Exhibit F

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Exhibit G

Affidavit of Scott Allan Marsh

Exhibit H

Plaintiff's Response to Order to Show Cause

Exhibit I

Minute Entry

Exhibit J

Affidavit of Scott Allan Marsh

Exhibit K

iv

Richard N. Bigelow (3991)
Attorney for Appellant
700 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6450
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

MARION MARSH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Appeal No. 970696-CA
Civil No. 894891070 DA
Oral Argument Priority
No. 15

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant-Appellant
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I.

JURISDICTION

The authority which confers jurisdiction on this Court to
hear this appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County is Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure No. 3(a).

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

This is an appeal from a April 17, 1997 decision of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County which requires
Appellant Scott Allan Marsh, ("Mr. Marsh") to pay Marion Marsh,
("Mrs. Marsh") a percentage of the separation pay he received as
a result of his involuntary separation from the U.S. Navy.

In

addition, Mr. Marsh appeals from a decision of the Trial Court
which allowed Mrs. Marsh to default on her payments of a loan in
which she agreed to hold Mr. Marsh harmless thus violating the
Decree of Divorce dated August 16, 1989.

III.

A.

QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

SHOULD A MILITARY SEPARATION PAYMENT MADE UNDER 10

U.S.C. §1174 AND RELATED STATUTES BE TREATED AS A PENSION OR
RETIREMENT PAYMENT WHEN STATUTORILY IT WAS NOT MADE SUCH A
BENEFIT AND WAS INTENDED TO ASSIST THE DISCHARGED INDIVIDUAL IN
HIS RE-ENTRY INTO CIVILIAN LIFE?
reviewed for correctness.
1989); Lake Philgas
App. 1993); Marchant

B.

Service

This is a question of law

Doelle

v. Bradley,

v. Valley

v. Park City,

Bank,

784 P.2d 1176 (Utah
845 P.2d 955, (Utah

111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).

SINCE THE SEPARATION BENEFIT APPELLANT RECEIVED MUST BE

REPAID IN THE EVENT THE DISCHARGED INDIVIDUAL BECOMES ELIGIBLE
FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MUST THE APPELLEE BE REQUIRED TO
2

CONTRIBUTE TO THE REPAYMENT IF SHE RECEIVES ANY OF THE SEPARATION
PAY?

This is a question of law which the Trial Court failed to

properly decide and is reviewed for correctness. Doelle
Bradley,
Valley

City,

784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Lake
Bank,

Philgas

v.

Service

845 P.2d 955, (Ut. App. 1993); Marchant

v.

v.

Park

111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).

C.

IS MRS. MARSH'S FAILURE TO HOLD MR. MARSH HARMLESS FROM

DEBTS AGAINST THE MARITAL RESIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF HER
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DEGREE OF DIVORCE JUSTIFYING AN AWARD OF
SANCTIONS AGAINST HER?

This is a mixed question of law and fact

to be reviewed factually and for correctness. Marchant
City,
Valley

111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); Lake Philgas
Bank,

Service

v.

v.

Wright,

845 P.2d 955, (Ut. App. 1993); Gillmor

850 P.2d 422 (Utah 1993); Matter

of Estate

v. Park

of Bartell,

116 P.2d

885 (Utah 1989).

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES

All of the foregoing issues for review on this Appeal
present questions of law for determination by this Appeals Court.
For the purposes of this appeal there are very limited factual
disputes.

This appeal is based on the Trial Court's order

requiring Mr. Marsh to pay a percentage of his separation pay to
Mrs. Marsh as though such pay were part of a Pension or
3

Retirement Benefit when according to the applicable statutes,
Separation pay is not the same as a retirement benefit since the
requirements for receiving Separation pay and the formula for
calculating the payments are different.

This appeal is also

based on the Trial Court's order allowing Mrs. Marsh to avoid her
obligations of the divorce decree by refusing to hold Mr. Marsh
harmless in regard to the debt on the marital residence.
The standard for review (where the appeal as here presented
is essentially on issues of law and interpretation of statutes)
is that upon review, no deference is given to the trial court
statements, conclusions, rulings, or interpretations and the
Appellate Court is free to render its independent interpretation
and review for Correctness.
(Utah 1989); Mountain

Doelle

Fuel Supply

Co. v. Salt

752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Faulkner
(Utah 1986); Arnold

Machinery

v. Bradley,

Co.

Lake City

v. Faulkner,
v.

Balls,

784 P.2d 1176
Corp.,

714 P.2d 1149

624 P.2d 678 (Utah

1981).
In this case, the facts on both issues are not in dispute.
Mr. Marsh received a separation payment upon his involuntary
termination from the military.

The Trial Court erred in

considering this as a Retirement or Pension benefit.

In such an

instance the appellate court need not grant any deference to the
trial court when "even if viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support

4

the findings." Doelle

v. Bradley,

784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah

1989).
In addition, the Trial Court erred in determining that the
obligations of the divorce decree were contingent upon one
another and that failure of one justified failure of another.
Under U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (c) the divorce decree must specify which
party is responsible for the payment of joint debts and
provisions for the enforcement of these orders.

The Marsh's

Divorce Decree provides that in the event Mr. Marsh fell 30 days
or more in arrears on his support payments, Mrs. Marsh was
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief.

This is the

only remedy permitted by the decree and the Trial Court erred in
determining that Mr. Marsh's arrearage was justification for Mrs.
Marsh's failure to maintain her obligation of holding him
harmless from the mortgage.

V.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Statutes determinative of Mr. Marsh's first issue are 10
U.S.C. §§627-1174 and §1408 (Exhibit A) which govern Separation
Pay and Pension and Retirement Benefits from the U.S. Military.
While no Utah Cases have been found on point, the California case
of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (CA 2nd, Calif 1986) is
directly on point. (Exhibit B)

5

The statute determinative of Mr. Marsh's second issue is
U.C.A. §30-3-5 which proscribes that upon divorce debts are to be
divided, and the Decree of Divorce must contain provisions for
failure to meet financial obligations.

The Divorce Decree

provides that if Mr. Marsh fails to pay child support, Mrs. Marsh
is entitled to mandatory withholding to satisfy the payments.

VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 16, 1989, Marion Marsh and Scott Allan Marsh were
divorced.

(R. at 38, Exhibit C at 6). The relevant portions of

the Divorce Decree awarded Marion Marsh "ll/40ths of all pension
and retirement benefits that the [Mr. Marsh] may receive upon his
retirement from military service."

(Divorce Decree, R. at 43,

Exhibit C at 6; R. at 462, Exhibit D at 2).

This included only

retirement and pensions and was silent as to separation pay.
addition Mrs. Marsh was awarded the marital residence.

In

(R. at

43, Exhibit C at 6). With the home, she assumed the debt of
$75,000 with Fleet Mortgage and the Veterans Administration and
was ordered to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the financial
obligation.

(R. at 44, Exhibit C at 7).

In addition, Mr. Marsh

was ordered to pay alimony and child support.

(R. at 41-42,

Exhibit C at 4-5).
In November, 1991, Mr. Marsh was involuntarily discharged
from his employment with the United States Navy.

6

(Tr. at 52,

Exhibit E at 52). Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1174, Mr. Marsh was
given separation pay in the amount of $30,000. Mr. Marsh treated
the separation pay as such and not a pension or retirement
payment and did not pay Mrs. Marsh ll/40ths of the payment.
While the military referred to the payment as a pension plan on
his W-2 form, Mr. Neil Crist, ("Mr. Crist''), a retired Air Force
Colonel and the expert at the hearing on this matter,
acknowledged that the W-2 form did not contain an appropriate
place on the form to enter military separation pay.

He indicated

that under the circumstances, the Retirement/Pension line is
where an individual would likely be instructed to enter the
payment.

(Tr. at 66, Exhibit E at 66).

Mrs. Marsh contends that she was entitled to ll/40ths of the
separation pay as part of a pension or retirement plan.
283, Exhibit F at 3).

(R. at

Commissioner Michael Evans recommended a

ruling in favor of Mrs. Marsh.

At the trial, Mr. Crist, a

retired colonel with the Air Force, testified as an expert
witness.

(Tr. at 25, Exhibit E at 25).

He testified that

separation pay and retirement were treated differently by the
Military, but that in his opinion the separation pay was an
"advancement on retirement".

(Tr. at 48-50, Exhibit E at 48-50).

On June 9, 1997, the Honorable Leslie Lewis ordered that
Mrs. Marsh be awarded ll/40ths of the disbursement received by
Defendant in 1991, together with interest.

7

(R. at 460, Exhibit G

at 7).

Mr. Marsh appeals from that decision on the grounds that

the payment he received was a separation payment and was not a
pension or retirement benefit.
In addition, Mrs. Marsh breached her obligation under the
Divorce Decree by failing to make the mortgage payments and
allowing the mortgage company to foreclose on the marital
residence.

(Veterans Affairs Letter of August 25, 1993, R. at

200, Exhibit H at 1). Mrs. Marsh contends that her failure to
make the mortgage payment was a direct result of Mr. Marsh's late
support payments.

(R. at 206, Exhibit I at 3).

Commissioner

Michael Evans recommended that Mrs. Marsh not be held in contempt
for her failure to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the debt.
Entry, R. at 239, Exhibit J).

(Minute

Mr. Marsh objected to the

commissioner's ruling.
The Trial Court found that since Appellant was in arrears in
his support at the time Appellee permitted the foreclosure, the
Appellee had not failed in her duty under the Decree of Divorce.
(R. at 454, Exhibit G at 2-3). Mr. Marsh appeals from this order
on the grounds that the elements of a divorce decree are treated
individually and an arrearage in support on his part does not
justify her breach of the order to hold him harmless on the
mortgage payment.
The Decree of Divorce provides Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the
event that Mr. Marsh gets behind on his support payments.

8

The

Decree states "if the Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in
arrears in his child support obligation, the Plaintiff should be
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated (78-45(d)-l et. seq.)(1984 as amended). (Tr. at
41, Exhibit E at 41). This is her exclusive remedy and does not
provide her the option of defaulting on her mortgage payment and
allowing the mortgage company to foreclose on the house which is
held jointly with Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Marsh appeals from this decision on the grounds that
obligations of a divorce decree are individual obligations which
are not contingent upon the other obligations. Mr. Marsh has
made up payment of all arrearages.

In addition, at the time of

the hearing on this matter, Mr. Marsh was current on his child
support obligations as acknowledged by Mrs. Marsh's attorney.
(Tr. at 14, Exhibit E at 14).

VII.

SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

A military separation payment made under 10 U.S.C. §1174 and
related statutes should not be treated as a pension or retirement
payment when statutorily it was not made such a benefit and was
intended to assist the individual in his re-entry into civilian
life.

At the Commissioner's recommendation, the trial court

ruled that the payment Mr. Marsh received when he was
involuntarily terminated from his military service was divisible

o

as part of the retirement and pension described in the Divorce
Decree.
Congress and the military have statutorily dealt with
involuntary separations by creating a separation payment.

This

payment is different from a retirement or pension because
retirement requires 20 years of service in the military while the
separation pay requires only 6 years of service.

While the

expert testified that this separation was, in his opinion, an
"advancement on retirement," that implies that everyone who
receives a separation payment will receive retirement.

That is

clearly not the case. Mr. Marsh appeals the Trial Court's
decision on the ground that the Court erred in considering the
money a retirement benefit when it was, in fact, paid as a
separation payment pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1174.
If Mr. Marsh subsequently retires from the military, a
portion of his retirement pay will be applied toward the amount
he received upon his separation from the military.

If Mrs. Marsh

receives ll/40ths of the separation pay, Mr. Marsh will be paying
her ll/40ths of the money he may later be required to pay back.
If Mr. Marsh is currently required to pay Mrs. Marsh her ll/40ths
of the separation pay, in equity she must be required to pay back
ll/40ths out of her portion of the retirement in the event that
the repayment becomes necessary.
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Mr. Marsh also appeals the order of the trial court which
holds him responsible for the foreclosure on the marital
residence in spite of the fact that in the Divorce Decree orders
Mrs. Marsh to hold him harmless on that mortgage.

The Trial

Court found that she was not in contempt for breaching her
obligation based on the fact that Mr. Marsh was behind in his
support payments. Mr. Marsh contends that the obligations in a
divorce decree are separate and should not be contingent upon one
another.

In addition, at the time of the hearing on this matter,

Mr. Marsh had repaid all arrearages and was current in his
support obligations.

VIII.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I

Under 10 U.S.C. §1174, Military Separation Payments are
treated separate and apart from retirement and pensions and
should be treated separately under a decree of divorce.
Separation pay upon involuntary discharge or release form active
duty is defined by §1174 to include termination of an individual
"who has completed six or more but less than twenty, years of
active service immediately before that discharge."

It does not

apply to those who have worked with the military in excess of 20
years who are entitled to retirement.

11

The separation pay is computed as "10 percent of the product
of A) his years of active service, and B) 12 times the monthly
basic pay to which he was entitled at the time of his discharge
or release from active duty."

The statute further provides that

if the discharged employee eventually collects retirement
benefits, a percentage of those benefits will be deducted until
the amount of the separation pay has been repaid.
§1174 (h)).

(10 U.S.C.

(Exhibit A ).

Pursuant to the Divorce Decree dated August 16, 1989, Mrs.
Marsh is entitled to ll/40ths of Mr. Marsh's retirement benefits
"upon his retirement from military service."
E at 6.)

(Tr. at 43, Exhibit

Mrs. Marsh cites the case of Woodward v. Woodward. 456

P.2d 431,(considering retirement benefits a marital asset) as
controlling in this matter.

The Divorce Decree clearly addresses

how retirement benefits should be divided.

That division of

retirement benefits is not applicable here since Congress
specifically has determined the separation payment to not be a
retirement benefit.
In the hearing on this matter, Mrs. Marsh's expert, Neil
Crist, testified that the separation pay and retirement are
handled differently since someone who receives the separation
payment will not necessarily receive retirement.

Among other

possibilities, this would occur if the individual did not
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complete 20 years of service in the Reserves or if the individual
did not reach the age of 60.
Mr. Crist testified that in his opinion, based on the
repayment plan, the separation pay was an "advancement on the
retirement."

(Tr. at 49, Exhibit E at 49). An advancement,

however, implies that the individual would later receive
retirement. As Mr. Crist admitted, this may not be the case.
(Tr. at 67, Exhibit E at 67). In the instance that the
individual does not reach retirement age, the money is not
repaid.

Mr. Crist also acknowledged that §1174 relates to

severance and separation pay and not retirement and pension.
Mr. Marsh was released from active duty in the Navy under 10
U.S.C. §632 commonly known as the "up or out" policy.

Section

632 provides in part:
(a) Each officer. . .who holds the regular grade of captain
or major. . .who has failed of selection for promotion to
the next higher regular grade for the second time and whose
name is not an a list of officers recommended for promotion
to the next higher regular grade shall be discharged on
the date requested by him and approved by the Secretary
concerned, which date shall be not later than the first day
of the seventh calendar month beginning after the month in
which the President approves the report of the board which
considered him for the second time.
As a result of his involuntary discharge, Mr. Marsh was given a
separation payment of $30,000 (before taxes), as provided in 10
U.S.C. §1174.

These benefits are provided for discharged

employees who are not eligible for retirement because of their
years of service.
13

Utah does not have any case law relating to military
separation pay but the California case of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak,
222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Cal.App.2Dist. 1986) is precisely on point.
(Exhibit B).

The facts of the Kuzmiak case are very similar to

the present case. While California (like Utah) recognizes a
marital interest in retirement benefits earned during the
marriage, the court held "that unlike military benefits based
upon longevity of service, separation pay does not serve to
compensate for past services. Although longevity of service
determines the amount of this one-time payment, the right to
separation pay occurs only when there is an involuntary discharge
of the service member."

Id at 64 6. The court further went on to

state that the legislative history of §1174 shows that:
the separation pay is a contingency payment for an officer
who is career committed but to whom a full military career
may be denied. It is designed to encourage him to pursue
his service ambition, knowing that if he is denied a full
career under the competitive system he can count on an
adequate readjustment pay to ease his reentry into civilian
life.
Id. at 646, (quoting House Rep. No. 96-1462, reprinted in 1980
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. P. 6333, 6361.)

The court

concluded that it was "satisfied that Congress did not intend
separation pay to be compensation for past services. . . the
payment is the separate property of the service member."
647.

14

Id. at

While Crist testified that it was clear in his mind that
what Mr. Marsh received was severance or separation pay, Mrs.
Marsh contends that it was a retirement benefit since Mr. Marsh
indicated it as such on his W-2 form.

The W-2 form does not

contain a category for separation pay so as Mr. Crist indicated,
the retirement line would be the appropriate place to include
separation pay. (Tr. at 66, Exhibit E at 66).
The $30,000 that Mr. Marsh received was compensation for his
separation from the military under 10 U.S.C. §1174. (Exhibit A ) .
It was designed to give him the opportunity to work back into
civilian life. Although Mr. Marsh indicated on his tax form that
the payment was retirement, the form did not provide an
appropriate place for the entry of this figure.

Since the amount

paid to Mr. Marsh was separation pay as a part of his involuntary
discharge, the reasoning used in the Kuzmiak case should be
applied to determine that separation pay is not compensation for
past services and is consequently not divisible in the divorce
decree.
If Mrs. Marsh is awarded ll/40ths of the separation pay, the
issue arises about the repayment.

In the event that Mr. Marsh

becomes eligible for retirement, he will be required to repay the
separation pay, and Mrs. Marsh will receive ll/40ths of the
retirement.

Equity requires that Mrs. Marsh be required to

participate in the repayment if she receives part of the

IS

separation pay.

If she receives her ll/40ths of the separation

pay, she should be required to repay ll/40ths when and if she
receives retirement benefits.

ARGUMENT II
Mr. Marsh appeals the Trial Court's decision making Mrs.
Marsh's obligation to hold him harmless on the mortgage
contingent on his payment of child support.

Each party's duties

were separate under the Decree of Divorce but the Trial Court has
refused to enforce Appellee's duty to hold Appellant harmless on
the mortgage obligation.

As a result, Mr. Marsh or someone on

his behalf must repay the Department of Veteran's Affairs the sum
of $12,870.96 before the Appellant can once again be eligible for
Veteran's loans.

(Exhibit H ) .

Cases concerning the separate obligations of a divorce
decree deal primarily with linking child support with visitation.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382
(Utah 1985) cited various jurisdictions and concluded that "A
court may not deny the noncustodial parent visitation rights for
the mere failure to pay child support, where the failure to pay
is due to an inability to pay."

The court in that case, however,

ruled against the non-supporting parent because there was no
evidence that he was unable to provide for the child, he had

16

abused his visitation rights and that his conduct was detrimental
to the child.

The court clearly indicated that the restrictions

on the father's visitation rights were a result of plaintiff's
"willful and intentional failure to support his child and his
contumacy with respect to a court-ordered visitation schedule and
attempt to forcefully remove the child from the custodial
parent."
The Utah Court of Appeals in Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726
(Utah App. 1990) further separated the obligations of child
support and visitation by ruling that a father who did not meet
his visitation schedule could not be required to pay additional
child support.

In child support and visitation cases, courts

have treated each obligation as separate and not contingent upon
one another.
Wilson,

Kane v. Kane,

391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964); Wilson

252 P.2d 197, (Idaho 1953); Garris

186 (SC App. 1986).

V. McDuffie,

v.

344 SE.2d

This is similar to our present case where

provisions of a Divorce Decree should not be conditional upon one
another unless the decree specifically links them.
The Divorce Decree provided Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the event
of an arrearage in support payments.

The Decree states "if the

Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in arrears in his child
support obligation, the Plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (7845(d)(1) et. seq.)(1984 as amended)."

17

This provides her an

exclusive remedy for collecting support.

It does not, however,

provide her justification to evade her obligations under the
Decree.
In the Affidavit of Scott Marsh, Dated October 7, 1997, Mr.
Marsh testified that he has been current in the payment of his
support obligations since 1992 except when the Court ordered
retroactive support. At that time he quickly paid off any
arrearages the court determined were owed.

(Exhibit K).

Mr.

Marsh's arrearages were less than the debt Mrs. Marsh owes on the
foreclosure of the home.
Even if Mr. Marsh had been totally delinquent in his support
payments, which he was not, that does not justify Mrs. Marsh's
delinquency on the mortgage payment since her obligation to hold
him harmless was not contingent upon his duty to pay support.
Because Mr. Marsh has repaid all his arrearages, including
interest, and has made Mrs. Marsh whole, it is now her obligation
to make Mr. Marsh whole by repaying the debt of $12,870.96. Mr.
Marsh has remained current in his support and has fulfilled his
obligations under the Divorce Decree and is entitled to the same
fulfillment of obligations from Mrs. Marsh.
The obligations of the Divorce Decree are separate
obligations and should be treated as such.

The mere fact that

Mr. Marsh was behind in his child support payments does not
justify Mrs. Marsh's refusal to pay the mortgage payment and the
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subsequent foreclosure on the marital home. Under the Divorce
Decree, Mrs. Marsh had an exclusive remedy for income holding
relief in the event of an arrearage on the payments.

This is the

remedy which should have been allowed to her. Mr. Marsh was
current on his support payments at the time of the hearing on
this matter but is subject to a payment of $12,870.96 before he
will again be eligible for a loan from the department of
Veteran's Affairs.

Payment of this should be the responsibility

of Mrs. Marsh since the Divorce Decree ordered her to hold Mr.
Marsh harmless on the mortgage.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce Mrs. Marsh was to receive
ll/40ths of Mr. Marsh's retirement from the military.

The money

he received as separation pay from his involuntary discharge by
statute was separation pay and not retirement. As such, the
trial court erred in requiring Mr. Marsh to pay Mrs. Marsh
ll/40ths of the military separation pay.

The separation pay is

not compensation for past service (as retirement is) but is
instead a payment to help the individual work back into the
civilian work force. As the court ruled in Kuzmiak, the
separation payment should be considered separate property and
awarded to Mr. Marsh in its entirety.
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In the event Mr* Marsh is required to give Mrs. Marsh
ll/40ths of the payment, she should be required to participate in
the repayment plan.

While it is uncertain that Mr. Marsh will

ever receive his military retirement, if he does so, he will be
required to repay the amount of the separation pay.

If Mrs.

Marsh is awarded a percentage of the separation pay, in equity,
she should be required to repay that same percentage in the event
the she receives the military retirement.
Finally, the trial court erred in allowing Mrs. Marsh to
breach her duties under the Decree of Divorce requiring her to
hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the Mortgage.

The foreclosure created

a debt for Mr. Marsh of $12,870.96 which must be repaid, and has
clouded his credit record.

Duties of a divorce decree are

separate and should not be contingent upon one another unless the
divorce decree expressly links them.
Based on the law and facts, the judgment of the Trial Court
should be reversed to allow Mr. Marsh to keep the entire
separation payment and to require Mrs. Marsh to be responsible
for the repayment of the Veteran's Affairs loan.
DATED t h i s J ^ L d a y of

Ax~~f

, 1998.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard N. Bigelow
Attorney for Appellant
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Sec

630

631.
632.

633.
634.
635.
636.

Discharge of regular commissioned officers
with less than five years of active commissioned service or found not qualified for
promotion for first lieutenant or lieuten
ant (junior grade).
Effect of failure of selection for promotion.
regular first lieutenants and lieutenants
(junior grade).
Effect of failure of selection for promotion*
regular captains and majors of the Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps and regular
lieutenants and lieutenant commanders of
the Navy.
Retirement for years of service: regular lieutenant colonels and commanders
Retirement for years of service* regular colonels and Navy captains.
Retirement for years of service: regular brigadier geneials and rear admirals (lower
half).
Retirement for years of service* regular
major generals and rear admirals.
AMENDMENTS

1985-Pub. L. 99-145, title V, § 514(b)(5)(B), Nov. 8,
1985, 99 Stat. 628, substituted "rear admirals (lower
half)" for "commodores" in item 635.
1981—Pub. L. 97-86, title IV, § 405(b)(5)(B), Dec. 1,
1981, 95 Stat. 1106, substituted "commodores" for
"commodore admirals" in item 635.
§ 627. Failure of selection for promotion

An officer in a grade below t h e grade of colonel or, in t h e case of an officer of t h e Navy,
captain who is in or above t h e promotion zone
established for his grade and competitive category under section 623 of this title and is considered but not selected for promotion by a selection board convened under section 611(a) of
this title shall be considered to have failed of
selection for promotion.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2859.)
EFFECTIVE DATE

Subchapter effective Sept. 15, 1981, but the authority to prescribe regulations under this subchapter effective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section 701 of Pub. L.
96 513, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 101 of this title.
TRANSITION PROVISIONS UNDER DEFENSE OFFICER
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT

For provisions to prevent extinction or premature
termination of rights, duties, penalties, or proceedings
that existed or were begun prior to the effective date
of Pub. L. 96-513 and otherwise to allow for an orderly
transition to the system of officer personnel management put in place under Pub. L. 96-513, see section 601
et seq. of Pub. L. 96-513, set out as a note under section 611 of this title.
§ 628. Special selection boards

(a)(1) In t h e case of an officer who is eligible
for promotion who t h e Secretary of t h e military department concerned determines was not
considered for selection for promotion by a selection board because of administrative error,
t h e Secretary concerned, under regulations prescribed by t h e Secretary of Defense, shall convene a special selection board under this subsection (composed in accordance with section 612
of this title or, in t h e case of a warrant officer,
composed in accordance with section 573 of this
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title and regulations prescribed by t h e Secretary of t h e military department concerned) to
determine w h e t h e r such officer should be recommended for promotion.
(2) A special selection board convened under
paragraph (1) shall consider t h e record of t h e
officer as his record would have appeared to
t h e board t h a t should have considered him.
T h a t record shall be compared with a sampling
of t h e records of those officers of t h e same
competitive category who were recommended
for promotion, and those officers who were not
recommended for promotion, by t h e board t h a t
should have considered him.
(3) If a special selection board convened
under paragraph (1) does not recommend for
promotion an officer in a grade below t h e grade
of colonel or, in t h e case of an officer of the
Navy, captain whose name was referred to it for
consideration, t h e officer shall be considered to
have failed of selection for promotion.
(b)(1) In t h e case of an officer who is eligible
for promotion who was considered for selection
for promotion by a selection board but was not
selected, t h e Secretary of t h e military department concerned, under regulations prescribed
by t h e Secretary of Defense, may convene a
special selection board under this subsection
(composed in accordance with section 612 of
this title or, in t h e case of a warrant officer,
composed in accordance with section 573 of this
title and regulations prescribed by t h e Secretary of t h e military department concerned) to
determine w h e t h e r such officer should be recommended for promotion if t h e Secretary concerned determines that—
(A) t h e action of t h e board which considered t h e officer was contrary to law or involved material error of fact or material administrative error; or
(B) t h e board did not have before it for its
consideration material information.
(2) A special selection board convened under
paragraph (1) shall consider t h e record of the
officer as his record, if corrected, would have
appeared to t h e board t h a t considered him.
T h a t record shall be compared with t h e records
of a sampling of those officers of t h e same competitive category who were recommended for
promotion, and those officers who were not recommended for promotion, by t h e board that
considered him.
(3) If a special selection board convened
under paragraph (1) does not recommend for
promotion an officer whose name was referred
to it for consideration, t h e officer incurs no additional failure of selection for promotion.
(c)(1) Each special selection board convened
under this section shall submit to t h e Secretary
of t h e military department concerned a written
report, signed by each member of t h e board,
containing t h e n a m e of each officer it recommends for promotion and certifying t h a t the
board has carefully considered t h e record of
each officer whose name was referred to it.
(2) T h e provisions of sections 617(b) and 618
of this title apply to t h e report and proceedings
of a special selection board convened under this
section in t h e same m a n n e r as they apply to
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the report and proceedings of a selection board
convened under section 611(a) of this title.
(d)(1) If the report of a special selection
board convened under this section, as approved
by the President, recommends for promotion to
the next higher grade an officer whose name
was referred to it for consideration, such officer
shall, as soon as practicable, be appointed to
the next higher grade in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 624 of this
title.
(2) An officer who is promoted to the next
higher grade as the result of the recommendation of a special selection board convened under
this section shall, upon such promotion, have
the same date of rank, the same effective date
for the pay and allowances of that grade, and
the same position on the active-duty list as he
would have had if he had been recommended
for promotion to that grade by the board which
should have considered, or which did consider,
him.
(e) The provisions of section 613 of this title
apply to members of special selection boards
convened under this section.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2859; amended Pub. L. 98-525,
title V, § 527(a), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2525;
Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title XI, § 1131(4), Dec.
5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1506; Pub. L. 102-484, div. A,
title X, § 1052(10), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2499.)
AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 102-484 substituted
"section 573" for "section 558".
1991—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102-190 substituted
"section 573" for "section 558".
1984—Subsecs. (a)(1), (b)(1). Pub. L. 98-525 substituted "(composed in accordance with section 612 of
this title or, in the case of a warrant officer, composed
in accordance with section 558 of this title and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the military department concerned)" for "(composed in accordance
with section 612 of this title)".
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1991 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102-190 effective Feb. 1,
1992, see section 1132 of Pub. L. 102-190, set out as a
note under section 521 of this title.
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS

Functions of President under subsec. (dkl) to ap
prove, modify, or disapprove report of a selection
board delegated to Secretary of Defense to perform,
without approval, ratification, or other action by
President, and with authority for Secretary to redelegate, see Ex. Ord. No. 12396, §§ 1(a), 3, Dec. 9, 1982, 47
F.R. 55897, 55898, set out as a note under section 301
of Title 3, The President.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 618, 641 of this
title.
§ 629. Removal from a list of officers recommended
for promotion
(a) The President may remove the name of
any officer from a list of officers recommended
for promotion by a selection board convened
under this chapter.
(b) If, after consideration of a list of officers
approved for promotion by the President, the
Senate does not give its advice and consent i<>
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the appointment of an officer whose name is on
the list, that officer's name shall be removed
from the list.
(c)(1) An officer whose name is removed from
a list under subsection (a) or (b) continues to be
eligible for consideration for promotion. If he is
recommended for promotion by the next selection board convened for his grade and competitive category and he is promoted, the Secretary
of the military department concerned may,
upon such promotion, grant him the same date
of rank, the same effective date for the pay and
allowances of the grade to which promoted, and
the same position on the active-duty list as he
would have had if his name had not been so removed.
(2) If such an officer who is in a grade below
the grade of colonel or, in the case of the Navy,
captain is not recommended for promotion by
the next selection board convened for his grade
and competitive category, or if his name is
again removed from the list of officers recommended for promotion, of if the Senate again
does not give its advice and consent to his promotion, he shall be considered for all purposes
to have twice failed of selection for promotion.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2860.)
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS

Functions of President under subsec. (a) to remove
name of any officer from a promotion list to any grade
below commodore or brigadier general delegated to
Secretary of Defense to perform, without approval,
ratification, or other action by President, and with au
thority for Secretary to redelegate, see Ex. Ord. No.
12396, §§ Kb), 3, Dec. 9, 1982, 47 P\R. 55897, 55898, set
out as a note under section 301 of Title 3, The President.
§ 630. Discharge of regular commissioned officers
with less then five years of active commissioned
service or found not qualified for promotion for
first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade)
The Secretary of the military department
concerned, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense—
(1) may discharge any regular officer on the
active-duty list who—
(A) has less than five years of active commissioned service; or
(B) is serving in the grade of second lieutenant or ensign and has been found not
qualified for promotion to the regular grade
of first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior
grade); and
(2) shall, unless the officer has been promoted, discharge any officer described in
clause (1KB) at the end of the 18-month
period beginning on the date on which the officer is first found not qualified for promotion.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2861; amended Pub. L. 98-525,
title XIV, §1405(11), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat.
2622.)
AMENDMENTS

1984 k'ai. (2) Pub 1, 98 52b Mihbtituted "18
uioiiil) " tin ' i ighteen month".
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SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 1174 of this
title.
§631. Effect of failure of selection for promotion:
regular first lieutenants and lieutenants (Junior
grade)

(a) Except an officer of the Navy and Marine
Corps who is an officer designated for limited
duty (to whom section 5596(e) or 6383 of this
title applies), each officer of the Regular Army,
Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps
Who holds the regular grade of first lieutenant
and has failed of selection for promotion to the
regular grade of captain for the second time,
and each officer of the Regular Navy who holds
the regular grade of lieutenant (junior grade)
and has failed of selection for promotion to the
regular grade of lieutenant for the second time,
Whose name is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the next higher regular grade shall—
(1) be discharged on the date requested by
him and approved by the Secretary of the
military department concerned, which date
shall be not later than the first day of the
seventh calendar month beginning after the
month in which the President approves the
report of the board which considered him for
the second time;
l^> \l Yie te engYble ior retirement under any
provision of law, be retired under that law on
the date requested by him and approved by
the Secretary concerned, which date shall be
not later than the first day of the seventh
calendar month beginning after the month in
which the President approves the report of
the board which considered him for the
second time; or
(3) if on the date on which he is to be discharged under clause (1) he is within two
years of qualifying for retirement under section 3911, 6323, or 8911 of this title, be retained on active duty until he is qualified for
retirement and then be retired under that
section, unless he is sooner retired or discharged under another provision of law.
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer
pursuant to this section shall be considered to
be an involuntary retirement or discharge for
purposes of any other provision of law.
(c) An officer who is subject to discharge
under subsection (a)(1) is not eligible for further consideration for promotion.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2861; amended Pub. L. 98-525,
tttAe V, * 53&Vc\ Oct. \$, \SM,TOStat. %%.>
AMENDMENTS

1984—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98-525 added subsec. (c).
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 619 of this title.
§632. Effect of failure of selection for promotion:
regular captains and majors of the Army, Air
Force, and Marine Corps and regular lieutenants
and lieutenant commanders of the Navy

(a) Except an officer of the Navy and Marine
Corps who is an officer designated for limited
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duty (to whom section 5596(e) or 6383 of this
title applies) and except as provided under section 037(a) of this title, each officer of the Regular Army, Regular Air Force, or Regular
Marine Corps who holds the regular grade of
captain or major, and each officer of the Regular Navy who holds the regular grade of lieutenant or lieutenant commander, who has
failed of selection for promotion to the next
higher regular grade for the second time and
whose name is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the next higher regular grade shall—
(1) be discharged on the date requested by
him and approved by the Secretary concerned, which date shall be not later than the
first day of the seventh calendar month beginning after the month in which the President approves the report of the board which
considered him for the second time;
(2) if he is eligible for retirement under any
provision of law, be retired under that law on
the date requested by him and approved by
the Secretary concerned, which date shall be
not later than the first day of the seventh
calendar month beginning after the month in
which the President approves the report of
the board which considered him for the
second time; or
(3) if on the date on which he is to be discharged under clause (1) he is within two
years of qualifying for retirement under section 3911, 6323, or 8911 of this title, be retained on active duty until he is qualified for
retirement and then retired under that section, unless he is sooner retired or discharged
under another provision of law.
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer
pursuant to this section shall be considered to
be an involuntary retirement or discharge for
purposes of any other provision of law.
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2862.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 637 of this title.
§ 633. Retirement for years of service: regular lieutenant colonels and commanders

Except an officer of the Navy designated for
limited duty to whom section 5596(e) of this
title applies and an officer of the Marine Corps
designated for limited duty to whom section
5596(e) or section 6383 of this title applies and
except as provided under section 637Cb) of this
title, each officer of the Regular Army, Regular
Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps who holds
the regular grade of lieutenant colonel, and
each officer of the Regular Navy who holds the
regular grade of commander, who is not on a
list of officers recommended for promotion to
the regular grade of colonel or captain, respectively, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on
the first day of the month after the month in
which he completes 28 years of active commissioned service. During the period beginning on
July 1, 1993, and ending on October 1,1999, the
preceding sentence shall not apply to an officer

(1) there is evidence satisfactory to the Secretary concerned that the member is under
eighteen years of age; and
(2) the member enlisted without the written
consent of his parent or guardian.
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968,
81 Stat. 757.)
§ 1171. Regular enlisted members: early discharge

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned and approved by the President,
any regular enlisted member of an armed force
may be discharged within three months before
the expiration of the term of his enlistment or
extended enlistment. A discharge under this
section does not affect any right, privilege, or
benefit that a member would have had if he
completed his enlistment or extended enlistment, except that the member is not entitled to
pay and allowances for the period not served.
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968,
81 Stat. 757.)
Ex. ORD. NO. 11498. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Ex. Ord. No. 11498, Dec. 1, 1969, 34 P.R. 19125, provided:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that the Secretary of Defense is hereby designated and empowered
to approve regulations issued by the Secretaries concerned under section 1171 of title 10, United States
Code, effective January 2, 1968, which relate to the
early discharge of regular enlisted members of the
armed forces.
RICHARD NIXON.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in title 38 section 5303A.
§1172. Enlisted members: during war or emergency;
discharge

A person enlisted under section 518 of this
title may be discharged at any time by the
President, or otherwise according to law.
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968,
81 Stat. 757.)
§ 1173. Enlisted members: discharge for hardship
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a regular enlisted member of an
armed force who has dependents may be discharged for hardship.
(Added Pub. L. 93-64, title I, § 102, July 9, 1973,
87 Stat. 147.)
EFFECTIVE D A T E

Section effective July 1, 1973, see section 206 of Pub.
L. 93-64, set out as a note under section 401 of Title
37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in title 37 sections 404,
406; title 38 section 5303A.
§ 1174. Separation pay upon involuntary discharge or
release from active duty
(a) REGULAR OFFICERS.—(1) A regular officer

who is discharged under chapter 36 of this title

(except under section 630(1)(A) or 643 of such
chapter) or under section 580, 1177, or 6383 of
this title and who has completed six or more,
but less than twenty, years of active service immediately before that discharge is entitled to
separation pay computed under subsection
(d)(1).
(2) A regular commissioned officer of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is
discharged under section 630UXA), 643, or 1186
of this title, and a regular warrant officer of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps
who is separated under section 1165 or 1166 of
this title, who has completed six or more, but
less than twenty, years of active service immediately before that discharge or separation is
entitled to separation pay computed under subsection (d)(1) or (d)(2), as determined by the
Secretary of the military department concerned, unless the Secretary concerned determines that the conditions under which the officer is discharged or separated do not warrant
payment of such pay.
(b) REGULAR ENLISTED MEMBERS.—(1) A regular enlisted member of an armed force who is
discharged involuntarily or as the result of the
denial of the reenlistment of the member and
who has completed six or more, but less than
20, years of active service immediately before
that discharge is entitled to separation pay
computed under subsection (d) unless the Secretary concerned determines that the conditions under which the member is discharged do
not warrant payment of such pay.
(2) Separation pay of an enlisted member
shall be computed under paragraph (1) of subsection (d), except that such pay shall be computed under paragraph (2) of such subsection
in the case of a member who is discharged
under criteria prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense.
(c) OTHER MEMBERS.—(1) Except as provided
in paragraphs (2) and (3), a member of an
armed force other than a regular member who
is discharged or released from active duty and
who has completed six or more, but fewer than
20, years of active service immediately before
that discharge or release is entitled to separation pay computed under subsection (d)(1) or
(d)(2), as determined by the Secretary concerned, if—
(A) the member's discharge or release from
active duty is involuntary; or
(B) the member was not accepted for an additional tour of active duty for which he volunteered.
(2) If the Secretary concerned determines
that the conditions under which a member described in paragraph (1) is discharged or separated do not warrant separation pay under this
section, that member is not entitled to that
pay.
(3) A member described in paragraph (1) who
was not on the active-duty list when discharged
or separated is not entitled to separation pay
under this section unless such member had
completed at least six years of continuous
active duty immediately before such discharge
or release. For purposes of this paragraph, a
period of active duty is continuous if it is not
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interrupted by a bieak in SPIV ice of i n o i e t h a n
30 days.
(d) AMOUNT OF SEPARATION P A Y . - T h e a m o u n t

of s e p a r a t i o n p a y w h i c h m a y be paid to a
m e m b e r under t h i s section is—
(1) 10 percent of t h e product of (A) h i s
years of active service, a n d ( B ) 12 times t h e
m o n t h l y basic pay to w h i c h h e was e n t i t l e d at
t h e t i m e of h i s discharge or release from
active duty; or
(2) one-half of t h e a m o u n t c o m p u t e d under
clause (1).
( e ) R E Q U I R E M E N T FOR SERVICE I N R E A D Y R E SERVE; E X C E P T I O N S T O E L I G I B I L I T Y . — ( 1 ) ( A ) As a

c o n d i t i o n of receiving separation pay under this
s e c t i o n , a person o t h e r w i s e eligible for that pay
shall be required to e n t e r into a written agreem e n t w i t h t h e Secretary c o n c e r n e d t o serve in
t h e R e a d y Reserve of a r e s e i v e c o m p o n e n t for
a period of n o t less t h a n t h r e e years following
t h e person's discharge or release from active
d u t y . If t h e person h a s a service obligation
u n d e r s e c t i o n 651 of this title or under a n y
o t h e r provision of law that is n o t c o m p l e t e d a t
t h e t i m e t h e person is discharged or released
from active duty, t h e three-year obligation
u n d e r t h i s s u b s e c t i o n shall begin o n t h e d a y
after t h e date o n w h i c h t h e person c o m p l e t e s
t h e person's obligation under s u c h section or
o t h e r provision of law,
( B ) E a c h person w h o e n t e r s into a n agreem e n t referred t o in subparagraph (A) w h o is
n o t already a R e s e r v e of a n armed force a n d
w h o is qualified shall, u p o n s u c h p e r s o n s disc h a r g e or release from active duty, be enlisted
or a p p o i n t e d , as appropriate, as a R e s e r v e and
be transferred t o a reserve c o m p o n e n t .
(2) A m e m b e r w h o is discharged or released
from active duty is n o t eligible for separation
pay under t h i s s e c t i o n if t h e m e m b e r (A) is discharged or released from active
d u t y at h i s request;
( B ) is discharged or released from active
d u t y during a n initial term of e n l i s t m e n t or
a n initial period of obligated service;
(C) is released from active d u t y for training;
or
( D ) u p o n discharge or release from active
d u t y , is i m m e d i a t e l y eligible for retired or retainer p a y based o n h i s military service.
(f) C O U N T I N G FRACTIONAL Y E A R S OF SERVICE.—

In d e t e r m i n i n g a m e m b e r ' s years of active service for t h e purpose of c o m p u t i n g separation
pay u n d e r t h i s section, e a c h full m o n t h of service t h a t is in addition t o t h e n u m b e r of full
y e a r s of service creditable t o t h e m e m b e r is
c o u n t e d a s o n e - t w e l f t h of a year a n d a n y rem a i n i n g fractional part of a m o n t h is disregarded.
( g ) COORDINATION W I T H O T H E R SEPARATION OR
SEVERANCE P A Y B E N E F I T S . — A p e r i o d for w h i c h a

m e m b e r h a s previously received s e p a r a t i o n p a y
u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n or s e v e r a n c e p a y or readjustm e n t p a y u n d e r a n y o t h e r provision of law
based o n service in t h e armed forces m a y n o t be
included in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e years of service
t h a t m a y be c o u n t e d in c o m p u t i n g t h e separat i o n p a y of t h e m e m b e r u n d er t h i s section.
( h ) COORDINATION W I T H R E T I R E D OR R E T A I N E R
PAY
AND D I S A B I L I T Y
COMPENSATION.—(1)
A

membei \\\\o h a s leceived s e p a i a t i o n pay under
this section, or s e p a r a t i o n pay, severance pay,
or readjustment p a y under a n y o t h e r provision
of law, based o n service in t h e armed forces,
and w h o later qualifies for retired or retainer
pay under this title or title 14 s h a l l have deducted from e a c h p a y m e n t of s u c h retired or
retainer pay s o m u c h of s u c h pay as is based on
t h e service for w h i c h h e received separation
pay under this section or s e p a r a t i o n pay, severance pay, or r e a d j u s t m e n t p a y under a n y o t h e r
provision of law until t h e total a m o u n t deducted is equal t o t h e total a m o u n t of separation
pay, severance pay, and r e a d j u s t m e n t pay received.
(2) A m e m b e r w h o h a s received separation
pay under t h i s section, or severance p a y or rea d j u s t m e n t p a y under a n y o t h e r provision of
law, based o n service in t h e armed forces shall
not be deprived, by reason of h i s receipt of such
separation p a y , severance pay, or r e a d j u s t m e n t
pay, of a n y disability c o m p e n s a t i o n t o w h i c h h e
is e n t i t l e d under t h e laws administered by t h e
D e p a r t m e n t of V e t e r a n s Affairs, b u t t h e r e shall
be deducted from t h a t disability c o m p e n s a t i o n
an a m o u n t equal t o t h e total a m o u n t of separation pay, severance pay, a n d r e a d j u s t m e n t pay
received. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e preceding sentence, n o deduction m a y be m a d e from disability c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e a m o u n t of a n y separation pay, severance pay, or r e a d j u s t m e n t pay
received because of a n earlier discharge or release from a period of active duty if t h e disability w h i c h is t h e basis for t h a t disability comp e n s a t i o n w a s incurred or aggravated during a
later period of active duty.
(i) REGULATIONS; CREDITING OF O T H E R C O M M I S -

SIONED SERVICE.—(1) T h e S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e

shall prescribe regulations, w h i c h shall be uniform for t h e Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps, for t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of this
section.
(2) Active c o m m i s s i o n e d service in t h e National Oceanic a n d A t m o s p h e r i c Administration or
t h e Public H e a l t h Service shall be credited as
active service in t h e armed forces for t h e purposes of this section.
(Added P u b . L. 96-513, title I, § 109(c), D e c . 12,
1980, 94 S t a t . 2870; a m e n d e d P u b . L. 97-22,
§ 10(b)(10)(A), J u l y 10, 1981, 95 S t a t . 137; Pub.
L. 98-94, title I X , §§ 911(a), (b), 923(b), title X,
§ 1007(c)(2), S e p t . 24, 1983, 97 S t a t . 639, 640,
643, 662; P u b . L. 98-498, title III, § 320(a)(2),
Oct. 19, 1984, 98 S t a t . 2308: P u b . L. 101-189, div.
A, title X V I , § 1621(a)(1), Nov. 29, 1989, 103
S t a t . 1602; P u b . L. 101-510, div. A. title V,
§ 5 0 1 ( a ) - ( d ) , (g), ( h ) , N o v . 5, 1990, 104 Stat.
1549-1551; P u b . L. 102-190, div. A, title X I ,
§ 1131(6), D e c . 5, 1991, 105 S t a t . 1506; P u b . L.
103-160, div. A, title V, § 501(a), N o v . 30, 1993,
107 S t a t . 1644; P u b . L. 103-337, div. A, title V,
§ 560(c), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 S t a t . 2778.)
AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 103-337 inserted
", 1177," after "section 580".
1993—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 103-160 substituted
"six" for "five".
1991—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102-190 substituted
"section 580" for "section 564".
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1990—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(1), inserted heading.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(g)(1), substituted "or under section 564 or 6383 of this title" for
", under section 564 or 6383 of this title, or under section 603 or 604 of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act" and struck out "or release" after "that
discharge".
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(1), substituted "six or more" for "five or more".
Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(2), redesignated subsec. (b)
as subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(3), added
subsec. (b). Former subsec. (b) redesignated (a)(2).
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(1), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(g)(2), struck out
"after September 14, 1981," after "member who" in introductory provisions.
Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(1), substituted "six or
more" for "five or more" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(2), substituted "at least six years" for "at least five years".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(2), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(c)(1)(A), struck
out "or $30,000, whichever is less" after "active duty".
Subsec. (d)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(c)(1)(B), struck
out ", but in no event more than $15,000" after "under
clause (1)".
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(d), amended
subsec. (e) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (e)
read as follows: "A member w h o ' d ) is discharged or released from active duty at
his request;
"(2) is released from active duty for training; or
"(3) upon discharge or release from active duty, is
immediately eligible for retired or retainer pay
based on his military service;
is not eligible for separation pay under this section."
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(3), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(4), inserted
heading.
Pub. L. 101-510, §501(0(2), struck out "(1)" after
"(g)" and struck out par. (2) which read as follows:
"The total amount that a member may receive in separation pay under this section and severance pay and
readjustment pay under any other provision of law,
other than section 1212 of this title, based on service
in the armed forces may not exceed $30,000."
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(5), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(6), inserted
heading.
1989—Subsec. (h)(2). Pub. L. 101-189 substituted
"Department of Veterans Affairs" tor "Veterans' Administration".
1984—Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 98-498 substituted "separation pay, severance pay," for "severance pay"
before "or readjustment pay" in two places.
1983—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98-94, § 911(a), amended
subsec. (c) generally, designating existing provisions as
par. (1) and existing pars. (1) and (2) as subpars. (A)
and (B), respectively, and in provisions preceding
subpar. (A) substituted "Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a member" for "A member" and
"fewer than 20, years of active service immediately
before that discharge or release is entitled to separation pay" for "less than twenty, years of active service
immediately before that discharge or release is entitled, unless the Secretary concerned determines that
the conditions under which the member is discharged
or separated do not warrant such pay, to separation
pay", and added pars. (2) and (3).
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 98-94, § 923(b), amended subsec.
(f) generally, substituting "each full month of service
that is in addition to the number of full years of serv
ice creditable to the member is counted as one-tweltth
of a year and any remaining Iractional part of a
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month is disregarded" for "a part of a year that is six
months or more is counted as a whole year and a part
of a year that is less than six months is disregarded".
Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 98-94, § 911(b), inserted
", other than section 1212 of this title," after "any
other provision of law".
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 98-94, § 1007(c)(2), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
1981—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97-22 substituted "after
September 14, 1981," for "on or after the effective
date of the Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act".
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1993

AMENDMENT

Section 501(b) of Pub. L. 103-160 provided that:
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section]
shall apply with respect to any regular officer who is
discharged after the date of the enactment of this Act
[Nov. 30, 19931.
"(2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
not apply with respect to an officer who on the date of
the enactment of this Act has five or more, but less
than six, years of active service in the Armed Forces."
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1991

AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102-190 effective Feb. 1,
1992, see section 1132 of Pub. L. 102-190, set out as a
note under section 521 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1990

AMENDMENT

Section 501(e) of Pub. L. 101-510 provided that:
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), subsection
(b) of section 1174 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by subsection (a), and the amendments made by
subsections (b), (c), and (d) [amending this section]
shall apply with respect to a member of the Armed
Forces who is discharged, or released from active duty,
after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 5,
1990].
"(2) The amendments made by subsection (b)
[amending this section] shall not apply in the case of
a member (other than a regular enlisted member) of
the Armed Forces who (A) is serving on active duty on
the date of the enactment of this Act, (B) is discharged, or released from active duty, after that date;
and (C) on that date has five or more, but less than
six, years of active service in the Armed Forces "
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1983

AMENDMENT

Section 911(c) of Pub. L. 98 94 provided that: The
amendments made by this section [amending this section] shall take effect on October 1, 1983."
Section 923(g) of Pub. L. 98 94 provided that: "The
amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1401, 1402, 1402a, 3991, 3992, 6151,
6328, 6330, 6404, 8991, and 8992 of this title, section
423 of Title 14, Coast Guard, section 853o of Title 33,
Navigation and Navigable Waters, and section 212 of
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare] shall apply
with respect to (1) the computation of retired or retainer pay of any individual who becomes entitled to
that pay after September 30, 1983, and (2) the recom
putation of retired pay under section 1402, 1402a,
3992, or 8992 of title 10, United States Code, of any individual who after September 30, 1983, becomes entitled to recompute retired pay under any such section."
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1981

AMENDMENT

Section 10(b) of Pub. L. 97-22 provided that the
amendment made by that section is effective Sept. 15,
1981.
EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective Sept. 15, 1981, but the authority to
prescribe regulations under this section effective on
Dec. 12, 1980, see section 701 of Pub. L. 96 513, set out
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(A) years of service;
(B) skill or rating;
<C) grade or rank; and
(D) remaining period of obligated service.

For provisions to prevent extinction or premature
termination of rights, duties, penalties, or proceedings
that existed or were begun prior to the effective date
of Pub. L. 96-513 and otherwise to allow for an orderly
transition to the system of officer personnel management put in place under Pub. L. 96-513, see section 601
et seq. of Pub. L. 96-513. set out as a note under section 611 of this title.

(d) PROGRAM APPLICABILITY.—The Secretary
concerned may provide for the program under
this section to apply to any of the following
members:
( D A regular officer or warrant officer of an
armed force.
(2) A regular enlisted member of an armed
SECTION REFERRED TO TN OTHER SECTIONS
force.
This section is referred to in sections 580, 642, 1165,
(3) A member of an armed force other than
1166, 1174a, 1186.6383, 14517, 14905 of this title.
a regular member.

§ 1174a. Special separation benefits programs

(e) APPLICABILITY SUBJECT TO NEEDS OF THE

SERVICE.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3),
the Secretary concerned may limit the applicatary concerned shall carry out a special separa
tion benefits program under this section. An el- bility of a program under this section to any
igible member of the armed forces may request category of personnel defined by the Secretary
separation under the program. The request in order to meet a need of the armed force
shall be subject to the approval of the Secre- under the Secretary's jurisdiction to reduce the
number of members in certain grades, the
tary.
number of members who have completed a cer(b) BENEFITS.—Upon the approval of the request of an eligible member, the member tain number of years of active service, or the
number of members who possess certain milishall (1) be released from active duty or full-time tary skills or are serving in designated competiNational Guard duty or discharged, as the tive categories.
case may be; and
(2) Any category prescribed by the Secretary
(2) be entitled to—
concerned for regular officers, regular enlisted
(A) separation pay equal to 15 percent of members, or other members pursuant to parathe product of (i) the member's years of graph (1) shall be consistent with the categoactive service, and (ii) 12 times the monthly ries applicable to regular officers, regular enbasic pay to which the member is entitled listed members, or other members, respectively,
at the time of his discharge or release from under the voluntary separation incentive proactive duty; and
gram under section 1175 of this title or any
(B) the same benefits and services as are other program established by law or by that
provided under chapter 58 of this title, sec- Secretary for the involuntary separation of
tions 404 and 406 of title 37, and section such members in the administration of a reduc503(c) of the National Defense Authoriza- tion in force.
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (104 Stat.
(3) A member of the armed forces offered a
1558; 37 U.S.C. 406 note) for members of
the armed forces who are involuntarily sep- voluntary separation incentive under section
arated within the meaning of section 1141 1175 of this title shall also be offered the opportunity to request separation under a proof this title.
gram established pursuant to this section. If
(c) ELIGIBILITY.—Subject to subsections (d)
the Secretary concerned approves a request for
and (e), a member of an armed force is eligible separation under either such section, the
for voluntary separation under a program es- member shall be separated under the authority
tablished for that armed force pursuant to this of the section selected by such member.
section if the member—
(f) APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.—(1) In order
(1) has not been approved for payment of a
to
be separated under a program established
voluntary separation incentive under section
puisuant to this section—
1175 of this title;
(A) a regular enlisted member eligible for
(2) has served on active duty or full-time
separation under that program shall—
National Guard duty or any combination of
(i) submit a request for separation under
active duty and full-time National Guard
duty for more than 6 years;
the program before the expiration of the
(3) has served on active duty or full-time
member's term of enlistment; or
National Guard duty or any combination of
(ii) upon discharge at the end of such
active duty and full-time National Guard
term, enter into a written agreement (purduty for not more than 20 years;
suant to regulations prescribed by the Sec(4) has served at least 5 years of continuous
retary concerned) not to request reenlistactive duty or full-time National Guard duty
ment in a regular component; and
or any combination of active duty and full(B) a member referred to in subsection
time National Guard duty immediately pre(d)(3) eligible for separation under that proceding the date of the member's separation
from active duty; and
gram shall submit a request for separation to
the Secretary concerned before the expira(5) meets such other requirements as the
tion of the member's established term of
Secretary may prescribe, which may include
active service.
requirements relating to—
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PROGRAMS.—The Secre-
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S r c l i o n 1.131 of this title, referred to in subsecs
( c ) ' l ) and (d)(1), was renumbered section 12731 of this
title and a m e n d e d generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A.
title XVI, § 1 6 6 2 ( j ) ( l ) . Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998.
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337
Chapter 67 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(1),
was transferred to part II of subtitle E of this title, renumbered as chapter 1223, and amended generally bv
Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI. $ 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5.
1994, 108 Stat. 2998. A new chapter 67 (§ 1331) of this
title was added by section 1662(i)(7) of Pub. L.
103-337.
PRIOR

PROVISIONS

A prior section 1407, added Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII,
§ 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100; a m e n d e d Pub.
L. 96-513, title I, § 113(c), title V. §§501(21), 511(53),
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925, related to determination of retired base pav, prior to repeal by
Pub. L. 99 348, § 104(b).
AMENDMENTS

1994-Subsec.
(c)(2)(B).
Pub.
L.
103-337,
§ 1662(j)(5)(A). which directed substitution of "chapter 1223" for "chapter 67", could not be e x e c u t e d because t h e words "chapter 67" did not appear subseq u e n t to a m e n d m e n t by Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2),
(4). S e e 1989 A m e n d m e n t note below.
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337, § 1662(j)(5)(B), which
directed a m e n d m e n t of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "section 12731" for "section 1331" in text, could not be executed because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by
Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). S e e 1989 A m e n d m e n t note
below.
1 9 8 9 - S u b s e c . (b). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(1), (b)(2),
substituted "person" for "member", " p e r s o n s " for
" m e m b e r s " , and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsection (c)".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (4), added
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to c o m p u t a t i o n of h i g h - t h r e e average.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(4), added
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (3). redesignated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck o u t former subsec.
(e) w h i c h related to special rules for short-term disability retirees.
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), struck
out subsec. (f) w h i c h related to special rule for members retiring w i t h non-regular service, and subsec. (g)
w h i c h defined t h e term "years of creditable service".
EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1994

AMENDMENT

A m e n d m e n t by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1,
1994, e x c e p t as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337, s e t out as an Effective D a t e n o t e
under section 10001 of this title.
S E C T I O N REFERRED TO I N O T H E R S E C T I O N S

T h i s section is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a,
3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334, 8991, 8992, 12739 of this
title; title 14 sections 357, 423, 424; title 33 section
853o; title 42 sections 211, 212.
§ 1408. P a y m e n t of retired or retainer pay in complia n c e with court orders

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term "court" means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of
any State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands;
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(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of
a foreign country with which the United
States has an agreement requiring the
United States to honor any court order of
such country.
(2) The term "court order" means a final
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation issued by a court, or a court
ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued
decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws
of the jurisdiction of that court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined
in section 462(b) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 662(c))); or
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property,
specifically provides for the payment of an
amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the
disposable retired pay of a member to the
spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree
from which no appeal may be taken or from
which no appeal has been taken within the
time allowed for taking such appeals under
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) The term "disposable retired pay"
means the total monthly retired pay to which
a member is entitled less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the
United States for previous overpayments of
retired pay and for recoupments required
by law resulting from entitlement to retired
pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of
such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a
result of a waiver of retired pay required by
law in order to receive compensation under
title 5 or title 38;
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are
equal to the amount of retired pay of the
member under that chapter computed using
the percentage of the member's disability
on the date when the member was retired
(or the date on which the member's name
was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to
whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to
a court order under this section.
(5) T h e term "member" includes a former
member entitled to retired pay under section
1331 » of this title.
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse"
means the husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who,
on or before t h e date of a court order, was
married to t h a t member.
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer
pay.
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—For

the

purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary
concerned designated for receipt of service
of court orders under regulations prescribed
pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent
has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by
certified or registered mail, return receipt
requested;
(B) t h e court order is regular on its face;
(C) t h e court order or other documents
served with t h e court order identify t h e
member concerned and include, if possible,
the social security number of such member;
and
(D) t h e court order or other documents
served with t h e court order certify t h a t t h e
rights of t h e member under t h e Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50
U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if t h e
order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
(C) includes nothing on its face t h a t provides reasonable notice t h a t it is issued
without authority of law.
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT T o TREAT RETIRED
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.—

(1) Subject to t h e limitations of this section, a
court may treat disposable retired pay payable
to a member for pay periods beginning after
June 25, 1981, either as property solely of t h e
member or as property of t h e member and his
spouse in accordance with the law of t h e jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to
divide or partition any amount of retired pay of
a member as t h e property of the member and
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident
to such decree) affecting t h e member and t h e
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was
issued before J u n e 25, 1981, and (B) did not
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any
amount of retired pay of t h e member as property of t h e member and t h e member's spouse or
former spouse.
1

See Reference in Tex I note below.
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(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, this section does not create any right, title,
or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by t h e Secretary concerned under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as t h e property of a member and t h e member's spouse under
this subsection may not be treated as amounts
received as retired pay for service in t h e uniformed services.
(3) This section does not authorize any court
to order a member to apply for retirement or
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate
any payment under this section.
(4) A court may not treat t h e disposable retired pay of a member in t h e m a n n e r described
in paragraph (1) unless t h e court has jurisdiction over t h e member by reason of (A) his residence, other t h a n because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of t h e court,
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of
t h e court, or (C) his consent to t h e jurisdiction
of the court.
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED T o
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective

service on t h e Secretary concerned of a court
order providing for t h e payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of
property, specifically providing for t h e payment of an amount of t h e disposable retired
pay from a member to t h e spouse or a former
spouse of t h e member, t h e Secretary shall
make payments (subject to t h e limitations of
this section) from t h e disposable retired pay of
t h e member to t h e spouse or former spouse in
an amount sufficient to satisfy t h e amount of
child support and alimony set forth in the
court order and, with respect to a division of
property, in the amount of disposable retired
pay specifically provided for in t h e court order.
In t h e case of a member entitled to receive retired pay on t h e date of the effective service of
the court order, such payments shall begin not
later t h a n 90 days after t h e date of effective
service. In the case of a member not entitled to
receive retired pay on t h e date of the effective
service of t h e court order, such payments shall
begin not later t h a n 90 days after t h e date on
which t h e member first becomes entitled to receive retired pay.
(2) If t h e spouse or former spouse to whom
payments are to be made under this section was
not married to t h e member for a period of 10
years or more during which t h e member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in
determining the member's eligibility for retired
pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent t h a t they include an amount
resulting from the t r e a t m e n t by t h e court
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of
t h e member as property of t h e member or
property of the member and his spouse.
(3) Payments under this section shall not be
made more frequently t h a n once each month,
and t h e Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement
cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a
court order.
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pav
of a member pursuant to this section shall t n
initiate in accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date
of the death of the member or the date of the
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom
payments are being made, whichever occurs
first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1)
provides for a division of property (including a
division of community property) in addition to
an amount of child support or alimony or the
payment of an amount of disposable retired
pay as the result of the court's treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of
the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of
this section) from the disposable retired pay of
the member to the spouse or fotmer spouse of
the member, any part of the amount payable to
the spouse or former spouse under the division
of property upon effective service of a final
court order of garnishment of such amount
from such retired pay.
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the
disposable retired pay of a member payable
under all court orders pursuant to subsection
(c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more
than one court order which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the
disposable retired pay of the member shall be
used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a firstcome, first-served basis. Such court orders shall
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired pay which remains after the satisfaction
of all court orders which have been previously
served.
OKA) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which
assert to direct that different amounts be paid
during a month to the same spouse or former
spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's
disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any
such conflicting court order, but not more
than the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of such
court orders based on when such court orders
were effectively served and the limitations of
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4);
(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired
pay that is equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest
amount required by any conflicting court
order to be paid to the spouse or former
spouse and the amount payable to the
spouse or former spouse under clause (i);
and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of any
conflicting court order based on when such
court order was effectively served and the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
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(iii) pay to that member the amount which
is equal to the amount of that member's disposable retired pay (less any amount paid
dining such month pursuant to legal process
served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid
dining such month pursuant to court orders
effectively served under this section, other
than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay
paid under clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
retained under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the
amount retained under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is
provided with a court order which has been certified bv the member and the spouse or former
spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained
amount in accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a
court order under this section and the service
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of
which provide for payments during a month
from the same member, satisfaction of such
court orders and legal process from the retired
pay of the member shall be on a first-come,
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which
are subject to such orders and legal process and
which remain available in accordance with the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph during such month after
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the total amount of the disposable retired
pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this
section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659) with respect to a member may not exceed
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay
payable to such member that is considered
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment
that is payable by the United States.
(5) A court order which itself or because of
previously served court orders provides for the
payment of an amount which exceeds the
amount of disposable retired pay available for
payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously
served court orders or legal process previously
served under section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an
amount that exceeds the maximum amount
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to
be irregular on its face solely for that reason.
However, such order shall be considered to be
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay
permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to relieve a member of liability for the payment
of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that
payments made out of disposable retired pay
under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other
than the means provided under this section in
any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (4) has been paid.
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF

UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any

officer or employee of the United States shall
not be liable with respect to any payment made
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is
regular on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i).
(2) An officer or employee of the United
States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to
interrogatories shall not be subject under any
law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any
disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) NOTICE To MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT
ORDER O N SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-

ceiving effective service of a court order under
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not
later than 30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of
such court order (together with a copy of such
order) to the member affected by the court
order at his last known address.
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS W H O ARE VICTIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO
RETIRED PAY.—(1) If, in the case of a member or

former member of the armed forces referred to
in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in
the manner applicable to a division of property)
for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that
member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such
court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or
former spouse.
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or
former member of the armed forces is eligible
to receive payment under this subsection if—
(A) the member or former member, while a
member of the armed forces and after becoming eligible to be retired from the armed
forces on the basis of years of service, has eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a
result of misconduct while a member involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as
defined in regulations prescribed by the Sec
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retary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard
when it is not operating as a service in the
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation);
and
(B) the spouse or former spouse—
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was
married to the member or former member
at the time of that abuse; or
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former
member who was the victim of the abuse.
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to
a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that
member or former member for the purposes of
this subsection.
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible
spouse or former spouse of a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil
action for the issuance of a court order in the
case of that member or former member, the
Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that
the member or former member would have
been entitled to receive as of the date of the
certification—
(A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and
(B) if, in the case of a member or former
member not in receipt of retired pay immediately before that termination of eligibility for
retired pay, the member or former member
had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility.
(5) A court order under this subsection may
provide that whenever retired pay is increased
under section 1401a of this title (or any other
provision of law), the amount payable under
the court order to the spouse or former spouse
of a member or former member described in
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same
time by the percent by which the retired pay of
the member or former member would have
been increased if the member or former
member were receiving retired pay.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2MA) shall
have no ownership interest in, or claim against,
any amount payable under this section to a
spouse or former spouse of the member or
former member.
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments
under this subsection with respect to a member
or former member referred to in paragraph
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin,
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive
further payments under this subsection shall
terminate on the date of such marriage.
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments
under this subsection that is terminated under
subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall
be resumed in the event of the termination of
that marriage by the death of that person's
spouse or by annulment or divorce. The re-
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first
day of the month in which that marriage is so
terminated. The monthly amount of the pay
ments shall be the amount that would have
been paid if the continuity of the payments
had not been interrupted by the marriage.
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title or, in the
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Transportation for
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard.
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member
or former member of the armed forces referred
to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this subsection, shall
be entitled to receive medical and dental care,
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a
former spouse of a retired member of the
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case
may be, of a retired member of the armed
forces in the same manner as if the member or
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A)
was entitled to retired pay.
(B) A dependent child of a member or former
member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) who
was a member of the household of the member
or former member at the time of the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use
commissary and exchange stores, and to have
other benefits provided to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same
manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay.
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible
or entitled to receive that benefit under another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law instead of this paragraph.
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the
case of a member of the armed forces who has
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a
punishment that will terminate the eligibility
of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary
concerned, be considered terminated effective
upon the approval of that sentence by the
person acting under section 860(c) of this title
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).
(B) If each form of the punishment that
would result in the termination of eligibility to
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside,
or mitigated to a punishment that does not
result in the termination of that eligibility, a
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient
under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month foli™irincy thp month in which the Secretary con-
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cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in
writing that payment of the benefits will cease.
The recipient may not be required to repay the
benefits received before that effective date
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any
amount that was erroneous when paid).
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent
child", with respect to a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate child, including an adopted child or a
stepchild of the member or former member,
who—
(A) is under 18 years of age;
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a
mental or physical incapacity that existed
before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member
for over one-half of the child's support; or
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study
in an institution of higher education recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23
years of age and is dependent on the member
or former member for over one-half of the
child's support.
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section.
(Added Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(a), Sept.
8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730; amended Pub. L. 98-525,
title VI, §643(a)-(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat.
2547; Pub. L. 99-661, div. A, title VI, § 644(a),
Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3887; Pub. L. 100-26,
§§ 3(3), 7(h)(1), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, 282;
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title VI, § 653(a)(5), title
XVI, § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1462,
1605; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title V,
§ 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1569,
1570; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X,
§ 1061(a)(7), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472; Pub. L.
102-484, div. A, title VI, § 653(a), Oct. 23, 1992,
106 Stat. 2426; Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V,
§ 555(a), (b), title XI, § 1182(a)(2), Nov. 30, 1993,
107 Stat. 1666, 1771.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec.
(a)(5), was renumbered section 12731 of this title and
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title
XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998, 2999. A
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(j)(7) of
Pub. L. 103-337.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, referred
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D), is act Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54
Stat. 1178, as amended, which is classified to section
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and National Defense. For complete classification of this Act
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title
50 and Tables.
AMENDMENTS

1993—Subsecs. (b)(1)(A), (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 103-160,
§ 1182(a)(2)(A), substituted "subsection (i)" for "subsection (h)".
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(1), inserted "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation" after "Secretary of Defense".
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160, § 1182(a)(2)(B),
inserted "of" after "of that termination".
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Subsec. (h)(8). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(2), inserted
before period at end "or, in the case of the Coast
Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department
of Transportation for payment of retired pay for the
Coast Guard".
Subsec. (h)(10), (11). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(a), added
par. (10) and redesignated former par. (10) as (11).
1992—Subsecs. (h), (i). Pub. L. 102-484 added subsec.
(h) and redesignated former subsec. (h) as (i).
1991—Pub. L. 102-190 inserted "or retainer" after
"retired" in section catchline.
1990—Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" in section
catchline.
Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(1), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" wherever appearing.
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" wherever
appearing in introductory provisions and in subpar.
(D).
Subsec. (a)(4)(A). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(1), inserted before semicolon at end "for previous overpayments of retired pay and for recoupments required by
law resulting from entitlement to retired pay".
Subsec. (a)(4)(B). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(2), added
subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which
read as follows: "are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or retainer pay of such
member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by
courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and
amounts waived in order to receive compensation
under title 5 or title 38;".
Subsec. (a)(4)(C) to (F). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(3),
(4), redesignated subpars. (E) and (F) as (C) and (D),
respectively, and struck out former subpars. (C) and
(D) which read as follows:
"(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or
local income tax purposes, if the withholding of such
amounts is authorized or required by law and to the
extent such amounts withheld are not greater than
would be authorized if such member claimed all dependents to which he was entitled:
"(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 if such member presents
evidence of a tax obligation which supports such withholding;".
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(1), added par.
(7).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(2), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(3), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay".
Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(a), inserted at end "A court
may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of
a member as the property of the member and the
member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation
(including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such decree) affecting the
member and the member's spouse or former spouse
(A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of
retired pay of the member as property of the member
and the member's spouse or former spouse."
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(c), inserted at
end "Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect
to a division of retired pay as the property of a
member and the member's spouse under this subsection may not be treated as amounts received as retired
pay for service in the uniformed services."
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(4), inserted
heading.
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Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay"
for "retired or retainer pay" wherever appearing.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(5), inserted
heading.
Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay"
for "retired or retainer pay" wherever appearing.
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(d)(1), substituted "payable under all court orders pursuant to subsection (c)" for "payable under subsection (d)".
Subsec. (e)(4)(B). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(d)(2), substituted "the amount of the retired pay payable to such
member that is considered under section 462 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration
for employment that is payable by the United States"
for "the disposable retired or retainer pay payable to
such member".
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(6), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(7), inserted
heading.
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(8), inserted
heading.
1989—Subsec.
(a)(1), (2). Pub. L.
101-189,
§ 1622(e)(6), substituted "The term court" for
" 'Court" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substituted "The term final" for " 'Final".
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substituted "The term disposable" for " 'Disposable" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(4)(D). Pub. L. 101-189, § 653(a)(5)(A),
struck out "(26 U.S.C. 3402(D)" after "Code of 1986".
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 101-189, §§ 653(a)(5)(B),
1622(e)(6), substituted "The term member" for
" 'Member" and inserted "entitled to retired pay under
section 1331 of this title" after "a former member".
Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substituted "The term 'spouse" for " 'Spouse".
1987—Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 100-26, §3(3), made
technical amendment to directory language of Pub. L.
99-661, § 644(a). See 1986 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (a)(4)(D). Pub. L. 100-26, § 7(h)(1), substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue Code of 1954".
1986—Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 99-661, § 644(a), as
amended by Pub. L. 100-26, §3(3), struck out "(other
than the retired pay of a member retired for disability
under chapter 61 of this title)" before "less amounts"
in introductory text, added subpar. (E), and struck out
former subpar. (E) which read as follows: "are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage);
or".
1984—Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(a), inserted "in the case of a division of property,".
Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(b), inserted
", if possible,".
Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(c)(1), substituted
"After effective service on the Secretary concerned of
a court order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay from
a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the
member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject
to the limitations of this section) from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or
former spouse in an amount sufficient to satisfy the
amount of child support and alimony set forth in the
court order and, with respect to a division of property,
in the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay
specifically provided for in the court order" for "After
effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court
order with respect to the payment of a portion of the
retired or retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a
former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall,
subject to the limitations of this section, make pay-
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m e n t s to t h e spouse or f o i m n spouse in t h e amount
of t h e disposable retired or ietainei pay of the
m e m b e r specifically provided for in the court order".
Subsec. (d)(5). Pub. L. 98-525, $ 643(c)(2). substituted
"child support or alimony or t h e p a y m e n t of an
a m o u n t of disposable retired or retainer pay as t h e
result of t h e c o u r t s treatment of s u c h pay under subsection (c) as property of t h e m e m b e r and his spouse,
t h e Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to t h e limitations of this section) from t h e disposable retired or
retainer pay of t h e member to t h e spouse or former
s p o u s e of t h e member, any part" for "disposable retired or retainer pay, t h e Secretary concerned shall,
subject to t h e limitations of this section, pay to t h e
spouse or former spouse of t h e member, from t h e disposable retired or retainer pay of t h e member, any
part".
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L 98-525, § 643(d)(1), substituted
", t h e disposable retired or retainer pay of t h e
member" for "from t h e disposable retired or retainer
pay of a member, such pay" before "shall be used to
satisfy".
Subsec. (e)(3)(A). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(A),
struck out "from t h e disposable retired or retainer
pay" before "of t h e s a m e member".
Subsec. (e)(3)(A)(i). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(B),
substituted "from t h e member's disposable retired or
retainer pay t h e least a m o u n t " for "the least amount
of disposable retired or retainer pay" before "directed
to be paid".
Subsec. (e)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(C),
struck out "of retired or retainer pay" before "required by any conflicting".
Subsec. (e)(4)(A). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(3), struck
o u t "the retired or retainer pay of" before "the s a m e
m e m b e r " and substituted "satisfaction of such court
orders and legal process from t h e retired or retainer
pay of t h e m e m b e r s shall be" for "such court orders
and legal process shall be satisfied".
Subsec. (e)(5). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(4), struck out
"of disposable retired or retainer pay" after "payment
of an a m o u n t " in two places and substituted "disposable retired or retainer pay" for "such pay" before
"available for payment".
EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1993

AMENDMENT

S e c t i o n 555(c) of Pub. L. 103-160 provided that:
" T h e a m e n d m e n t s made by this section [amending
t h i s s e c t i o n ] shall take effect as of October 23, 1992,
and shall apply as if t h e provisions of t h e paragraph
(10) of s e c t i o n 1408(h) of title 10, United S t a t e s Code,
added by s u c h subsection were included in t h e amendm e n t m a d e by section 653(a)(2) of Public Law 102-484
(106 S t a t . 2426) [amending this s e c t i o n ] . "
EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1990

AMENDMENT

S e c t i o n 555(e) of Pub. L. 101-510, as a m e n d e d by
Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X, § 1062(a)(1), Dec. 5,
1991, 105 S t a t . 1475, provided that:
"(1) T h e a m e n d m e n t made by subsection (a)
[ a m e n d i n g this s e c t i o n ] shall apply with respect to
j u d g m e n t s issued before, on, or after t h e date of t h e
e n a c t m e n t of t h i s Act [Nov. 5, 1990]. In t h e case of a
j u d g m e n t issued before t h e date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of
this Act, s u c h a m e n d m e n t shall not relieve any obligation, o t h e r w i s e valid, to m a k e a p a y m e n t t h a t is due to
be m a d e before t h e end of t h e two-year period beginn i n g o n t h e date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of this Act.
"(2) T h e a m e n d m e n t s m a d e by subsections (b), (c),
and (d) [ a m e n d i n g this s e c t i o n ] apply w i t h only respect to divorces, dissolutions of marriage, annulm e n t s , and legal separations t h a t become effective
after t h e end of t h e 90-day period beginning on t h e
date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of this Act."
EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1987

AMENDMENT

A m e n d m e n t by section 3(3) of Pub. L. 100-26 applicable as if included in Pub. L. 99-661 w h e n enacted on
Nov. 14, 1986, see section 12(a) of Pub. L. 100-26, set
o u t as a n o t e under section 776 of this title.

EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1986

AMENDMENT

Section 644(b) of Pub. L. 99-661 provided that: "The
a m e n d m e n t s made by subsection (a) [amending this
s e c t i o n ] shall apply with respect to court orders issued
after t h e date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of this Act [Nov. 14,
1986]."
EFFECTIVE D A T E OF 1984

AMENDMENT

Section 643(e) of Pub. L. 98-525 provided that: "The
a m e n d m e n t s made by this section [amending this sect i o n ] shall apply with respect to court orders for
which effective service (as described in section
1408(b)(1) of title 10, United S t a t e s Code, as amended
by subsection (b) of this section) is made on or after
t h e date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of this Act [Oct. 19, 1984]."
EFFECTIVE DATE: T R A N S I T I O N

PROVISIONS

Section 1006 of title X of Pub. L. 97-252, as amended
by Pub. L. 98-94, title IX. § 941(c)(4), Sept. 24, 1983, 97
Stat. 654; Pub. L. 98-525, title VI, § 645(b), Oct. 19,
1984, 98 Stat. 2549, provided that:
"(a) T h e a m e n d m e n t s made by this title [amending
this section and sections 1072, 1076, 1086, 1447. 1448,
and 1450 of this title and enacting provisions set out as
notes under this section and section 1408 of this title]
shall take effect on t h e first day of t h e first m o n t h
[February 1983] w h i c h begins more t h a n one hundred
and twenty days after t h e date of t h e e n a c t m e n t of
this title [Sept. 8, 1982].
"(b) S u b s e c t i o n (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United
S t a t e s Code, as added by section 1002(a), shall apply
only with respect to p a y m e n t s of retired or retainer
pay for periods beginning on or after t h e effective
date of this title [Feb. 1. 1983, provided in subsec. ( a ) ] ,
but without regard to t h e date of any court order.
However, in t h e case of a court order t h a t became
final before J u n e 26, 1981, p a y m e n t s under such subsection m a y only be made in accordance with such
order as in effect on such date and w i t h o u t regard to
any s u b s e q u e n t modifications.
"(c) T h e a m e n d m e n t s made by section 1003 of this
title [amending sections 1447, 1448, and 1450 of this
title] shall apply to persons w h o become eligible to
participate in t h e Survivor Benefit P l a n provided for
in subchapter II of c h a p t e r 73 of title 10, United
S t a t e s Code [section 1447 et seq. of this t i t l e ] , before,
on, or after t h e effective date of such a m e n d m e n t s .
"(d) T h e a m e n d m e n t s made by section 1004 of this
title [amending sections 1072, 1076, and 1086 of this
title] and t h e provisions of section 1005 of this title
[set out as a n o t e under this s e c t i o n ] shall apply in t h e
case of any former spouse of a member or former
m e m b e r of t h e uniformed services w h e t h e r t h e final
decree of divorce, dissolution, or a n n u l m e n t of t h e
marriage of t h e former spouse and s u c h m e m b e r or
former m e m b e r is dated before, on, or after February
1, 1983.
"(e) For t h e purposes of this section—
"(1) t h e term 'court order' has t h e s a m e m e a n i n g
as provided in section 1408(a)(2) of title 10, United
S t a t e s Code (as added by section 1002 of t h i s title);
"(2) t h e term 'former spouse' h a s t h e s a m e meaning as provided in section 1408(a)(6) of s u c h title (as
added by section 1002 of this title); and
"(3) t h e term 'uniformed services' has t h e same
m e a n i n g as provided in section 1072 of title 10,
United S t a t e s Code."
T E R M I N A T I O N OF T R U S T TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC
ISLANDS

For termination of Trust Territory of t h e Pacific Islands, see n o t e set out preceding section 1681 of Title
48, Territories and Insular Possessions.
ACCRUAL OF P A Y M E N T S ; PROSPECTIVE APPLICABILITY

Section 653(c) of Pub. L. 102-484 provided that: "No
p a y m e n t s under subsection ( h ) of section 1408 of title
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10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)),
shall accrue for periods before the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 23, 1992]."
STUDY CONCERNING BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO
ARE VICTIMS OF ABUSE

Section 653(e) of Pub. L. 102-484 provided that:
"(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study
in order to estimate—
"(A) the number of persons who will become eligible to receive payments under subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 10, United States Code (as added by
subsection (a)), during each of fiscal years 1993
through 2000; and
"(B) for each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the
number of members of the Armed Forces who, after
having completed at least one, and less than 20,
years of service in that fiscal year, will be approved
in that fiscal year for separation from the Armed
Forces as a result of having abused a spouse or dependent child.
"(2) The study shall include a thorough analysis of—
"(A) the effects, if any, of appeals and requests for
clemency in the case of court-martial convictions on
the entitlement to payments in accordance with subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 10, United States
Code (as added by subsection (a));
"(B) the socio-economic effects on the dependents
of members of the Armed Forces described in subsection (h)(2) of such section that result from terminations of the eligibility of such members to receive
retired or retainer pay; and
"(C) the effects of separations of such members
from the Armed Forces on the mission readiness of
the units of assignment of such members when separated and on the Armed Forces in general.
"(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 23, 1992], the Secretary shall
submit to Congress a report on the results of the
study."
COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES

Section 1005 of Pub. L. 97-252, which directed Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations to provide
that an unremarried former spouse described in 10
U.S.C. 1072(2)(F)(i) is entitled to commissary and post
exchange privileges to the same extent and on the
same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired member
of the uniformed services, was repealed and restated
in section 1062 of this title by Pub. L. 100-370,
§ 1(c)(1), (5).
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1059, 1078a,
1447, 1461, 1463 of this title.
§1409. Retired pay multiplier
(a)

RETIRED

§1110

TITLE 10-ARMED FORCES

P A Y MULTIPLIER

FOR REGULAR-

SERVICE NONDISABILITY RETIREMENT.—In com-

puting—
(1) t h e retired pay of a m e m b e r of a uniformed service who is entitled to t h a t pay
under any provision of law o t h e r than—
(A) c h a p t e r 61 of t h i s title (relating to ret i r e m e n t or separation for physical disability); or
(B) c h a p t e r 1223 of this title (relating to
r e t i r e m e n t for non-regular service); or
(2) t h e r e t a i n e r pay of a member who is
transferred to t h e Fleet Reserve or t h e Fleet
Marine Corps Reserve under section 6330 of
this title,
t h e retired pay multiplier (or retainer pay multiplier) is t h e percentage determined under subsection (b).

(b) PERCENTAGE.—

(1) GENERAL RULE.—Subject to p a r a g r a p h s
(2) and (3), t h e percentage to be used u n d e r
subsection (a) is t h e product (stated as a percentage) of—
(A) 2V2, a n d
(B) t h e member's years of creditable service (as defined in subsection (c)).
(2)

REDUCTION

APPLICABLE

TO NEW-RETIRE-

MENT MEMBERS WITH LESS THAN 30 YEARS OF
SERVICE.—In t h e case of a m e m b e r who first
became a m e m b e r of a uniformed service
after J u l y 31, 1986, has less t h a n 30 years of
creditable service, and is under t h e age of 62
a t t h e time of retirement, t h e percentage determined under p a r a g r a p h (1) shall be reduced by—
(A) 1 percentage point for each full year
t h a t t h e member's years of creditable service are less t h a n 30; and
(B) Vi2 of 1 percentage point for each
m o n t h by which t h e member's years of
creditable service (after counting all full
years of such service) are less t h a n a full
year.
(3) 75 PERCENT LIMIT.—In t h e case of a
m e m b e r with more t h a n 30 years of creditable service, t h e percentage to be used u n d e r
subsection (a) is 75 percent.
(c) YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE DEFINED.—In

t h i s section, t h e t e r m "years of creditable service" m e a n s t h e n u m b e r of years of service creditable to a member in computing t h e m e m b e r ' s
retired or r e t a i n e r pay (including Vi* of a year
for each full m o n t h of service t h a t is in addition to t h e n u m b e r of full years of service of
t h e member).
(Added P u b . L. 99-348, title I, § 101, J u l y 1,
1986, 100 S t a t . 683; amended P u b . L. 101-189,
div. A, title VI, § 651(b)(3), Nov. 29, 1989, 103
S t a t . 1460; P u b . L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI,
§ 1662(j)(6), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 S t a t . 3005.)
AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 103-337 substituted
"chapter 1223" for "chapter 67".
1989—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101-189 substituted
"who is entitled to that pay" for "who is retired" in introductory provisions.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. h. 103-337 effective Dec. 1,
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note
under section 10001 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a,
1410, 1447, 1451, 1452, 3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334,
8991, 8992 of this title; title 14 section 423; title 33 section 853o; title 42 sections 211, 212.
§1410. Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62
for members entering on or after August 1, 1986
In t h e case of a member or former m e m b e r
who first became a member of a uniformed
service on or after August 1, 1986, and who becomes entitled to retired pay before t h e age of
62, t h e retired pay of such member or former
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great bodily injury), but remand the case
for resentencing on count VL23
PAULINE DAVIS HANSON,
P.J., and HAMLIN, J., concur.
(o

Acting
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In re MARRIAGE of Patricia A. and
Michael A. KUZMIAK.
|jj52Patricia A.,KUZMIAK, Respondent
and Appellant,
v.
Michael A. KUZMIAK, Petitioner
and Respondent
Civ. B003410.
Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 6.
Jan. 27, 1986.
Certified for Partial Publication *
Review Denied May 22, 1986.**
Wife filed for divorce. The Superior
Court, Santa Barbara County, Zel Canter,
J., entered final judgment dissolving marriage and decided property division two and
one-half years later. On appeal the Court
of Appeal, Gilbert, J., held that: (1) separation pay as a severance benefit upon involuntary discharge from military is separate
property of the service member, and (2)
wife whose husband received separation
pay upon involuntary discharge from military had present community property interest in husband's nonmatured longevity pension including the separation pay after husband reenlisted.
Reversed and remanded.
23. As to count VI, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of one-third of the middle term of
three years, namely, one year. Count II was
used as the base term.

176 CaI.App.3d 1151

1. Divorce <3=>252.3(4)
Separation pay as a severance benefit
upon involuntary discharge from military
under 10 U.S.C.A. § 1174 is not disposable
retired or retainer pay under Federal Uniformed Service Former Spouse's Protection
Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1), permitting
state court to treat disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to member either as
property solely of member or as property
of member and his spouse and is separate
property of the military service member,
where unlike military benefits based upon
longevity of service separation pay does
not serve to compensate for past service
but right to separation pay occurs only
when there is involuntary discharge of service member.
2. Husband and Wife <3=>249(3)
Wife whose husband received separation pay as a severance benefit upon involuntary discharge from military under 10
U.S.C.A. § 1174 had present community
property interest in husband's nonmatured
longevity pension including the separation
pay after husband reenlisted, since 10 U.S.
C.A. § 1174(h)(1) compels reimbursement
of separation pay from the service member's retirement benefits and hence purposes of separation pay to ease service
member's reentry into civilian life have not
been fulfilled.

j^i 54 Rodney S. Melville, Melville & Iwasko, Santa Maria, and Robert O. Angle, Santa Barbara, for respondent and appellant
Charles G. Ward, Lompoc, for petitioner
and respondent.
GILBERT, Associate Justice.
Husband Michael A. Kuzmiak appeals
the order of the trial court finding that the
division of his Air Force separation pay is
* Pursuant to Rule 976.1 of the California Rules of
Court this opinion is certified for partial publication.
** Reynoso, J., is of the opinion the petition
should be granted.
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community property. (10 U.S.C. § 1174.)l
We reverse the order and hold that although the trial court had jurisdiction to
divide the assets of the marriage, husband's military separation pay is his separate property unless he applies for military
longevity retirement.
FACTS
Husband enlisted in the United States
Air Force in New Jersey on May 6, 1966.
He married Patricia A. Kuzmiak four
months later. The parties moved under
military orders to Texas the day of their
marriage. The Air Force later assigned
husband to duty in New York, Ndrth Dakota and fjnally,n55 California. The couple
arrived in Lompoc, California in 1975 and
lived together there for five years until
wife filed for divorce on June 9, 1980. The
trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage on May 21, 1981, and
decided property division two and one half
years later.2

policy. (§ 632.)^ Husband was then entitledTxP'separation pay," calculated in part
on the number of years he served and his
annual salary. (§§ 642, 1174.) (The separation award formula is ten percent of
twelve times the member's monthly basic
pay times his years of active service, with a
cap of $30,000. (§ 1174, subd. (d)(1).)4)
Husband, a captain with sixteen years of
military service, received the maximum
award of $30,000. At the time of husband's release from duty, he was not entitled to longevity retirement benefits because he had not completed twenty years
of serviceI_(§ 3911.)

On February 28, 1983, between the time
of the final judgment dissolving the marriage and the trial of the property issues,
the Air Force released husband from his
command under the military's "up or out"

Three or four days after his release, husband reenlisted in the Air Force. He will
become entitled to longevity retirement
benefits once he achieves twenty years of
military service. (§ 3911.) However, the
government will deduct the $30,000 separation pay from the retirement benefits husband will receive. (§ 1174, subd. (h)(1).)5
As husband explained at trial, "[W]hen I
gothi56kicked out of the service, the option
that they present to you, if you choose to
stay in the service and you do get to retirement and you have collected this money,
you must give it back
I will start

1. All statutory references are to title 10 of the
United States Code unless otherwise stated.

be an involuntary retirement or discharge for
purposes of any other provision of law."

2. Trial on the property issues occurred after the
Unilted States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct.
2723, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 and after the enactment of
the Federal Uniformed Services Former
Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA). (§ 1408,
enacted September 8, 1982.)

4. Subdivision (d) of section 1174 provides:
'The amount of separation pay which may be
paid to a member under this section is—
(1) 10 percent of the product of (A) his years
of active service, and (B) 12 times the monthly
basic pay to which he was entitled at the time of
his discharge or release from active duty or
$30,000, whichever is less; . . . "

\. Section 632 provides in part:
"(a) [E]ach officer . . . who holds the regular
grade of captain or major . . . who has failed of
selection for promotion to the next higher regular grade for the second time and whose name
is not on a list of officers recommended for
promotion to the next higher regular grade shall
(1) be discharged on the date requested by him
and approved by the Secretary concerned,
which date shall be not later than the first day
of the seventh calendar month beginning after
the month in which the President approves the
report of the board which considered him for
the second time; . . .
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer
pursuant to this section shall be considered to

5. Subdivision (h)(1) of section 1174 provides:
"A member who has received separation pay
under this section, or separation pay, severance
pay, or readjustment pay undtr any other provision of law, based on service in the armed
forces, and who later qualifies for retired or
retainer pay under this title or title 14 shall have
deducted from each payment of such retired or
retainer pay so much of such pay as is based on
the service for which he received separation pay
under this section or separation pay, severance
pay, or readjustment pay under any other provision of law until the total amount deducted is
equal to the total amount of separation pay,
severance pay, and readjustment pay received."
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collecting retirement when the $30,000 is
paid back."
The trial judge divided the $30,000 as a
community retirement benefit or payment
in lieu of retirement.
On appeal husband contends that his military separation pay is his separate property under McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453
U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589,
and the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA)
(§ 1408) and that by analogy, California
courts have found layoff and termination
benefits to be the separate property of the
receiving spouse.
DISCUSSION
Separation Pay
For many years under California law, a
spouse had a community property interest
in retirement benefits earned by the other
spouse from employment during the marriage. In 1981 McCarty v. McCarty, supra, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69
L.Ed.2d 589, held that a state may not
divide military longevity retired pay incident to a divorce absent a federal statute
permitting such action. The United States
Supreme Court examined the military retirement scheme and concluded that application of state community property laws
conflicted with that scheme because Congress intended retired pay to be a personal
entitlement of the service member.
(McCarty, supra, at pp. 223, 232-236, 101
S.Ct. at pp. 2736, 2741-2743.) Thus, the
court impliedly overruled California decisions as contrary to congressional intent.
In direct response to McCarty, Congress
enacted the Federal Uniformed Services
Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA). (§ 1408; House Conference Report
No. 97-749, 1982 U.S. Code Congressional
& Admin. News, pp. 1555, 1570.) FUSFSPA, however, does not permit the states
unlimited powers over military retirement
benefits.
For example, a nonmember
spouse may not sell or assign his or her
interest. (Subd. (c)(2).) The parties must
have been jj^i57married 10 years (subd.
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(d)(2)) tand payments to the nonmember
spouse may not exceed 50 percent of the
member's disposable pay (subd. (e)(1)). (hi
re Marriage o/Costo (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d
781, 786-787, 203 Cal.Rptr. 85.) Moreover,
subdivision (c)(1) of FUSFSPA permits a
state court to "treat disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to a member for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as
property of the member and his
spouse
" (Emphasis added.)
Although separation pay is calculated in
a fashion similar to retired pay (§ 1401), we
think it is not embraced within the meaning
of "disposable retired or retainer pay" under FUSFSPA. Subdivision (a)(4) defines
retired or retainer pay as a "monthly" payment; husband's separation pay here was a
one-time payment. Moreover, section 1174
describes the severance benefit upon involuntary discharge as "separation pay."
FUSFSPA does not mention separation pay
in defining retired or retainer pay.
Furthermore, unlike military benefits
based upon longevity of service, separation
pay does not serve to compensate for past
services. Although longevity of service determines the amount of this one-time payment, the right to separation pay occurs
only when there is an involuntary discharge of the service member. The legislative history'of section 1174, awarding separation pay upon involuntary discharge,
states that the purpose of the payment is
to financially assist the member during the
transition period until he or she obtains
private employment: "The separation pay
is a contingency payment for an officer
who is career committed but to whom a full
military career may be denied. It is designed to encourage him to pursue his service ambition, knowing that if he is denied
a full career under the competitive system,
he can count on an adequate readjustment
pay to ease his reentry into civilian life."
(House Rep. No. 96-1462, reprinted in 1980
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. pp. 6333,
6361.)
If a marriage subsists at the time the
service member is involuntarily discharged,
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the loss of employment becomes a community loss and separation pay serves to ameliorate this loss. If the service member is
not married at the time of discharge, however, the adjustment to civilian life is his
alone to make. Accordingly, the separation pay should be his separate property.
We have located but one reported decision analyzing the community or separate
property characteristics of separation pay.
In Perez v. Perez (Tex.1979) 587 S.W.2d
(171, the military released the husband from
duty under circumstances entitling him to
separation pay. Despite their divorce seven years earlier, wife sued for a portion of
the payment, contending it was »a retirement benefit acquired during ihe marriage.
The Texas Supreme |1158CoUrt concluded
the purpose of the payment was to assist
the service member in adjusting to civilian
life, and the payment was not recompense
for past services. (Perez, supra, at p. 673.)
The court also held that application of community property principles to the payment
would defeat federal objectives. (Ibid.)
The court expressly declined to rule, however, whether wife was entitled to any retirement benefits if husband reenlisted and
served until retirement. (Ibid. )
In similar cases, California courts have
analyzed the purposes of "termination" or
"layoff benefits in determining their separate property or community character. In
re Marriage of Skaden (1977) 19 Cal.3d
679, 139 Cal.Rptr. 615, 566 P.2d 249, concerned termination benefits consisting of a
percentage of insurance premiums collected on insurance policies placed by a former
insurance agent. Our Supreme Court concluded that the language of the employment contract indicated that the commissions were community property because
they were deferred compensation for the
agent's previous endeavors. (Skaden, supra, at pp. 687-688, 139 Cal.Rptr. 615, 566
P.2d 249.)
In In re Marriage of Wright (1983) 140
Cal.App.3d 342, 189 Cal.Rptr. 336, an assistant hospital administrator received termination pay when he resigned his position.
Wright's employer testified that the pay-
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ment was made in recognition that Wright
would encounter difficulties in securing future employment as a hospital administrator. (Id., p. 343, 189 Cal.Rptr. 336.) Since
the payment was made after the parties
separated, the court held the payment was
separate property. (Id., p. 345, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 336.)
In re Marriage of Flockhart (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 240, 173 Cal.Rptr. 818, concerned a "weekly layoff benefit'' paid to
displaced timber employees when the
government expanded Redwood National
Park. The court analogized the federal
layoff benefit to disability benefits and recognized that both compensate the recipient
for loss of future earnings occasioned by
layoff or disability. (Flockhart, supra, at
p. 243, 173 Cal.Rptr. 818.) The court then
denied wife any community interest in the
layoff benefits because they did not compensate husband for employment during
marriage. (Ibid. )
[1] We are satisfied that Congress did
not intend separation pay to be compensation for past services, and that under the
reasoning of Flockhart and the California
disability benefits decisions (In re Marriage of Stenquist, (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779,
787, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96), the payment is the separate property of the service
member. Furthermore, FUSFSPA does
not discuss court division of separation pay
incident to divorce. This would end the
matter if it were not for subdivision (h)(1)
of section 1174 (fn. 5, supra), permitting
the government to deduct separation pay
from a service member's longevity retirement benefits as they are received.
| U 5 9 If a member reenlists after involuntary discharge and subsequently receives a
longevity pension after serving 20 years,
the purposes of the separation pay have
not been fulfilled. Subdivision (h)(1) of section 1174 recognizes this by compelling reimbursement of separation pay from the
member's retirement payments. There is
no reason for finding separation pay to be
the member's separate property once the
member reenlists and earns a longevity
pension.
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Therefore we conclude, wife presently
has an interest in husband's nonmatured
longevity pension, (hi re Marriage of
Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 842, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Husband's application for a longevity retirement pension
and the government's withholding of $30,000 from this retirement pay deprives wife
of her community property interest in
these funds. Our Supreme Court has held,
that when a husband who is a service member elects to take a disability pension over
a longevity pension, he cannot defeat the
community property interests of his wife
by unilaterally transmuting community
property infco separate property, (hi re
MarriaXje of Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d
779, 782, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96.
Such an election is inconsistent with "the
protective philosophy of the community
property law." (Ibid.) We think this reasoning pertains here.
Although McCarty v. McCarty, supra,
appears inconsistent with In re Marriage
of Stenquist, supra, the reasoning of Stenquist is still vital. Our Supreme Court
recently affirmed and applied the Stenquist reasoning to private disability insurance proceeds purchased with community
funds in In re Marriage of Saslow (1985)
40 Cal.3d 848, 221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d
346. The court declared that " . . . disability benefits have been denominated community property to the extent that they equal
the benefits foregone under a retirement
pension. (Ibid.)
We also note that McCarty technically
did not discuss an election of one form of
benefit over another. (In re Marriage of
Mastropaolo (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 953,
959, 213 Cal.Rptr. 26.) Moreover, within
months of McCarty, Congress enacted
FUSFSPA with the manifest purpose of
nullifying McCarty. (Id., at p. 960, 213
Cal.Rptr. 26.)
[2] For these reasons, we conclude that
wife has a community property interest in
husband's longevity pension, including the
$30,000 separation pay the government will
withhold from his retirement benefits.
This holding recognizes the separate prop-
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erty characteristic of the separation pay
(until husband's actions ir\ reenlisting and
earning a- longevity pension) and also protects wife's rights to a community property
asset. Moreover, our holding does not
frustrate congressional intent that separation pay ease the service member's reentry
into civilian life.
ln60The proper division of husband's longevity retirement benefits remains within
the trial court's discretion. The parties
may reach a reasonable agreement concerning division of the benefits. (In re
Marriage of Gillmore (1981) 29 Cal.3d 418,
428, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 629 P.2d 1.) If not,
the trial judge may divide the benefits according to any of the methods described by
our Supreme Court in Gillmore, pp. 428429, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 629 P.2d 1, or Skaden, supra, 19 Cal.3d 679, 688-689, 139
Cal.Rptr. 615, 566 P.2d 249.
Accordingly, the order is reversed and
the case remanded for a new hearing.
Each party to bear own costs on appeal.
STONE, P.J., and ABBE, J., concur.
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| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

176 Cal.App.3d 1161
_jj^i6iln re Christopher FALCO on
Habeas Corpus.
In re Roy E. SMITH on
Habeas Corpus.
In re Michael PUNZAL on
Habeas Corpus.
In re Andrea BOWEN on
Habeas Corpus.
AO 32559, AO 32627, AO 32684
and AO 32751.
Court of Appeal, First District,
Division 1.
Jan. 28, 1986.
Petitioners, after criminal convictions,
filed petition for writs of habeas corpus,
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IN THE TEIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

Q.\5>ioo

MARION MARSH,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 894901070DA
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Judge Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
* * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for Hearing on August 16, 1989 before
the Honorable

Raymond

above-entitled Court.

S. Uno, one of the Judges of the

Plaintiff was present and represented by

her attorney, Mark C. McLachlan, and Defendant was not present or
represented by counsel; and the parties having entered into a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement; and the Court
having approved the Stipulation as reasonable; that the Defendant
having consented, among other things, that his Answer be stricken
and that his default be entered; and pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the Stipulation of the parties, the default of
the Defendant was duly entered, and the Plaintiff having been
sworn and testified

in her own behalf, and the Court having

reviewed

the files herein and the pleadings contained

therein;

and based upon the Motion of Plaintifffs counsel, and more than
ninety (90) days having elapsed since the filing of the Complaint
in this action; the Court, being fully advised
and having heretofore made and entered

in the premises,

its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, now, therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff

is hereby granted

a Decree

of

Divorce,

dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon
being

signed

by the Judge

and entered

by

the Clerk

in the

Register of Actions.
2.

That Plaintiff

and Defendant are hereby awarded the

joint legal custody and control of the minor children of the
parties, to wit:

Bryana Marsh, age

5; Ana Maia Marsh, age

10; Christopher Marsh, age 12; and Stephen Marsh, age 14; subject
to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth:
(a)

The primary physical residence of the children

shall be the residence of Marion Marsh.
(b)
primary

The primary care taker of the children

and

the

legal residence of the children shall be with Marion

Marsh.
(c)
exchange

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to

information

concerning
- 2 -

the health, education,

and

welfare of the children and, where possible, confer before making
decisions concerning any of these areas.
(d)

It is ordered

that the rights and duties of each

parent regarding the children's present and future physical care,
religious training, support, and education shall be made jointly
by

the

parties

however,

except

as

if the parties

specifically

are unable

provided

for

to agree on an

herein;

issue, after

conferring with a mutually-agreeable third party, the decision of
Marion Marsh shall be controlling.
(e)

It is ordered

that at all times during the school

year, the children shall reside with Marion Marsh, except as the
parties may mutually otherwise agree in writing.
(f)
full cost

The

Defendant

of lodging, meals

is

and

hereby

ordered

transportation

to

for

pay

the

transporting

the children between Plaintiff's and Defendant's residences.
(g)
children
time
his

party

to reside with

while
or

Each

her

attending

not

Scott Marsh

attending

desire
school,

not

is hereby

to

ordered

the parties

encourage

for substantial

school; however,
reside

to

with

periods

if a child

Scott

Marsh

will make reasonable

the
of

expresses
while
efforts

not
to

encourage the child to reside with Scott Marsh, but shall not use
undue pressure on the children or force the children against
child's will to reside with Scott Marsh.

- 3 -

the

3.

That Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the

sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child, for
the support and maintenance of said minor children, commencing on
August 1, 1989.

It is further ordered that said child support

payments shall continue until said children shall attain the age
of eighteen (18) years or graduate from high school in the normal
course of his or her high school education, whichever last
occurs.

Further, if the Defendant falls thirty (30) days or

more in arrears in his child support obligation, the Plaintiff
should be entitled

to mandatory income withholding

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
amended).

relief,

(78-45(d)-l et. seq.) (1984 as

Further, it is ordered that the Plaintiff is entitled

to claim the two youngest minor children as exemptions for
purposes of Federal and State Income Taxes and that Defendant
is entitled to claim the two oldest children for such exemptions
and the Plaintiff and the Defendant are ordered to execute Form
8332, waiving their claim to the exemptions not awarded to them
for the purposes of Federal and State Income Tax.

In addition to

the child support obligations provided for herein, Defendant
is ordered to pay the monthly obligation presently being incurred
at the Utah Boys Ranch, for Stephen Marsh, until such time as
Stephen Marsh is released.

Said obligation being approximately

Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month.

Further, although the

parties hereto have agreed to joint legal custody of the minor
- 4 -

children, as hereinbefore defined and modified, Defendant is
hereby ordered, at all times until said minor children reach the
age of majority, to pay child support to Plaintiff for each child
as provided

for herein, even

if said child

resides with

Defendant, unless said child resides with Defendant pursuant to a
written agreement wherein Plaintiff waives her claim to child
support for said child or an Order is entered by this Court
relieving the Defendant from the obligation of paying child
support for said child.
4. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff tne sum
of Four Hundred Sixty-eight Dollars

($468.00) per month as

alimony, commencing August 1, 1989, and payable on the 1st day of
each month thereafter.

Said alimony payment to decrease to Three

Hundred ($300.00) per month after Plaintiff completes paying for
Plaintiff's Honda automobile under the current terms of the loan
agreement, but in no event later than July 1, 1992. Said alimony
payments shall continue until Plaintiff remarries; provided,
however, should Plaintiff

remarry prior

to the time the

automobile is paid in full, Defendant shall continue to pay
Plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Sixty-eight Dollars ($268.00)
per month until the automobile loan is paid in full.
5.

Plaintiff

is hereby awarded all right, title and

interest in and to the home and real property located at 8966
South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah, and more particularly
described as:
- 5-

Lot 28, V a l l e y West No. 1, according to the o f f i c i a l
p l a t thereof recorded in Book 79-12 of P l a t s a t Page
352, records of Salt Lake County, Utah,
the 1988 Honda Civic a u t o m o b i l e ,
hereinafter

and, except as

awarded to Defendant, a l l f u r n i t u r e ,

specifically
appliances and

household goods located in the home at 8966 South 3860 West, West
Jordan, Utah, P l a i n t i f f ' s
balances

on d e p o s i t

clothing and personal e f f e c t s

in P l a i n t i f f ' s

checking

and

and a l l
savings

accounts•
6.

Defendant is hereby awarded the 1988 Ford Ranger pickup

t r u c k , a l l sums on deposit in his checking and savings accounts,
together

with

all

personal

property

and p e r s o n a l

p r e s e n t l y in the possession of D e f e n d a n t .
is

hereby

awarded

the bedroom d r e s s e r ,

n i g h t s t a n d s , and one-half

Further,
mirror

effects

Defendant

and two

(2)

(1/2) of a l l video t a p e s , a l l of which

items except the video tapes are p r e s e n t l y in the possession of
the P l a i n t i f f

and should be made a v a i l a b l e to the Defendant upon

reasonable n o t i c e .
7.

Plaintiff

retirement benefits
retirement

i s hereby awarded l l / 4 0 t h s of a l l pension and
t h a t t h e Defendant may r e c e i v e upon h i s

from m i l i t a r y

Government and Defendant

service

with

the United

States

i s hereby awarded 2 9 / 4 0 t h s of

such

pension and retirement b e n e f i t s .
8.

Plaintiff

i s hereby ordered to assume, pay, and hold

the Defendant harmless on t h e o b l i g a t i o n with F l e e t
- 6 -

Mortgage

Company in the amount of approximately Seventy-five Thousand
Dollars ($75/000.00)/ which obligation is secured with the home
and real property located at 8966 South 3860 West/ West Jordan,
Utah, together with the balances presently owed upon the credit
cards, against which Plaintiff has made purchases.
9.

Defendant is hereby ordered to assume, pay# and hold

the Plaintiff harmless on the obligation with Naval Federal
Credit Union, which is secured with, among other things, the
Honda Civic XL 1988 automobile herein awarded to Plaintiff.
This obligation assumed by Defendant shall not be construed as
being in addition to the total alimony payment of Four Hundred
Sixty-eight Dollars ($468.00)per month, unless Defendant dies
before the obligation is paid.
10.

Defendant is hereby required to assume, pay, and hold

Plaintiff harmless on all other debts and obligations incurred
during the marriage not herein specifically ordered to be assumed
by Plaintiff.
11.

Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain health/ dental

and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and
each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of any medical
or non-elective dental bills not covered by insurance.
12.

Defendant is hereby ordered to keep in effect his life

insurance policy through the United States Government in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00)/ naming the minor
- 7 -

children

of the parties as beneficiaries until such minor

children shall reach the age of majority.
13.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay Five Hundred Dollars

($500.00) towards Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred
in this action.
14.

Each party is hereby ordered to cooperate with each

other to effectuate changes and titles to properties agreed to be
divided hereunder, to change the names and responsibility for
payment under the charge accounts and other debts divided herein,
and to cooperate as may be necessary or proper to insure that the
terms of this Decree of Divorce are carried out in detail.
DATED this / #

day of August, 1989.
BY THE COURT

(7
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RAYMOND S. UNO '
District Court Judoe

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to Scott
A. Marsh, 6500 Hampton Boulevard, Norfolk, VA 23508, this
day of August, 1989.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARION MARSH,

ORDER AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION

316 ICO

Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894901070 DA
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Comm. Michael S. Evans

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled court on April 17, 1997, at the hour of
9:30 a.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court
Judge, presiding, on

Plaintiff's

motions

and

petitions, and

Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by counsel,
Kellie F. Williams, and Defendant being present in person and being
represented by counsel, Richard Bigelow, and the parties having
testified and having presented exhibits to the court and Plaintiff
having called Neil B. Crist as an expert witness, and the court

Marsh v. Marsh
Order of
Modification
June 3, 1997

EXHIBIT A

having reviewed the file, the case law, and having considered the
exhibits and testimony, and the court having also considered
Defendant's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, and the
court

having

previously

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, based thereon, and for good cause appearing
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
31,

The $30,000.00 disbursement Defendant received on January

1991 was either a marital assert or in anticipation of

retirement and, therefore, an advance on retirement. Plaintiff is
awarded ll/40ths of the disbursement.
2.

Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiff with his 1991

tax return immediately.

Plaintiff's ll/40ths shall be calculated

by assessing the actual tax rate and tax paid by Defendant on the
$30,000.00. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defendant
in the sum of ll/40ths of that net sum, together with interest at
the rate of 7.64% from February 1, 1991 to the present.
Defendant

fails to provide his

If

1991 tax return to Plaintiff

immediately, then judgment shall enter in the sum of $8,250.00,
together with interest at 7.64% on that sum since February 1, 1991.

1

\

J

/

A

Marsh

v. Marsh

3.

Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees and court

costs.
DATED THIS

^

j

/ ':^day of

J
V

)
/ Lt/}^j{

^ —

, 1997

LESLIE A. LEWIS < ,;x_- ^
Third District Court judge"'
APPROVED:

RICHARD BIGELOW
Attorney for Defendant
DATED:

Marsh v. Marsh
Order of
Modification
June 3, 1997
Page 3

TabE

Exhibit
E

^r

<s

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

MARION MARSH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 894901070

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant.
* * * * *

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
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Attorney at Law
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 17, 1997; A.M. SESSION
THE COURT:

Counsel and the parties, welcome.

Let me indicate that I have now had an opportunity in
Marsh V. Marsh to look at the objection to
commissioner's recommendation.

And first, I want to

apologize, a 4-501 was filed on that a long time ago,
although it doesn't look like it was filed, at least the
one I spotted, near the time that the recommendation, or
the objection was filed.

But clearly November 4 of '96

there was a notice to submit for decision filed, and it
never came to my attention.

For that I apologize.

I've now had an opportunity to review the
objection to the commissioner's recommendation.
recommendation itself- -

J

The

And the response to the

objection, and the objection is denied.

It appears that

the recommendation was appropriate at the time,
well-reasoned, and the same reasoning was articulated.
Specifically that the reason the plaintiff
became delinquent in the mortgage payments was as a
direct result of not having been paid child support and
alimony as ordered, therefore the commissioner
determined it appropriate to handle it in the manner he
did, and this court supports that.
We are here today in Marsh V. Marsh,
894901070, to deal with two issues that remain from the
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trial that was conducted on November 7th of '96 on the
petition t o mo dify.

The remaining issues are the

retirement pay and separation pay of the defendant, and
how that ought to be treated.
I will indicate that I've read all of the
pleadings on f ile from beginning to end, I believe I'm
generally conversant with the facts of the case and this
particular issue,

I understand there will be some

testimony addu ced, and perhaps some proffers and
argument, and that this is primarily a legal issue, and
there's ve ry little question as to the facts.

And I'm

happy to h ear from counsel.
Ms. Williams, would you like to lead off?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Yes, Your Honor, I'd like a

brief opening statement, just to explain to the court,
indeed, in our opinion there is one issue, not two
issues, be cause the retirement/severance issue that the
court, or sepa ration pay issue that the court has
alluded to is the same issue.
THE COURT:

1

It's a single issue?

MS. WILLIAMS:

It is a single issue.

One of

the questi ons, initial questions before the court is a
clarification, or definition of what Mr. Marsh received,
and the ne xt question for the court is whether it is a
marital as set.

We strongly believe, and believe the

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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court should find that it is a marital asset, accrued
during the marriage, that should be divided.
We believe that the testimony will show that
it is appropriately divided, and that, frankly, if it
isn't divided by this court, there is little likelihood
that Ms. Marsh would receive the retirement that she was
awarded in paragraph 7 of the decree of divorce.
When the parties divorced in 1989, the now
Ms. Garner was awarded eleven-fortieths of the military
pension of Mr. Marsh.

I was not representing Ms. Garner

at that time, and though they had been married for
fourteen years—they'd been married longer than fourteen
years, but they'd been married during fourteen years of
his service—for whatever reason she was only awarded
eleven fortieths.

But we're working with that

provision.
In 1991, subsequent to the parties' divorce,
Mr. Marsh did receive a $30,000 distribution, which, on
the W-2, was indicated as pension plan.

Different

evidence that the court will hear will call it variable,
different things, different names.

But ultimately, we

believe that, whether it be called separation pay or
pension, that she is entitled to her eleven fortieths of
that distribution, and that, again, if the court does
not award it, that she will be foreclosed from getting
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her portion.
There is just no other way to make certain
that this asset, this marital asset is divided without
her receiving the portion that we're requesting.
And there is a case that will be referred to
by counsel that I will argue in closing, if the court
gives us that opportunity, that is a California case,
and I don't believe it's applicable, nor is it binding
on this court.
THE COURT:

And you will certainly both have

an opportunity for closings.
Mr. Bigelow?
MR. BIGELOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Just

very briefly, I would indicate to the court that I
believe that the statutes that we will argue are quite
clear on the nature of the payment that was received by
Mr. Marsh, and clear on the distribution and resolution
of the issue.

And that, coupled with the case law that

I will cite the court to and provide for the court,
would indicate that the retirement pay issue addressed
in the decree of divorce has not yet arisen.
The risks inherent in receiving that
retirement pay are the same risks inherent in any award
of retirement benefits that will not be available until
some future date, and would indicate to the court that
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Mr. Marsh's proffer of testimony, along with the
statutes we would submit, I think will clearly show the
court at least how the congress intended that these two
issues, or the issue of severance pay versus retirement
pay, are to be treated.

And that in this case it should

be held as a severance pay, to be treated as set forth
in those statutes and cases.
THE COURT:

All right, and you may proceed.

MS. WILLIAMS:
proffer of- -

Thank you.

Your Honor, would you like the

We have stipulated that we can proffer

clients' testimony.

It would appear that it would

probably be a little clearer to the court if we
proffered our clients' testimony before Mr. Crist
testifies.
THE COURT:

I think that's appropriate.

MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

We have agreed to that.
You have or have not, counsel?

MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

We have.
All right, thank you.

MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, if my client were

called to testify, she would testify that the parties
were married in 1974 and divorced by this court in
August of 1989, at that time having had four children at
the time of the divorce.

They were ages five through

fourteen.
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At the time of the decree of divorce, in
paragraph 7 of that decree, she was awarded eleven
fortieths of the pension and retirement benefits of
Mr. Marsh.

That at the time of the decree that she had

been marri ed to him for a period of fourteen years,
during which he was in the military, and so that she was
a military wife for that fourteen years.
She would testify, Your Honor, that she was a
homemaker during the marriage, that she accrued no
retirement benefits of her own during the marriage, that
she, in fa ct, only worked minimally for, I believe,
approximat ely six months during the entire time of the
marriage on a part-time basis only, and that the parties
relied upo n Mr. Marsh and his future, and military
service for their future and for their retirement.
Ms. Marsh would testify that she was informed
that Mr. Marsh, on February 22nd, 1991, received a
$30,000 di sbursement from the Navy Finance Center, that
the disbur sement was indicated on the 1991 W-2 that he
received, marked on the W-2 as a pension—and I have
Plaintiff' s Exhibit 1- -

And I would ask to admit

Plaintiff' s Exhibit 1.
THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

Any objection?
No objection, Your Honor.
All right, thank you, it's
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received.
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 1 was received into
evidence,.)
MS. WILLIAMS:

That Ms. Garner, now Garner,

has calculated her eleven fortieths of the dist ribution
that was made, and that we have calculated both the
gross and the ]net calculations, and also included in
those calculations the interest that was, that
Ms. Garner wou.Id request from the date that it was
received until today's date at 10 percent interest.

And

if I can approach the court- THE COURT:

You may.

MS. WILLIAMS:

The Plaintiff's Exhib its 2 and

3 are the gross and net computations.
THE COURT:

Any objection to those?

MR. BIGELOW:

I have not seen those yet, Your

Honor.
MS. WILLIAMS:

I'm sorry, these are the same

that you had prior.
MR. BIGELOW:

Actually, my objection to the

o n e — I don't have the numbers on them, Your Honor—the
one I think is the gross- THE COURT:

Wait a minute, have they been

marked?
MR. BIGELOW:

I'm not sure what they are.
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MS. WILLIAMS:

I gave you the wrong ones,

excuse me •
THE COURT:

What is your objection?

MR. BIGELOW :

I believe the proffer was that

Mr. Marsh rece ived a $30,000 distribution, and I believe
this is showim g a $33, 000.
THE COURT:

Well, with that exception, do you

have any objec tion?
MR. BIGELOW :

Not as to P-2, Your Honor.

Just that the calculations need to be adjusted.
THE COURT:

P-2 is received with that

understanding.
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 2 was received into
evidence. )
MR. BIGELOW :

And P-3, I have no objection to

P-3, except that I hav e not- to the 10 percent interest.

Obviously we don't agree

We don't stipulate to the

numbers.
THE COURT:

Do you stipulate that it may be

received as illustrative of the plaintiff's testimony,
were she to testify?
MR. BIGELOW :

That's correct, Your Honor, I

do.
THE COURT:

All right, it's received on that

basis.
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(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 3 was received into
evidence.)
MS. WILLIAMS:

Also Ms. Garner would testify

that she has been addressing this issue, now, for a
period of approximately five years.
Initially, back in 1992, there was an order
that the defendant, Mr. Marsh, provide Ms. Garner with
severance information, and that she be provided
information in order to assess whether the payment made
in '91 was separation pay, and somehow excluded, or was
retirement, or in the nature of retirement, and
specifically that at that time she was awarded the right
to assert an interest in that asset.
That since that time that this matter has
been pending she has made vigorous efforts to resolve
the issue, it has resulted in a trial before Your Honor.
She would testify that at the time of a pretrial where
she was present with counsel, that counsel for Mr. Marsh
indicated at the pretrial that he, indeed, agreed that
it was a pension disbursement.
There was a retraction of that at a later
pretrial, and that, based upon those sequence, or that
sequence of events, that she believes it is appropriate
that she be awarded her attorneys fees.
She has no savings or source of moneys other
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than from Mr. Marsh's income to pay those attorneys
fees.

Indeed, this matter did proceed to trial before

Your Honor earlier on the issue, or various other
issues.

There was attorneys fees awarded at that time

of some substance.

Even though we've attempted, there

has been no payment of those fees.
And again, Ms. Garner is in a position that
she is in need, and unable to bear the expense of the
attorneys fees.

And I have prepared our affidavit of

attorneys fees related to this issue only, and

J

subsequent to finalization of the earlier issues and
documents related to the first trial in this matter.
And that those sums are due and owing and have not been
paid by Ms. Garner.

J

I would then call myself to testify, if
Mr. Bigelow believes that's necessary, or I would ask to
submit the affidavit.

J

MR. BIGELOW:

Your Honor, I have no objection

to Ms. Williams' affidavit as illustrative of what her
testimony would be.
THE COURT:

All right.

And it's received

with that understanding.
MS. WILLIAMS:

And that's Plaintiff's Exhibit

5, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right, 5's received.
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(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 5 was received into '
evidence.)
THE COURT:

Ms. Williams, let me just ask

you- -and certainly I'll want to hear from Mr. Bigelow on
this question, as well--is the defendant current at the
mome nt on child support and alimony?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, since the last- -

Don't you hate it when people don't say yes or no?
THE COURT:

Take whatever time you need.

MS. WILLIAMS:

Since the last trial, when one

of the children ended up in the custody of Mr. Marsh,
that child has now moved over into the custody of
Mrs. Marsh.

And so I believe that, under the current

court orders, technically he is current.
But because the child has moved over, and
because that's an issue, so that she's back in her
cust ody, that's an issue that really wasn't before the
court, we haven't been able to address that.
The]re are certainly support issues, because

she' s not gett.ing adequate support at this time.

But

technically he is currently current in support.
THE COURT:

But two of the children are with

Mrs. Marsh?
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

All right, that gives me a better
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feel for i t.

And Mr. Bigelow?

Would you like to make a

commensura te proffer?
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your ]Honor, I would.
You may proceed, counsel.

MR. BIGELOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

First I

would like to indicate that we do have a disagreement
over wheth er the one child that was just referred to as
being returned to the custody of Ms . Garner, if that
really is the case.

It's my unders'tanding that that

child is in the custody of juvenile court presently.
THE COURT:

1

Well, and counsel, I appreciate

hearing from you, because I heard from Ms. Williams
briefly on it, but I'm not actually sure that's before
me today.

Unless both parties want me to look at this

issue, I'm going to leave it up to <counsel to resolve
this.
MR. BIGELOW:
resolved.

I believe that will be

Mr. Marsh indicated he h<as already agreed to,

with Recovery Services, I believe, to pay additional
support ba sed upon this child being in with juvenile
court.
I would like to indicate to the court that
Mr. Marsh would proffer, or I would proffer as
Mr. Marsh' s testimony, first of all , that the issue of
the calculation to arrive at eleven fortieths of the
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separation pay, or excuse me, the eleven fortieths
calculation that's reflected in paragraph 7 of the
decree of divorce was arrived at by way of a stipulated
agreement at the time of the prior divorce.
THE COURT:
either.

And that is really not before me,

That's what it is.

So do you dispute the

J

figure?
MR. BIGELOW:
figure.

No, we do not dispute the

I thought counsel was going to make an argument

to dispute the figures, for some reason.
THE COURT:

I didn't understand that to be

the case.
MR. BIGELOW:

Okay.

I would indicate to the

court that Mr. Marsh was, his proffer would be that he
was involuntarily separated from the Navy on November
11th, 1991 , due to not being selected for higher tenure.
There is a letter we would submit, Exhibit 14,
Defendant' s Exhibit 14, to substantiate that.
THE COURT:

Ms. Williams, do you have any

problem wi th that as being received?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I do have an

objection, because the individual is not here to
examine.
THE COURT:

All right.

You can, if you wish

to, proffe r what the defendant would say, just as he
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might speak to this issue were he called.

But I think

Ms. Williams' point, with reference to my receiving an
exhibit without foundation, is well taken.
MR. BIGEL0W:
understand that.

Your Honor, Mr. Marsh- -

I

Mr. Marsh would testify that that was

the basis on which he was separated from the Navy, that
it was involuntary, and it was done as a result of his
being passed over for promotion.
He would proffer that he was, at the time he
was separated, a lieutenant in the Navy, grade 0-3, and
he'd been passed over for promotion to the rank of
lieutenant commander, 0-4.

And that as a result of that

separation, that Mr. Marsh was then- THE COURT:
on this.

Let me get a little clarification

Are you saying that in the Navy if you're

eligible, along with other individuals, for a promotion,
and you don't get promotion, that they also terminate
you?
MR. BIGELOW:

Yes, that's correct, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:

Why is that?
There are- -

I'm not certain

all the reasons, but the ones I'm aware of, Your Honor,
are that they have a process whereby they- -

That's

their way of, in essence, determining if someone is, in
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their view , fit for continuing in a full-time career,
the review for promotion looks at that.

And so they've

instituted a rule, as I understand it, that says if you
are passed over for promotion, I think, especially as an
officer—I don't know if the same applies to enlisted
men—but if you're passed over for promotion a certain
number of 1bimes, you then are, they do involuntarily
separate y<DU.

I have a couple of statutes.

THE COURT:
curious.

I'm not disputing.

It seems a little- -

I'm just

It's a different way of

looking at it.
MR. BIGELOW:

Additionally, Mr. Marsh would

testify that it was his understanding that when this
happened in '91, there was a lot of national pressure to
reduce the size of the military, and this became a
sensible way for the armed forces, as well, to reduce
the number of personnel in the armed forces.
So there may have been some other thinking
there that we're not aware of.

But at any rate, I am

confident, Your Honor, that it does happen, that they do
involuntarily separate individuals if they're passed
over a sufficient number of times for promotion.
I would indicate to the court that, based
upon this t separation, there was a separation pay made to
Mr. Marsh on or about the date proffered by Ms. Marsh,
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or by' Ms. Garner, of $30,000.

And that $30,000 amount

was, in fa ct, a separation, or severance pay, and not a
retirement payment.

And I would submit Defendant's

Exhit>it 13 in support of that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

On Exhibit 13, is this the one

previously discussed to which you have an objection,
Ms. Williams?
MR. BIGELOW:

No.

MS. WILLIAMS:

I don't have any objection,

Your Honor .
THE COURT:

All right, 13 is received.

(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 13 was received
into evide nee. )
MR. BIGELOW:

Your Honor, I would indicate

that addit iona lly the defendant, or excuse me, Mr. Marsh
would test ify that the total gross amount of the
severance pay paid to him is reflected on the worksheet
that we would submit as Defendant's Exhibit Number 10.
THE COURT:

Any objection to the receipt of

10?
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

All right, 10 is received.

(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 10 was received
into evide nee. )
MR. BIGELOW:

If I might, Your Honor, I'd
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give them to the court.
And I would indicate, Your Honor, that
reviewing those two exhibits, Mr. Marsh would testify
that, as I said, the gross was thirty, that the- -

That

he actually, or there was an amount of $6,000 withheld
that's reflected on Exhibit 13 for federal income tax
withholding when this lump sum was paid to Mr. Marsh.
So in reality, he only received $24,000, and the taxes
on that distribution were paid at that time.
So that in the event the court concludes that
it is going to award an amount to Ms. Marsh pursuant to
her petition, that the court would please take note of
the fact that the gross amount was thirty, but the net
was twenty-four, and the taxes have been paid, and
therefore it would be Mr. Marsh's position that only the
net amount would be the appropriate amount to consider
if the court were going to consider that.
Mr. Marsh would also, we also proffer his
testimony that at the time he was separated from the
Navy, he was not entitled to retirement benefits, that
those would not be available to him until he was the
statutory age, which he understood to be sixty years of
age.

He was only thirty-nine when he was separated from

the Navy, and therefore had no claim on any retirement
benefits.
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THE COURT:

What is the severance pay, what

he alludes to as the severance pay , predicated upon?
How do they ca lculate the amount?
MR. BIGELOW f:

It is bas ed upon a years of

service calculation, as I understa nd it, Your Honor.

It

is, based upon years o f service, a nd whatever his pay
rate had been as of th e time of th e severance or
And that formula is 1 aid out by statute.

separation.

I

don't believe I have that exact st atute with me.
THE COURT:

So it's not for six months or

something, equ ivalent to what one was earning per month
for a period o f six mo nths to allow one to sort of
regroup.

It's based upon years of service, then?
MR. BIGELOW

It is- -

J

Well, my

understanding of it is that, Your Honor.

I'll see if I

can find the s tatute, while we're sitting here, that

J

specifically 1 ays out the formula for that.
THE COURT:

And we have an expert today, as

well, right?
MR. BIGELOW :

If I can come- -

The other

J

side has an expert.
THE COURT:
for a side.

Well, I assume he's not an expert

I assume he may have been called by one

side, but my understanding is he's an independent
expert.

But we'll see , I suppose.
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MR. BIGELOW:

At any rate, Your Honor, that

would be Mr. Marsh's proffer, except, to the extent that
he would indicate that he, too, has incurred costs and
legal fees in this matter regarding the separation,
severance pay 'versus retirement pay issue.
And while the divorce decree is clearly

J

speaks to retirement pay and retirement benefits, it
does not speak to separation or severance pay.
on that basis iwe'd,

And that

one, deny any liability for legal

fees, and two, indicate to the court that he has had to
incur legal fe es, as well, to contest this matter.

And

Your Honor, that would be under Mr. Marsh's proffer.
The only other evidence we would have would
be, I intended to simply testify as to the amount of
time and legal fees incurred by me in preparation for
this matter.

I did not prepare- -

THE COURT:

All right, this is in lieu of an

affidavit?
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Before I hear from you, can I get

you to raise y<our right hand and we'll just swear you

in?
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RICHARD N. BIGELOW
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT TESTIMONY
BY MR. BIGELOW:
Thank you.

My name is Richard N. Bigelow,

I'm an attorney for the defendant in this matter.

I've

been licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho
since 1978, and the state of Utah since 1983.

I've

practiced law continuously in Salt Lake City since 1983.
My, a substantial portion of my time as a
legal practitioner has been devoted to domestic cases
such as this one.
$150 an hour.

My current customary billing rate is

I believe, for someone of my time as an

attorney, and experience, that that is a reasonable
rate.
I would proffer to the court that my time in
doing legal research to prepare for this hearing today
was two hours, that my preparation in preparing for this
trial today was two hours, and that I obviously am in
court now, and am billing my client for the time to be
here.

And would ask that the court, in the event it

finds that an award of attorneys fees in this issue is
appropriate, would award the four hours prior to coming
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here today, and the time for being in court, and
finalizing the documentation that's required in this
matter, at the rate of my normal billing rate of $150 an
hour.

That would be my testimony.
THE COURT:

What part of Idaho, counsel?

MR. BIGELOW:

I grew up in Idaho Falls, I

lived there for about four years while I was practicing
law.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And Ms. Williams, do

you wish the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Bigelow?
He's not- -

He's chosen to testify, which is most

appropriate, on this point, rather than submitting an
affidavit.

But I think, given that, you're entitled to

cross.
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

All right, fine, and I accept the

representation of counsel.
THE COURT:

I have no cross examination.

You may be seated.

And I guess what remains is to

adduce the remaining testimony, Ms. Williams.
MS. WILLIAMS:

I'd like to call Mr. Neil

Crist.
THE COURT:

Mr. Crist, if you'd come forward

to be sworn.
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NEIL B. CRIST
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff,
having b een first <iuly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. WILLIAMS:
Q

Would y<DU state your name and your business

address, please.
A

My name is Neil Berry Crist, my law practice

is 380 North 200 W<sst, Suite 260, Bountiful, Utah.
Q

Can you describ e for the court your expertise

in relat ion to mil.itary retirement and separation pay?
A

I can.

I'm not sure how far the court would

like me to go back , but l'<ve been on active duty and
reserve for almost thirty- five years.
Q

With what?

A

With th<* United States Air Force.

retired as a colonel, 0-6.

I recently

For the past ten years I

have managed three separat e substantial manpower
programs for the Air Force Reserve, in which I have
dealt wi th the severance a nd separation issue on
numerous occasions .
I believe the c ourt is aware that I am an
attorney , and I've practiced law since April of 1978 in
the stat e of Utah, with a , very heavy concentration in
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domestic.

And I've taught many seminars for both the

Air Force and for the Utah State Bar in relation to the
retirement type issues.

I've taught at the Air Force

Institute of Technology and for the Air University and
for the JAG Course, Judge Advocate General-type people,
on the same type things.
Q

And that'rs with regarding military

retirement?
A

That's with the Air Force on those issues,

that's correct.
Q

Does the Air Force military retirement differ

from the Naval retirement?
A

No, it's all dealt with under the same,

10 USC 11-74 is the United States code section that
deals with that.
Q

So the armed forces are one group, when it

comes to issues relating to severance pay or retired
pay?
A

It's all handled as Department of Defense,

Q

Okay.

yes.
In your education background, your

teaching background , can you tell me when you last spoke
on the issue?
A

Or taught on the issue?

The last time I taught a seminar was about

three weeks ago for the Utah State Bar.
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THE COURT:

Ms. Williams, can I ask for

clarification on one point?

This may show my ignorance.

But I,m not clear on what Mr. Crist meant when he said
for ten years he's managed substantial manpower
programs.

Could we clarify that at some point, as well?
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE WITNESS:

Yes.
I'll answer that directly, if

that's okay.
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE WITNESS:

Okay.
I have a hard time being a

witness instead of the attorney.

I have been, for the

last ten years, in a portion of the Air Force Reserve
where I would work about ninety days a year, eighty or
ninety days a year, as the senior mobilization augmentee
for either Air Force Materiel Command or Air Combat
Command, managing reserve programs.
It's sort of an unusual type hybrid
situation, where you have an active duty counterpart,
but the management of the entire reserve side of the
house is delegated to the reserve mobilization
augmentee.

And that's what I have done.

I've been

responsible for hiring all the reserve people, many of
which are these people that have separated under the
VSI-type programs.
THE COURT:

All right, I understand.
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you.
Q

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

And through that

employment , have you developed an expertise, or a skill
related to military retirements, military separation
pay?
A

Yes, I've dealt with it many times on an

actual case-by- case basis with people that we've
employed.
Q

And as an attorney, have you represented Air

Force pers ons out of Hill Air Force Base?
A

I've represented both sides.

The wives of

the Air Force p eople, and the members themselves.
Q

And prepared military allocation orders, or

divisions of re tirement assets, military retirements?
A

That 's correct.

Q

And how many do you think you've prepared?

A

A lot.

More than 100.

J

Two hundred, 300,

it's been quite a few.
Q

Okay

In addition to your teaching in a

seminar se tting , have you testified as an expert before
in Utah?
A

Yes, in Judge Medley's court.

Q

And when was that?

A

It's been about six months ago.

Q

Okay

And you were designated as an expert
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at that time?
A

Nobody challenged it.
THE COURT:

I think, then, it would be fair

to say you were so qualified.
Q

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

Are you, or can you tell

the court what documents you have reviewed in relation
to this case, Marsh versus Marsh?
A

Yes.

I reviewed- -

I went back and checked

the statutory foundation, which is 10 USC 11-74.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

One more time.

Ten- -

|

USC 11-74, and the relevant

section of that statute, if the court wants a complete
reference, is section small "H," paren 1, that I believe
is the one that the court's going to be most interested

in.
And I also checked the Department of Defense,
they changed the whole regulation system, here, about
two years ago, and I think they're called DOD-FMR's,
which is the Department of Defense Financial Management
Regulation, which also deals with this sort of the
implementing regulation, sort of like the IRS regs
implement the IRS code.
And I also looked at some documents that you
provided me, one of which was, I think, Defendant's
Exhibit 10, which was the worksheet on the allocation of
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the severance pay, or how they calculated it.

And I saw

a letter that I guess you objected to, from DFAS
Cleveland, that's Defense Finance Accounting Service,
and the abbreviation is DFAS.

Cleveland, which is the

central Department of Defense management point for all
these kind of things, now.
Q

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

And did you review the

decree of divorce?
A

Oh, yes, I did review the decree of divorce,

Q

And did you review the W-2 that was referred

too.

to as Plai ntiff s Exhibit 1?
A

I don't remember if I saw the W-2.
THE COURT:

Q

Here is the original, counsea.

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

Did you have an

opportunity to review Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
A

Oh, I think I did see this, yes.

This

document, I would note, predates the current
organizati onal structure, where everything is combi.ned
under the Department of Defense now.

In actuality, what

they show here is the Navy finance center is now thLe
entire financial management center for the entire
Department of Defense for these type of issues.
Q

Okay.

A

So yes, I have seen that, and I do note that
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it's checked as pension funds.
Let me show you what I've had marked as

Q

Plaintiff s Exhibit 15.

Is that the statute for the

U.S. code provision that you were referencing?
Yes, it starts down at the bottom of the

A

page, deal ing with separation pay upon involuntary
discharge or release from active duty.
Okay.

Q

After reviewing the documents that

we've referred to in the code provisions, have you come
to a concl usion or formed an opinion regarding whether
the moneys received by Mr. Marsh are retired pay,
retirement , or connected to the retirement?
The short- -

A

MR. BIGELOW:
objection, here?

Your Honor, could I make an

I think we'll solve it, but I don't

believe you've got, moved to have Mr. Crist admitted as
an expert.
THE COURT:

That's true.

MS. WILLIAMS:

I apologize.

I jumped.

I

would ask the court to find that Mr. Crist is an expert,
and qualif ied to testify regarding his opinion in this
case.
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:
finds.

And I have no objection.
All right, and the court so

Th e court finds that Mr. Crist is an expert in
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matters pertaining to legal interpretation of retirement
benefits for the Department of Defense.
MR. BIGELOW:

The next issue I have was that

I think you re ferred to an Exhibit 16 just now?
THE COURT:

I don't know that we've had a 16,

have we?
MS. WILLIAMS:

It was 15?

Okay.

I'm sorry,

it was 15.
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

Thank you, I've now seen 15.
Just one moment.

Let's see, 10

was received, as was 13, and 15 we had not made a
request for ye t.
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:
Q

No.

All right.

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

Then you may proceed.

Let me back up just a bit

before I get b ack into the opinion.

Can you tell me how

separation pay is calculated?
A

Yes

I noticed that the judge had that

question earlier, I made a note of it.
years of service type formula.

Basically it's a

It is specifically not

six months of pay or something like that, like the court
asked.
In this particular case, if I can speak to
that exhibit y ou objected to from the Navy finance
center, they refer in there that this was based upon
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fifteen years' service.

The $30,000 was calculated

based upon fifteen years of service.

So it is.

And there's a threshold that you have to be
beyond--and I'm not sure how far the court wants to get
into this—but depending on the career field and the
personnel management policies that they're trying to
implement- And Mr. Bigelow mentioned that in 1991,
that's correct, I was, I worked for the assistant
secretary of the Air Force for acquisition at that time,
and I was involved fairly heavily in the policy matters
that went into this.

And depending on the career field

for the Department of Defense, generally it was you had
to have at least six years.
There are different, pilots are treated

J
1

somewhat differently, doctors are treated somewhat
differently, but generally the policy, underlying policy
consideration was that people who were within their

1

mandatory service requirement for courses that they'd
taken or schooling that they'd received or whatever, did
not qualify for this.
Q

So you needed a certain number of years of

service before you could be considered for separation
pay?
A

Right, before you could even get it at all.
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Okay.

Q

Strike tha t.
A

And what is the relationship- -

How is retired pay calculated?

Retirement pay, depending on whether you're

active or reserve, is calculated based upon a years of
service formula.

Basically it's two and a half percent

of your ba se pay for each year of active duty service.
Now, as a reservist, it's calculated on a different
basis.

It 's a point system.

Q

But the formula for calculating separation

pay and retired pay, am I correct that it's basically
the same?
A

Or similar?
It's very similar, yes.

time element.

I
And in terms of the

The formulas are not the same, obviously.

And that's why I asked specifically earlier exactly

J

which prog ram he received the payment under, because the
actual pol icies are pretty much the same.

It's

basically about $2,000 a year.
Q

On separation pay?

A

On the separation pay, yes.

Q

Based on past service.

A

Prior- -

Q

And so future service doesn't have any

Service at the time of separation.

bearing on it.
A

No.

No, future service does have a bearing,

and that's why I think section 11-74-H is so critical to
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this, because there is a provision where a person who is
involuntary separated for being passed over, like
apparently Mr. Marsh was- -

And that is a DOD-wide

policy for up and out, Your Honor.

It's strictly a

management, flow of the promotion-type management tool.
Q

You're referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 15?

A

Fifteen, yes.

Q

Okay.

Can you tell me what connection the

separation pay has with the pension and retirement
benefits?
A

Yes.

The relevant portion of this is

subsection 1, "A member who has received separation pay
under this section or separation pay, severance pay, or
readjustment pay under any other provision of law based
on service in the armed forces, and who later qualifies
for retired or retainer pay under this title or Title
14, shall have deducted from each payment of such
retired or retainer pay as is based on the service for
which he received separation pay under this section,
until the total amount deducted is equal to the total
amount of the separation pay received."
Q

Can you tell us, in laymen terms, what that

means?
A

Well, just to make sure that I understood it

correctly, since I was going to have to testify about
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it, I called the Air Force Reserve expert in Denver and
went through it with them.
thing I di<i,
be repaid.

And it's probably a good

because my understanding was that it had to
But the mechanics of how it was repaid are a

little bit different than I expected.

J

Basically what they will do is they will take
the number of months- MR. BIGELOW:

I'm going to object to this as

hearsay on Mr. Grist's part.

He's testifying about what

somebody's told him.
THE COURT:

Will you lay some additional

foundation , Ms. Williams as to whether the witness has
an independent working knowledge of this?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I would submit to

the court *that, as an expert witness, he has the
ability—ai nd as an exception to the hearsay rule—the
ability to gather information, and through the gathering
of informa*tion as an expert, in needing to gather that
information for a particular case, he can rely on
what- THE COURT:
foundation , too.

All right, and that requires

So you may wish to ask that question

instead.
MS. WILLIAMS:
Q

Okay.

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

In the preparation for
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this case , in order tc) more fully understand the US code
provision , did you do further research or inquiry?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And what was the- -

What did you do in that

research or inquiry?
A

Well, based[ on my prior experience with my

military duties, I knew that the office that had the,
all the e xpertise for the Air Force on the actual
implement ation of this provision was located at the Air
Force person, Air Force Reserve Personnel Center in
Denver.
Q

And I called and spoke to that individual.
When you have questions relating to finance

issues, is that where you call?
A

That's correct.

Q

And you- -

A

And I also spoke with the people at Defense

Finance and Accounting Service in Cleveland, which is
the peopl e that actually implement this for the
Department of Defense, to make sure that I was on the
right tra ck.
Q

And do you use that service in your, acting

in your reserve status as employed by the military?
A

Yes.

Q

And do you regularly contact them, as well,

on other financial issues related to the military?
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A

Yes.
MR. BIGELOW:

Your Honor, if I might object

and voir dire simply on the issue of who the individual
was that he spoke to.
THE COURT:
if you'd like to.

Well, you're welcome to voir dire

Would you like to ask that?

MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
And sir, if you remember the

inquiry, you can answer that.
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

The individual's name is

Jim, I'm not positive of his last name, it's like
Hebertsen, it starts with "H."

And if you call the

personnel center, his extension is 246.

I didn't bring

that piece of paper with me.
THE COURT:

J

I

That's all right.

Anything

further by way of voir dire?
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:
Q

No, thank you.

J

You may proceed.

J

(BY MS. WILLIAMS)

And in your services in

the reserve, and as an attorney preparing military

J

allocations orders, do you regularly contact these

1

entities, and rely on the information you receive?
A

I do.

They are the people that actually

carry it out.
Q

And after the contact, were you able to gain
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more understanding of how the code provision, sub H, is
implemented?
A

Yes.

And the other thing I would point out

is that I did review the Department of Defense financial
management regulation, which is the regulatory guidance
for implementing that, also.
Q

And do you recall the cite on that

regulation?
A

Yes, it's DOD-FMR, as in Frank, Mike, Romeo,

Volume 7, part B, paragraph 60308, and it's that whole
section.

Paren C is the one that's really the most

important, I think.
Q

And after doing that investigation, again,

what, how is the pay back of the separation pay
implemented in relation to the retirement?
A

It's based on a pro rata distribution of the

disposable retirement pay.

And disposable retirement

pay is an important concept that we'll probably have to
define, here.
Q

Okay, why don't you do that now?

A

Because it's really important in these

retirement allocations.

And that definition changed as

of February, 1991, and for purposes of this case, a lot
of the things that they talk about are not applicable.
But the one thing that is really relevant to
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this case is the federal and state taxes.

Because after

February of 1991, federal and state taxes are not
considered part of the net disposable retainer pay, as
they were prior to 1991.
Q

What impact does that have on this case?

A

The impact it has on this case is whether or

not the plaintiff should receive eleven fo rtieths of the
gross amount and she pay taxes on what she receives, at
what I understand to be a lower rate than Mr. Marsh # s
rate , or whether Uncle Sam gets 20 percent off the top
because of his tax rate, and then she just gets her
eleven fortieths of the after tax.
Q

Okay.

And so the implement that the military

uses now is that they do not make it a percentage of the
net, they make it a percentage of the gross now.
A

They actually allocate- -

The way it's done

now is they will allocate the, what they d efine as the
net <disposable retirement pay, which does not include
taxe s.
Q

Okay.

A

And then they actually give to the alternate

payee a form 1099-R, which shows that they received that
duri ng the year.
Q

Okay.

A

And that's to avoid- -

Because there was all
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kindis of c omplications with trying to do it th e other
way.
Q

Okay, so that impacts the issue of iwhether

it's• gross or net.
A

Correct.

Q

But as to the pro rata distribution that

you' re describing, can you explain how that would affect
Mr. Marsh, if he's got $30,000 gross pay that',s being
pro rata d ivided between the retirement pay.
A

The thing that I got clarification from these

people on, that bothered me, is because of the
diff erence between the active duty side of the
reti rement , and the reserve side.
Now, once he's gone into the reserve side of
the house, he has to be paid under the Reserve
Reti rement Entitlement Act.

Okay, which means , as

Mr. Bigelow said, he doesn't start to get paid until age
sixty.

And it's based upon his total points aib the time

of retirement.
Now, where you have a problem is wh<are you
have the i nterface, where he had fifteen years of active
duty* service.

What they do is they'll convert that to

360 points per year.

And now, for his reserve duty, he

receives one point for each period of inactive duty, and
one point for each day of active duty.
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said, in my experience in the last ten years, I've been
receiving anywhere around ninety to 120 days of worth of
points during the year.
Okay.

So the thing that's going to really

make this lopsided on the payback is, they are going to
withhold, assuming that he retires at fifteen years—or
twenty years of service, I'm sorry—which is the
minimum, when he gets to be age sixty, he will have an
entitlement for whatever grade he is at the time.

And I

don't know if he's been promoted or not, but it's
whatever the rank is at the time that he gets his
retirement.
They will then withhold fifteen twentieths of
any payment he would otherwise be entitled to.

So

they're going to hold 75 percent of every payment until
this $30,000 is paid back.
Q

Uh-huh.

A

Okay.

Did I say that clearly?

So the net effect of this is going to

be, if he has fifteen years of active duty, that would
work out to- -

What's 15 times 2 and a half percent?

That's going to be thirty, almost 40 percent of the base
pay that was accrued during his active duty time.
Now, for his remaining five years, assuming
he takes a 20-year retirement, and he could go to thirty
years, and if he gets to be a general he could go to
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thirty-five years or something like that.
don't make the general cut.

Most of us

But so what he's going to

have is, he's going to have- -

Something like 90

percent of his total accrued payable points actually
took place during the fifteen years that he was on
active duty.

So he's not going to have near as many

points for that last part.
The bottom line of that is going to be, most
of what he's going to get is going to go towards
repaying this $30,000 until it's paid off.

So that the

equity problem that you run into is, and the way the
defense finance and accounting service will actually
implement this, is after they take the 75 percent, which
is considered an obligation owed to the federal
government, which is deducted from the pay before it
becomes net disposable, so that's going to come out
every month.

So what Mrs. Garner is going to get is

going to be eleven fortieths of- Q

25 percent?

A

The peanuts that are left.

even going to be 25 percent.

It's not really

Because of the difference

between active duty years and reserve years.

So she

would get eleven fortieths of almost nothing until that
$30,000 is repaid.
After the $30,000 is repaid, then she would
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get eleven fortieths of whatever the retirement pay is,
which, <assuming he retires as a lieutenant commander, it
would probably be $1,800 a month.

I would have to- -

It's going to depend on his rank and how ma ny years he
has at the time that he retires.
Q

Okay, so under the decree of divorce she's

entitled to eleven fortieths, which is a li ttle more
than 2 5 percent of his gross retired pay.
A

That's correct.

Q

But because of the fact that the severance

pay has to be paid back, she cannot receive that from
the mil.itary.
A

If she doesn't get it out of the severance

pay , she won't ever get her share of it.

Her share of

the retirement will be reduced by what her share of that
$30 ,000 would have been.
Q

Is that the interplay between the pension and

retirement and the separation that we were talking
about, ( or is there any other interplay that we should
know about?
A

No, that's primarily what it is.

I can tell

you the policy considerations that went int o it in 1991,
because that's what we did at the air staff , and it was
to make a lump sum retirement- The problem that the Air Force a nd the Navy
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have is, they needed to get their force size down.

They

didn' t want to involuntarily terminate any more people
than they had to.
it.

So there's two primary ways they do

One is th e way of calling out officers that

Mr. Bigelow re ferred to, which is the up-or-out program,
or if you're p assed over twice you're on the street.
But then they give you the severance pay to go with
that.
The other thing, that got more publicity, is
the voluntary separation, where someone who has ten
years can come in, and they'll give him $20,000--and
it # s different if you're a pilot and some other
thingrs--but ba sically give you $20,000 and you're on
your way.
Now , a lot of these people, especially
somebody in th e situation that he's in, where they have
fifte en years, want to get into the retirement, or the
reserve program, because of the fact all they have to do
is serve five more years and they qualify for a pretty
good retirement.
So we have, we used to have a lot of those
peopl e getting , trying to get into our programs.

And

initi ally, when they first came out, we couldn't even
take them.

So this was a change where they made it to

where we could actually take them and they would pay
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back the retirement.
Q

Okay.

As a military officer in the field of

expertise that you have, do you consider this separation
pay under Utah law a marital asset?
A

Since Woodward, I believe it is.

I think

Woodward settled the issues of what's speculative on the
receipt of the retirement pay and so on and so forth.
In fact, this portion is, there's no speculation
involved in this part.
Q

He's already got it.

By the speculation, you're talking about

Woodward1 s reference to vested versus unvested?
A

1

And whether you'll stay long enough to

actually get it and so on and so forth, yes.
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.

Cross?

MR. BIGELOW:

Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, would it be

possible to take just a two-minute break?
THE COURT:

Yes.

J

Is that acceptable to you,

counsel?
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:
10-minute break.

Yes.
We'll make it actually a

We'll take a 10-minute break and pick

up where we left off.

Thank you.

(Brief recess.)
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THE COURT:

Let's proceed with cross.

MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I don't believe I

asked to admit Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, although I don't,
since it is a U.S. Code cite, I don't need it to be used
as an exhibit.
THE COURT:

Any objection to the receipt of

15?
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
All right, 15 is received.

(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 15 was received
into evidence.;)
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BIGELOW
Q

•

1

•

1

Mr. Crist, just for clarification sake, for

the court, you 're here at the request of the plaintiff
and her attorney, correct?

1

A

Yes »

Q

You and I have not previously met to discuss

1

this matter, have we?
A

No.

Q

To your knowledge, was I aware of you being

called as an expert before today?
A

I don't know.

I haven't talked to you.

I
On

this maitter.
Q

You are being paid by the plaintiff in this
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matter as an expert?
A

That's correct.

Q

Thank you.

Mr. Crist, you stated, I believe,

that you did review the decree of divorce regarding the
award to the plaintiff of certain pension retirement
benefits; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And from your review of that decree of

divorce, is there any reference made to severance or
separation benefits?
A

I don't- -

Not that I recall, but I'll check

just to make sure.
Q

Paragraph 7 is, I believe, the applicable

paragraph?
A

It says "eleven fortieths of all pension and

retirement benefits that the defendant may receive upon
his retirement from military service from the United
States government."
Q

In the military, regarding the issues of

severance or separation pay on the one hand, and
retirement or pension pay on the other hand, is there a
distinction between those two areas?
A

You mean are they handled separately, I

guess?

Yeah, there is a distinction between them.

Q

Is there- -

When the military refers to
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pension and retirement benefits, is it also referring to
severance or separation pay?
A

It depends- -

this right.
it from.

I'm not sure if I can answer

It depends on which side you're looking at

If you're looking at it from the retirement

side, then it clearly fits in, because it's calculated
in.
If you're looking at it strictly from the
severance pay side, then you can get severance pay and
never be entitled to retirement if you don't complete- It's kind of like you were talking about, the
speculative nature of the retirement thing.
Q

Is there any question in your mind in this

instance as to whether Mr. Marsh, when he received the
$30,000 distribution, whether that was a severance or
separation pay, rather than a retirement or pension
payment?
A

In his mind?

Q

In your mind.

A

In my mind.

Is there any question- In my mind, it's clearly an

advance on a retirement pay.
Q

Okay.

Can you tell me, in the applicable

code section, where it says that it is an advance on
retirement?
A

I don't think it says- -

I don't know of any
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place where it actually says that.

If you look at it

as- Q

So the term "advance on retirement," then, is

your term, correct?
A

Well, it's calculated on the basis of number

of years of service, that's correct.

And that's my

term, I guess.
Q

And again, let me go back, just to make

certain I understand.

In this particular case, do you

believe that Mr. Marsh was paid severance or separation
pay?
A

Yes.

Q

And when he received that distribution in

1991, that was paid, intended to be paid to him by the
military as a severance or separation pay, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And the chapter of the Armed Forces Act that

deals with severance or separation pay is which chapter,
if you know?
A

It's the Title 10, 1174, section 1174.

I'm

not sure what the chapter is on that.
Q

Is it Chapter 36?

Does that ring a bell to

A

I could probably- -

Q

I'll withdraw that question, Your Honor.

you?
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1174 that you have referred to, Mr. Crist, specifically
deals with the issue of how to handle severance or
separation pay, does it not?
A

The section that I referred to- -

You mean

1174-H, that I referred to and read from?
Q
1174.

No, I'm talking about the entire section,
That's dealing with separation and severance pay,

correct?
A

Upon involuntary discharge or release from

active duty, right.
Q

Correct.

It is not dealing with pension or

retirement pay, correct?

Except as stated within the

body of that section.
A

Well, it does deal with retirement pay.

That's what that section, or the section H deals with.
Q

That's right.

Section H does address the

issue of retirement pay, and it specifies, does it not,
that at the time that a person who has received
separation or severance pay who later qualifies for
retirement pay, that then there is an adjustment to be
made, correct?
A

Yes.

That's what it-says.

Q

When Mr. Marsh was separated from the Navy in

November of 1990, was he entitled to any kind of
retirement or pension benefits at that time?
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A

I think it was November of 1991, if I'm

not- THE COURT:

That was the testimony.

THE WITNESS:

But at that time he had fifteen

years accrual towards what's a between-year minimum
that's re quired for retirement.

But he could not

receive a retirement based on fifteen years.

Well, he

could if he took a medical, but that's totally
different
Q

.

I

(BY MR. BIGELOW)

I misspoke the date.

Point of clarification, and

The date when he was involuntary

separated was November of 1991.

J

A

Right.

Q

The day he received the disbursement was

February of 1992.

Simply to clarify that point.

So back to my question, then, and I think you
answered it, let me just make sure.

Was he entitled to

any disbursement of retirement or pension funds when he
was involuntarily separated from the Navy in November of
1991?
A

He could not receive any in November of 1991.

Q

When would have been the earliest time at

which he could receive retirement or pension benefits,
if he was age thirty-nine in November of 1991, with the
years of service he had at that time?
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A

It would be five more years.

So he would

have been forty-four.
Q

Would he have to had remained on active duty

to receive that pension at age forty-four?
A

He would have had to receive active duty

retirement credit, and generally that has to be on
extended a ctive duty.
Q

And to your knowledge, did Mr. Ma rsh

participat e in that kind of active duty?
A

I don't know anything about that.

Q

But that's the only way he could have

received it by age forty-four; is that correct?
A

That's correct, once he transfer- -

what I sai d.

That's

Once he transfers to a reserve component,

he has to take his retirement through the reserve
component retirement plan, which is the age sixty thing.
Q

Assuming Mr. Marsh did not engage in any kind

of extended active duty, as you testified, but, instead,
went into the reserve component, then it wou Id be your
testimony that he could not then qualify for any kind of
retirement or pension benefits until he was age sixty;
is that co rrect?
A
type.
sixty.

Unless he qualified for a disabil ity of some
But standard, plain-old retirement, requires age
You can get a disability component earlier than
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that.
Q

Thank you.

There is an entire separate

chapter in the Armed Forces Act, Section 10 USCA,
regarding retirement payments, isn't there?
A

Are you talking about Title 10?

Q

Title 10, excuse me.

A

Yeah, there is a whole section that the

Yes.
1

Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act is
appended t o, if that's what you mean.
Q

J

In fact, there's a separate fund set up from

which the government pays retirement benefits under the
Armed Fore es Retirement Act, is there not?
A

No, there's not- -

personnel appropriations.

j

It is paid out of current

It is not a fund, like you

would have an IRA fund, that makes those payments.

It's

a line-item appropriation for the defense personnel
budget.
Q

Are you familiar with Title 10, section 1408,

that—subs ection H-8—that references that, "Retirement
payments in accordance with this section shall be made
out of funds in the Department of Defense Military
Retirement Fund established by Section 1461 of this
title"?
A

Section 1408, I think- -

Isn't that the

Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act section?
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Q

That does deal with that.

A

Right.

Well, I guess it depends on how

you're usi ng the term "fund."

It is paid from funds

that are a ppropriated against the line item for
personnel, retirement personnel payments.
Q

Are those funds the same funds from which

separation or severance benefits are paid?
A

I remember during the time that we were

working on that at the air staff, there was some
discussion of that.

j

To be honest with you, I don't remember where
it came down, if it came out of that same line item
entry, or if it came out of a separate appropriation.

I

would say it probably did come out of those funds,
because I don't know of a separate appropriation that
was made f or separation payments.

So it's got to come

out of- In order for the government to spend it, it's
got to come out of some appropriation.

And that's the

most likel y one for it to come out of.
Q

But you're just speculating on that, aren't

A

I don't know of any other one that it could

you?

possibly come out of.
Q

Okay.

I'd like to go to the example that
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you've stated in your testimony about, you believed a
lieutenant commander, presently, if he were to retire,
would receive in the neighborhood of $1,800 a month.
Wasn't that your testimony?
A

Based on the number of points that I would

project for him.

That's really a rough projection.

And I'm not going to hold you to an exact

Q
project ion.

I simply want to use it for purposes of

working through an example.

Mrs. Garner is entitled to

eleven fortieths of any retirement pay Mr. Marsh is to
receive , correct?

1

A

Of the net disposable retirement pay, yes.

Q

Correct.

And that eleven fortieths is, it's

not exactly, but roughly 25 percent of the, what would
be the disposable pay, correct?
A

Just a little bit more than 25 percent, yes.

Q

Right.

And can we say that of $1,800 a

month, 25 percent of that would be approximately $450 a
month?
A

Yes.

Q

And as I understand your testimony, you

stated that, given the fact that Mr. Marsh will have to
repay the $30,000 by having that deducted out of net
disposable retired pay at the time he does retire, that
roughly 75 percent of that total amount would be
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withheld by the Navy, and roughly 25 p ercent would be
paid out; is that correct?
A

It won't be withheld by the Navy, it'll be

withheld by the Defense Accounting and Finance Service
in Cleveland.
Q

Okay.

But other than that clarification, is

what I stated generally correct?
A

Until the $30,000 is repaid , that's correct.

Q

Okay.

And then it was your testimony, as I

understand it, that the military would then divide that
remaining four, approximately $450 a month into a parcel
that is twenty-nine fortieths to go to Mr. Marsh and
eleven fortieths to go to Ms. Garner.
A

That's correct.

Q

Until the $30,000 has been repaid?

A

That's correct.

Q

And based upon that, you testified that you

didn't believe that she would be able to receive her
eleven fortieths of what she'd be enti tied to, correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

I need to ask you a few oth er questions.

If

Scott Marsh had come to the end of a term of service of
enlistment in the armed forces, excuse me, in the Navy,
in November of 1991, and had not been involuntarily
separated, but simply his time was up and he chose not
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to re-en list, would he have been entitled to any kind of
severance or separation benefit at that time?
A

Well, it was my understanding he was an

officer.
Q

He was.

A

Officers don't have terms of enlistment.

They're appointed for an indefinite term.

So- -

I

don't think the question makes sense.
Q

My example does not work for an officer,

A

No, it wouldn't work for an officer.

Q

If he simply chose to submit his resignation,

then?

rather than be involuntary separated, involuntarily

j

separated, would he have been entitled to any sort of
disbursement at that time?
A

I

In November of 1991, he probably would have.
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I'd object based

on relevancy and- THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:

J
How is this relevant, counsel?
I think we need to establish

what Mr. Marsh was and would have been entitled to at
the time of the separation, trying to distinguish the
issue of whether it's retirement and pension benefits- THE COURT:

At the time of what separation?

Separation from the military?
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MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

From the military, correct,
And your last question was- -

Well, ask your next question, let's see where we are.
Q

(BY MR. BIGELOW)

I just want to know, if

Mr. Marsh would have voluntarily resigned from the
military at that time, versus having been involuntarily
separated, would he have been entitled to any kind of
retirement or pension benefits at that time?
A

Without knowing the specific plans that were

available at the time, without looking at those plans, I
can't tell you that.

I know that there were VSI-type

programs at the time for voluntary separation that did
provide the same type payment.

But whether he qualified

under the terms of those plans, without knowing more
specifics, I can't answer it in a general- Q

If Mr. Marsh dies before he turns age sixty,

would there be any of this retirement pay available to
Mrs. Garner?
A

It depends.

I'm not sure you want to get

into this can of worms, but it depends on whether or not
there has been an election under the Survivor's Benefit
Program.

If there's been an election under the

Survivor's Benefit Program, then she would have a
payment, whether or not he gets it.
That has been changed recently in the last
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two years as to how that's done.

In the past, if the

court ordered that to be done, then he would be ordered
to elect that, or, if he had previously elected that
option prior to the divorce, then it would continue in
effect.
Now, there's a way that she can apply, even
if it hasn't been awarded by the court, she can apply to
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Cleveland
and obtain what's called SVP, survivor benefit
protection on her portion of the retirement.
What they do then is, the actuary will take
the present value of what her share would be, and then
they stretch it out for the amount of payments for her
lifetime.

So it actually reduces the amount- So if she was going to get, under your

example, $450 a month, then with her difference in life
expectancy, I would say it would reduce it to $375 a
month.
Q

But that would then continue for her lifetime.
Okay.

In the event that Mr. Marsh lived to

age sixty, took his retirement that would be available
to him, but died prior to the $30,000 being recouped by
the military, would basically the same result occur as
what you've just described?
A

Well, under that scenario it would be

different, because she would receive eleven fortieths of
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the $450 until he died, and then from that time forward
she would receive her portion under the SVP, if that's
what you're asking.
Q

Okay, I understand that.

So I think, to make

sure we've had a meeting of the minds, here, is that she
would- -

If this election were made about this

surviving- A

SVP?

Q

- -SVP.

That if that was made, in essence

Mrs. Marsh would receive the eleven fortie ths payment of
whatever it should have been, or was to be , if Mr. Marsh
died, whether he died before age sixty or after age
sixty.
A

Is that correct?
Clearly if he gets to age sixty and he goes

into pay status, there's no question she gets it that
way.

And to be honest with you, with this new election

where she can apply for it herself, I don' t know- That deals with what we refer t o as the gray
area.

And that's what I'm in now.

Where you've retired

from active reserve service, but you haven 't qualified
for the age sixty payment plan yet.

And I honestly

would have to go back and research that to make sure I
was absolutely positive.
But I think, as long as she's e lected the
survivor benefit, and he's actually got hi s twenty years
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of creditable service, then whether or not he gets to
age sixty to get his, she can still get hers under the
SVP allocation.
Q

When he would otherwise be age sixty.

If Mr. Marsh never reached the twenty years

of service, would Mrs. Garner ever be entitled to
receive eleven fortieths of any type of pension or
retirement benefits from Mr. Marsh?
A

Not under that program, no.

Q

Or from the government?

A

No.

Q

I believe in your testimony you made the

statement that if she doesn't get her eleven fortieths
out of the retirement—I think you're referring to the
full retirement benefit in my example, which would have
been the $1,800 a month—you made the statement she will
never get it.

I just want to ask you about that

statement.
I think what you were stating is that—and
you tell me if I#m wrong—is that the amount, eleven
fortieths of the $450 a month she would be getting if
the recoupment was going on, is a small enough amount
that you were suggesting that it may take a long time,
or forever, to recoup that amount.

And there's no

guarantee based upon whether she lives, or longevity, or
whatever.
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A

No.

No, the point was that there's going to

be 75 p ercent of that retirement pay that's going to go
back to the government.

So she's never going to get

eleven fortieths of that, what is it, $1,350 a month
that's going back to the government.

She would only get

her eleven fortieths of the $450 that's left.

But he's

already got the $30,000 that the $1,350 a month is
paying back.
Q

Okay.

Now, using that as a base, if- -

That

could be simply remedied, couldn't it, by Mr. Marsh

|

simply permitting Ms. Garner to receive the full $450 a
month, which would be roughly equivalent to what she was
going to receive under the eleven fortieths of $1,800 a
month.
A

No, he couldn't.

Q

He couldn't do that?

A

No, because under the Uniform Services Former

J

Spouses Protection Act, there are limits on what can be
paid, a nd for retirement benefits it's a maximum of 50
percent unless there's an arrearage or some other
things.

It can go up to 65 percent if there's an

arreara ge on alimony or child support at the time, but
the basic limitation under FSPA is 50 percent.
Q

You're saying that's the most that could be

garnished from Mr. Marsh, is this 50 percent or 60
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percent?
A

That's the only amount that the Defense

Finance Accounting Service will send her, period.
Q

I understand that.

But Mr. Marsh, certainly

there are ways that Mr. Marsh could, for example,
receive a check and pay out of his own pocket the sum to
Mrs. Marsh, correct?
A

Well, I guess, yes.

Q

There's no law preventing him from doing

that, is there?
A

There's no law that prevents it, but it kind

of undermines the whole purpose of the Former Spouses
Protection Act.
Q

Well, I'll move on to another area.

When the

military makes a payment of moneys to Mr. Marsh, as it
did in February of 1992, is it your opinion that the
military knows what it's doing when it terms it as
severance pay or separation pay, rather than retirement
pay?
A

Well, the problem I have with that is the W-2

that they provided showed it as retirement pay.
Q

Okay, on that W-2, if it was severance or

separation pay rather than retirement, what- -

Where

should it have been marked on that particular W-2?
A

On this particular one, they don't have a
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block for VSI that I can tell.

The print is so small

that I can 't- THE COURT:

Let me interrupt.

Counsel, how

much more do you have with this witness?
MR. BIGELOW:

Just a couple of minutes, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

(BY MR. BIGELOW)

Strike tha t.

To your knowl edge- -

Do you recall looking at W-2 forms

provided f or the military during the time frame of this
W-2, for the year 1991, previously?
A

Most of what I've had to do with this is

people coming into the program that were wanting to make
sure they could get their money, or they could get their
retirement after they came in.
Q

So you don't recall whether the re's an, on

W-2s gener ated by the military at this time, whether
there was a box for severance pay, versus simply marking
it as retirement or pension pay, do you?
A

I honestly don't, no.

Q

To your knowledge, was it a course of dealing

of the mil itary to include a reference to severance or
separation pay on a W-2 form in the same b ox as pension
or retirement pay?
A

All I can go by is the one that 's sitting in
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front of me, and I would say I guess the answer would be
yes.
Q

That they do do that?

A

Yes.

Q

Because it # s clear in your mind that what

Mr. Marsh got was a severance or separation pay,
correct?
A

That's what they called it.

Q

One last thing.

You stated that in your

opinion, under Utah law, that this severance or
separation pay Mr. Marsh received became a retirement
benefit?
A

It was a retirement benefit at the time it

was paid .
Q

And what's your basis for saying that?

A

Well, if you used the analysis that the court

made in 'the Woodward formula, this is a deferred
compensation that was accrued during the period of time
that the parties were married that is received by one
party rather than the parties jointly.
I think it fits into those criteria about as
squarely as it can fit.

I think the only difference is

that it ]lias a name of severance pay that denotes that it
is an advance payment that avoids that speculative
problem that you're talking about, that you mentioned in
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your openi]ng statement.
Q

If Mr. Marsh died before he's sixty, would

his estate be required to pay the $30,000?
A

No.

That's only repaid out of retirement

payments.
Q

And his retirement payments are not vested

until he h<as completed his twenty years and turned age
sixty, cor:rect?
A

No, they're vested as you go along.

The

military is a defined benefit plan, an unfunded defined
benefit pl<an.

And he's totally vested in it.

Whether

he reaches the payment age is another question.
Q

If he doesn't reach the payment age, though,

he would never, he or his estate would never be entitled
to any ret irement benefits.
A

His estate will never be entitled to any

retirement benefit, whether he gets to age sixty or not.
Q

So if he doesn't get to it, he won't get it

either?
A

If he doesn't get there he won't get it, but

there is a separate provision to take care of her.
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Anything by way of redirect?

MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

No, Your Honor.

Sir, you may stand down.
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you for your assistance

Any reason why Mr. Crist can't

be excused at this time 7
MS. WILLIAMS :
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
No, Your Honor.

Mr. Crist, now you can tell

witnesses you know what it feels like to be in the hot
seat.

Thank y ou again for your help.
THE COURT:

Counsel, I'm assuming that you're

going to want to make some brief argument.
quarter to 12: 00.

It's now a

Why don't we have our lunch break, I

haven' t given my court reporter or anyone el se much of a
break this morning, and then come back and p ick up at
about 1:15, 1: 30, and t ake what time you nee d.

Any

problem with that?
MS. WILLIAMS :

It's the court's choice.

I

don't know how much time counsel has, but we probably
would need about a half hour, I would guess.
THE COURT:

That's what I would f igure.

MR. BIGELOW:

I suspect that, as well, and it

would be my preference to do it at 1:30.
THE COURT:

Let's do it at 1:30.

We'll see

you then, and if you wish to leave anything in the
courtroom in the meantime, you can.
thirty minutes at that juncture.

I'll set aside

Thank you counsel.

(Noon recess .)

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

69

THE COURT:

Let's proceed, counsel, when

you're reaLdy.
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I would call

Mr. Marsh.
THE COURT:

Mr. Marsh, if you'd come forward,

please.

SCOTT A. MARSH
called as a witness by and on behalf of the PI aintiff,
having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. WILLIAMS:
Q

Would you state your name, please.

A

Scott Allan Marsh.

Q

And your address?

A

10034 Jordan Crest Circle, South Jo rdan,

Utah, 84095.
Q

How old are you?

A

Forty-five.

Q

Are you in the reserve?

A

Yes, I am.

Q

And is that the Naval Reserve?

A

That's correct.

Q

And how long have you been in the Naval
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Reserve?
A

Six years.

Q

Since 1991?

A

Tha-t's correct.

Q

So ;you have twenty years of military service

at this junctu:re?
A

Yes •
MS. WILLIAMS!:
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:
for your assis'tance.

No further questions.

No, Your Honor.
You may stand down.

1
Thank you

Any other witnesses?

MS. WILLIAMS\:
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor, we would rest.
And you've rested?

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

And both sides have

rested, both sides are entitled to make closings.
Let me indicate my understanding of the
status o f the <exhibits.

One, 2, 3 and 5 are in.

J
Is 4

in?
MS. WILLIAMS• :
THE COURT:

No, I didn't- -

Ten, 13 and 15 are in.

MS. WILLIAMS•:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Again, just some of the background, Your
Honor, b ecause I think it is important, because of the
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court's equitable nature, that this is a 15-year
marriage where four children were born as issue.

That

during the marriage Mr. Marsh was the wage earner,
Ms. Marsh, now Garner, was the homemaker, and she
accrued no retirement benefit throughout the course of
the 15-year marriage.
They were married in 1974, divorced in August
of 1989.

That at the time of the divorce, Mr., or

during the marriage and at the time of the divorce,
Mr. Marsh had fourteen years of service in the military,
and under the Uniform Spouse Protection Act, Uniform
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Public Law
97-257, Ms. Garner is entitled to, we don't call it a
QDRO, they will let you call it anything else, but she
is allowed to an order that will be directed to the
military that will tell the military that because she
has ten years of marriage during which the member had
ten years of service, that the military, then, under
that act, will send that retirement portion directly to
her.
As the court's aware, under Woodward and
numerous other cases, it was determined that, unlike the
old law, that spouses were left out in the cold, it was
determined that retirements were marital assets.
took the military a while to catch up.
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up to the extent of the ten-year period.

If it's under

ten years then you're left to your own devices.
Ms. Garner is awarded eleven fortieths of his
retirement, and it's clear that in February of '91 he
received a disbursement of $30,000 gross, $24,000 net.
The reason that we've done both exhibits is
because, whether you take the gross or the taxed amount,
is a 20 percent tax bracket.

Certainly there's been no

evidence produced by Mr. Marsh that he actually ended up
paying that full amount after his, by the time he filed
his taxes.

Who knows what the actual taxed amount was?
And I believe that that's one of the reasons

that Mr. Crist testified that there had been a recent
change, so that the military doesn't divide up the net
any more, they divide up the gross amount, so that the
individuals pay taxes at whatever level they are in,
whatever their tax bracket is.
Exhibit 15, which is titled 10 USC 1174- THE COURT:

So you're suggesting that

Mrs. Marsh is entitled to eleven fortieths of the
$30,000 gross.
MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

All right, go ahead.

MS. WILLIAMS:

We are also requesting a

reasonable interest, and I used 10 percent because for
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years the courts have used 10 percent as a prejudgment
interest, maybe just out of simplicity, because I've
never found it anywhere.

But Mr. Marsh has had the use

and benefit of those funds since he received them in
February of 1991.

And, indeed, since 1992, Ms. Garner

has been trying to get her portion, her share.
The first order from December of 1992, after
a hearing, ordered Mr. Marsh to provide more
verification and information regarding that
disbursement.

It also specifically stated that

J

Ms. Garner had a right to assert her interest in that.
Even though that order was outstanding, we still added
into our petition of April '96 in paragraph 5 that the
court needed to either consider it a pension plan for
division, or that the court should consider it as a
marital asset for purposes of division.
Clearly his receipt of those funds is a
substantial and material change of circumstances, since
the entry of the decree.
The applicable code that really ties it to
the retirement, Your Honor, is title 10 USC 1174 sub H,
which very clearly says that the member has to pay the
$30,000 — i n this case $30, 000—back upon retirement.
And I don't think there's any dispute that it says that
you do that.
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Mr. Crist, fortunately, was able to explain
to us in more detail what that meant, and how it's
actually paid out.

The net effect is that, since it's

paid out at the rate of 75 percent of each month's
disposable pay, that he would then get 25 percent of
what he would normally get.
What Mr. Crist also testified to, however, is
that because he gets more points because he's retiring
as a reservist, since he gets more points for those
fifteen years of service, that the actual end result, if
merely an allocation order, what would be a QDRO, is
granted to her for eleven fortieths, she doesn't even
get eleven fortieths of the 25 percent, because that's
not the way it's calculated by the military in terms of
reserves and active duty.
It's unquestioned from the testimony that he
has his twenty years in, that unless he dies, that at
age sixty he is going to receive this, his pension.
The testimony from Mr. Crist also was that,
because of the need to protect spouses, that there is a
new law that allows, under the current law, what is
called, he called the SBP election, a Survivor's Benefit
Program, that would allow Ms. Garner to apply now to the
Defense Finance and Accounting in Cleveland for some
rights to the retirement, even if he dies prior to
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attaining the age of sixty years.
The testimony from Mr. Crist is that the
same, to his knowledge, that the same fund of money that
pays out the severance from the military department is
the same fund that pays out the retirement.

He wasn't

absolutely sure, but he did say he couldn't think of any
other place where the moneys have been earmarked for
that purpose.
It was clear also from Mr. Crist's testimony
that if the court does nothing, and if Mr. Marsh is
permitted to retain the moneys he's received, then it
completely eviscerates her retirement.
allow her to be made whole.

It does not

There is absolutely no way

that she can get the portion she was awarded in the
decree of divorce.
Now, apparently counsel's indicating, and
questioned Mr. Crist, "Well, he can just pay it to her
himself."
And what Mr. Crist said is, "Well, yeah, but
that completely destroys the purpose of the Uniform
Services, Former Spouses Protection Act."

Because the

court is very much accustomed to people coming into
court chasing after people who aren't paying their
required bills and the requirements under the decree.
And again, that's what he's asking, apparently, that she
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do.
He's, in a sense he would end up with a great
deal.

He' s got a loan against his retirement, she has

to pay it back, and he isn't in any way required, except
for maybe at the age of sixty, if we can find him, he's
not requir ed to pay it back to her.
He's got the current use and benefit.

It was

an asset that accrued over the course of the marriage,
and it is important that it be divided.
Counsel will provide, or has provided the
court with a California case, which is In Re: Marriage
of Kuzmiak , and it's a 1986 case out of California that,
as I read it—and I'd like to discuss it now, because
he's going to bring it up.

As I read it, if you read it

quickly, y ou don't really get what it's saying, I don't
think.

I think you have to read it two or three times.

At least I was, maybe I'm slow.
But the court, in its analysis, determines,
and did determine, that the separation pay under
California law was separate property, and not marital
property.
I am going to disagree with their reasoning.
I think it was clear from Mr. Crist's testimony it's
based on p rior years of service, that it's not like a
severance package, where you're paying for the next six
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months.

But even if you agree to some degree with, or

if you agree with their characterization of it, once
Mr. Marsh has taken that, and once he's earned his right
to retirement, then it's a different thing altogether.
Because in this case, what the court said is
that the government's withholding of the $30,000 from
his retirement pay deprives wife of her community
property interest in these funds.

The $30,000 that

should have been in the retirement.
The election that he took, in the case of
Kuzmiak, is inconsistent with the protective philosophy
of the community property law.
Now, I understand California's community
property law, and Utah is a hybrid of equitable
distribution.

But I think that California has some of

the same concepts, which is if you've earned it during
the marriage, it's a marital asset.
The court, on page 648, said that if they
simply gave that $30,000 to him, it would deprive the
wife of her interest in the funds.

And the court said,

"For these reasons we conclude the wife has a community
property interest in husband's longevity pension,
including the $30,000 separation pay the government will
withhold from his retirement benefits."
This holding recognizes the separate property

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

78

characteristic of the separation pay, in quotes, "Until
husband's actions in reenlisting and earning a longevity
pension,"

And it goes on to say, same sentence, "And

also protects wife's rights to a community property
asset."
The court said afterwards that, "The proper
division of husband's longevity retirement benefits
remains wi.thin the trial court's discretion; the parties
may reach a reasonable agreement concerning the division
of the benefits."
So what the court was saying in this case,
Your Honor, is that if you don't include that $30,000,
even if you call it a separate asset, that you're going
to be damaLging, or injuring her rights to that asset.
What perhaps the lower court and the
appellate court didn't have in the record on this case
was the kind of testimony that the court's had from
Mr. Crist today, which is that if this court doesn't
divide up this asset now, that it creates a myriad of
problems in the future.
There is no way, given the scenario the court
has before\ it, that the court can compensate Ms. Garner
with what minimal moneys will be available when
Mr. Marsh retires.

There is no way to divide it up.

The only way to pay her her interest is to pay her the
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portion of the $30,000 that has already been received.
I think that the distinguishing feature of
this case from our case is likely that--and we don't
have that before us—but likely that the lower court
didn't have all the information, the appellate court
didn't have the record before it, indicating that if you
don't give it to her now, she's cut out when he retires.
THE COURT:

Let me turn to another question.

This interest concept.

Why is the 10 percent interest

figure appropriate if I determine that interest is
warranted?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, we have asked for

prejudgment interest, and prejudgment interest
historically, in my practice, has been assessed at 10
percent.
that.

Again, I really have never fully understood

In fact, I've called, I've researched it, I've

called the clerk's office, and it's just one of those
magic numbers that's unexplainable.
I have not gone back to try to figure out
what judgment interest was from 1991 to the present.
Certainly if the court believes judgment interest is
appropriate, we would ask the court for judgment
interest, which I think is 7.64 percent at this point.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. WILLIAMS:

And lastly, Your Honor, as to
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the issue of attorneys fees, again, Ms. Marsh, or
Garner, has been chasing this issue for five years, now.
It's been an ongoing issue.

As was testified through

proffer, at one point in the pretrial there was an
admission by counsel that it was a pension.

Certainly,

based upon those kinds of representations, there is no
reason that plaintiff would not continue pursuing it.
Besides the fact that the W-2 seems to be
clear, besides the fact that, given the testimony that
we have, and all of the evidence, that it is an asset, a
marital asset that should be divided.
We have requested attorneys fees and costs
relating to the expert.

Our attorneys fees are $1,125,

that's probably an understatement because there should
be another hour of attorneys time added to that, for
another $150, because of the longer trial than I
anticipated.

That would be $1,275.

Also that it was

anticipated that the fees related to Mr. Crist would be
five to $800.

We have not gotten a final bill from him,

he has been paid $400 thus far.
We would anticipate, given the length of the
trial, again, that it would run- the $800 figure.

We can

certainly get a statement from him to confirm that.
Ms. Marsh testified through proffer, she has
no moneys with which to pay this.

He, on the other
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hand, has had the fund of money ever since '91.

She

testified also that Mr,. Marsh was ordered in the last
court order to pay her attorneys fees, and he has taken
no action to d<D so, even though attempts have been made
for collection , and they have come to no avail at this
point.

Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms . Williams.

Counsel?
MR. BIGELOW:

Your Honor, I have previously

provided to opposing counsel a, just some materials

1

stapled together of certain statutes that I'd like to
present to the court.
THE COURT:

Yes, I'd be happy to consider

those, counsel .
MR. BIGELOW:

I'd like to submit that to you,

then.
THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:

Thank you.
Your Honor, I think if we start

with a clear reading of the decree of divorce in this
case, which, as I understand it, was a stipulated
agreement, and was not one that was submitted to the
court for its decision, paragraph 7 :Is very clear.

And

that's the one we're talking about.
Paragraph 7 refers to all pension and
retirement benefits that the defendant may receive upon
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his retirement from military service.

And I think,

under every look at the testimony that's been presented
today, including Mr. Crist's, there's absolutely no
question that what we are talking about that Mr. Marsh
received was not retirement or pension, but was
separation, or severance pay.
Now, if I might, Your Honor, the first page
of the materials I provided to you refers to Title 10,
section 627, indicating what Mr. Marsh had testified
about regarding the effect of failure of selection for
promotion, that when someone is not advanced, and as
Mr. Marsh testified about happened to him, that's what
resulted in his involuntary separation.
I will indicate to the court that I had not
pulled—and I just noticed it now--from this packet of
information a letter that I had sought to admit as
evidence, and the court sustained an objection to that,
so I think it would be appropriate, the second page, to
go ahead and delete from the court's packet of
materials, and I apologize for not going through and
pulling that out.
THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:

That's all right.
But at any rate, it's clear

we're talking about a separation.

The reason we get to

section 1174, that is the one that was relied upon by
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Mr. Crist and by counsel for Ms., by counsel, to argue
this entire issue is referenced in the next section,
section 642, indicating that an officer who's discharged
under this chapter is entitled, if eligible therefor, to
separation pay under section 1174 of this title.
Now, there has been no evidence or argument
to the contrary today but that Mr. Marsh was paid
pursuant to this chapter of the, of Title 10, which
refers to separation pay.

Section 1174, which is the

next, if you get to the next page, is specifically the
section that deals with involuntary discharge, or
release from active duty, and why that results in a
separation or severance pay.
Section 1174 subsection A indicates the
entitlement that Mr. Marsh had to this severance pay, or
excuse me, separation pay, that was provided by the Navy
to him, the $30,000 sum.

Again, this is specifically

identified as separation pay.

It is not retirement, or

pension pay.

J

I would indicate to the court on the next
page, which is numbered page 46 at the bottom, I hadn't
highlighted, but the court had asked the question
earlier, "How is the amount of separation pay
calculated?"

Well, there is a specific calculation

criteria set forth in this section, subsection D.
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It states amount of separation pay, the
amount of separation pay which must be paid to a member
under this section is, there's a calculation, 10 percent
of the product of his years of active service and twelve
times the monthly basic pay which he's entitled to at
the time of his discharge, or, one half of the amount
imputed under clause 1.
I will confess, I don't know quite how the
military comes down to a final number from that formula,
but clearly there is a calculation based upon his last
twelve months' pay, in part, which would go towards the
issue, which is the stated, I think, congressional
intent regarding this section, and that is to assist
someone who has been involuntarily separated from the
armed services to have the opportunity, by virtue of
this separation pay, to work their way back into
civilian life.
And it is that very concept that I believe is
the reason that the court in the Kuzmiak case that I
have attached here next, it's the very reason that court
came to the conclusion that this was a separation,
severance pay, that was a separate asset and not a
community asset, because of the nature of the intent to
assist an involuntarily separated military member to get
back into society.
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I would indicate to the court that subsection
H at the bottom of this page, page 46, is the subsection
that we specifically dealt with, and it is absolutely
clear, Your Honor, that separation pay and pension and
retirement pay are different things under this act.

And

that the money that was paid to Mr. Marsh is separation
pay.
The only question about whether or not it's
separation pay comes from the exhibit, I believe it is
1, that is the W-2 form where the "pension" box is

J

marked, and I believe—I'm not quite sure what the

1

testimony of Mr. Crist w a s — h e had never seen a W-2 form
with a different place to mark for separation pay than
in the pension box, and that he was not aware of it
being marked any place else on a W-2, and to the best of
his knowledge, the retirement and separation benefits
were reflected in the same box on the W-2 form.
What is clear in the Exhibits 10 and 13
submitted by plaintiff, is that there is a specific
calculation or reflection of the $30,000 sum as
separation pay.

There is a specific notation indicating

that $6,000 was withheld in terms of federal income tax,
and that the net that came to Mr. Marsh as a result of
that was $24,000.
At any rate, going on, regarding subsection H
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of section 1174, again, i t's clear that separation pay
is treated different than retirement pay.

And I

recognize that the problem in this particular situation
is that, in the event Mr. Marsh lives to be age sixty,
there will be required to be a repayment of the $30,000
that he got.
There are a wh ole bunch of sides to that
particular issue.

One of the sides is, first of all, he

has to live to age sixty.

Secondly, or- -

$30,000 repayment will never happen.

Or that

And according to

Mr. Crist's testimony, assuming this appropriate
designation is put in place of this Surviving Benefits
Protection, she would receive the same thing she would
be entitled to if the $30 ,000 had not been paid to
Mr. Marsh, minus whatever - -

Well, there's going to be

an adjustment, because it 's a surviving spouse's benefit
package that is adjusted somehow, not as a result of the
$30,000, but as a result of Mr. Marsh dying before age
sixty.
But there are other, I mean there are
other- -

Counsel wants to talk about the uncertainties

of Ms. Marsh ever collect ing this money.

Your Honor,

that's inherent in every award where there is an
expectation that that awa rd will not be paid until into
the future, depending on whether--especially a lengthy

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

1

87

period of time in the future—depending on whether each
side survives to that point in time.
If, for example, if Mrs. Marsh, or Ms. Garner
passed away before Mr. Marsh turned sixty, but this
court had required Mr. Marsh to pay that money back, or
pay that money to Ms. Marsh, conceivably she never would
have received any of that money.

And the factors that

are thrown into this kind of pension retirement factor
always create uncertainty about what's going to happen
fifteen years into the future.

Mr. Marsh is forty-five,

we're looking at fifteen years into the future.
If I might, Your Honor, go on.

The Kuzmiak

case, I know the court probably hasn't had, in fact I'm
sure you haven't had a chance to read it in detail.

I

would indicate to the court that it is clear from that
case, from this—and it is a California decision, and I
will tell the court it's the only one I could find
anywhere on the subject—but in this decision the court
clearly found that this separation pay was different
from retirement pay, and that it was a separate asset,
and not to be counted as part of the community assets.
The court then did go back and indicate that,
at the time of the making of the decision about how to
divide the assets, the court did say in the Kuzmiak
case, that the wife presently had an interest in the
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husband's non-mature longevity pension.

That's on page

648.
And based upon that, the court took, stated
with its two holdings that, one, the property was
separate, but two, the wife had an interest in the
husband's non-matured longevity pension.

It sent the

matter bac k to the lower court to be decided.

We don't

have a rep ort of a resolution from this particular case,
and so I can't report to you how the lower court dealt
with that.
I would indicate, though, that the appellate
court in California, it looks like the Second District
Appellate Court in California that decided this
particular ' case, referenced the parties back to another
California case called In Re:

Matter of Gilmore.

And

unfortunat ely I just had time to grab one copy of that
this morni ng, I've got a copy of it here, and I haven't
given one to counsel yet.

Because I just got the one

copy made, I'd be happy to make some more copies and
distribute it, or- THE COURT:
MR. BIGELOW:
whoever.

What does it say?
- -or make it available to

But Your Honor, basically what it says is that

the lower court should divide the property in such a way
that at thte time that the pension benefits are
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payable --but it was referring to pension benefits--that
at that point in time the divorced spouse who was
receivi ng a percentage, or pro rata portion, would be
entitled at that time to receive their pension, and that
the par ty who was actually receiving the retirement, had
worked for the company that was going to be paying for
the retirement, could not make decisions to delay
receipt of that pension money by virtue of, instead of
retiring at age sixty-two, the first time they could
retire, choosing to wait until age seventy and then
retiring, and for the interim eight-year period then the
spouse would not receive any benefits.
The California court said no, the spouse that
could have received benefits at age sixty-two can't go
put off , and you have to make those available to that
spouse at age sixty-two, or as soon as it was available.
Dealing only with retirement benefits.
And so that's as much direction as those
courts came up with in terms of providing direction for
us here

But I would indicate that I don't think that

law is any different than where we stand in terms of the
current understanding, here, of retirement plans, that
they are customarily to be paid out at the time that the
pension or retirement fund is available to be paid.

I would indicate to the court, if you go on
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in the packet of materials I've provided, that—and this
is, gets into an area that Mr. Crist was not conversant
with, apparently—section 1408 , it's chapter 74 of Title
10, and it gets into the issue of retirement pay.

It's

a totally different chapter th an the earlier chapter we
were dealing with on severance or separation pay.
And in this particular chapter, in section
1408, it gets to a definition of this term, "disposable
retired pay."

On page, what is page 105, it talks about

"disposable retirement pay, meaning the total monthly
retired pay to which a member is entitled, less amounts
which one are owed to the U.S. for previous overpayments
or for recoupments."

So that' s where the law comes in

that permits the, in essence, coupled with the prior
section, 1174-H, that permits the recoupment.
But going on in thi s section, and it is
section 1408 subparagraph H-8, it's reflected on page
109, it indicates that, "Payme nts in accordance with
this subsection shall be made out of funds in the
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund
established by section 1461 of this title."
And so there is, in fact, contrary to
Mr. Crist's recollection, a sp ecific fund that's set up
by the government for the purp ose of paying out
retirement benefits.
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And then the last page I have attached, the
last two pages I've attached references, number one,
what the, .In section 1462, what the assets of the fund
are, and section 1463, who receives payments from the
fund.

And the first subsection is A-l, "retired pay

payable to members on the retired lists of the Army,
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps." And I point that out
to Your Honor to indicate that, not only are these types
of pay, separation and pension, different in talk,
they're dijliferent in funding, they're different by

I

statute.
The controlling document, the decree of
divorce in this case, only references pension and
retirement benefits.

It was a document that was

negotiated between the parties, who had counsel, back in
1989.

And presumably the issue of severance, or

separation pay could have been dealt with at that time,
it was not »

1

But under any circumstance—at least it was
not from a plain reading of the decree of divorce—but
that asset , that the asset that Ms. Garner is claiming
Mr. Marsh's time in the military, that was in existence
in 1989 at the time of the decree of divorce, and from a
reading of all of these, the decree, the statutes, the
cases, the case that I've supplied to the court, there's
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no question, severance pay is a separate issue, and it
was not brought up in the decree.
To somehow, at this point, go back in time
and open up the decree and permit an opening up of the
decree to change paragraph 7 to include separation or
severance pay, to me seems to be permitting a revision
or review of that property distribution many, many
years—way past any length—after the fact, and could
not be permissible under our laws regarding going back
and reviewing judgments.
At any rate, Your Honor, the issues to me
seem absolutely crystal clear in terms of the difference
between the types of payments.

Mr. Crist and

Ms. Williams both have argued, or stated somehow, that
Ms. Garner will never get her money if she doesn't get a
judgment against Mr. Marsh for the eleven fortieths of
the money that was, that came to him by separation pay.
The other side of that coin is, Your Honor,
in the event that Mr. Marsh lives to age sixty and
starts to collect his retirement pay but Mrs. Garner
does not live that long, or is nowhere to be found, she
would have received a distribution of money, based upon
what she's asking for right now, that legally she ought
to be entitled to repay to the military.
Because if he's going to have to repay the
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portion of the $30,000 that he got, and then she ge ts
some of it, th en she's going to have to repay that
poirtion, as we 11.

It would not be fair to require him

to repay the e:ntire amount- THE COURT:

My understanding is it comes out

of each of their shares.
MR. BIGELOW:

At the time- -

If they're both

al ive, and Mr. Marsh is starting to see retirement, yes,
it would come out of their both of their shares.
THE COURT:

And Mr. Marsh is what?

MR. BIGELOW:

Forty-five.

Excuse me.

Mr . Marsh retired and started to receive the retirement,
thtsn it would <come out of both of their shares.

THE COURT:

Then they're both repaying.

But

if she receives nothing now, she's repaying somethi ng
she never received.

And that seems to, it seems to me,

is key to this whole analysis.
MR. BIGELOW:

Well, she may never be ent itled

to any of that money, either.

If she does the surviving

spouse benefit option that has been addressed by
Mr . Crist, then she would receive whatever the eleven
fortieths of the total, not just eleven fortieths o f the
smaller amount

If Mr. Marsh did not live until he was

sixty.
If ]Mr. Marsh lives to sixty, and she does
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also, well, she lives until then also, and he's
collecting retirement, then it's true she, in essence,
would, be only getting eleven fortieths of the
disposable amount.

If the court will remember my

example of Mr. Crist, on an $1,800 a month payment,
there would be $450 that, roughly, that would be paid
out.

And under the repayment process, only Mrs. Garner

will only receive eleven fortieths of that $450, and
Mr. Marsh the remaining portion.

I think, frankly, I

think that can be easily dealt with.

But that's what

would happen, based upon Mrs. Garner not getting any
money right now.
However, if she got money right now, and she
was not available to repay her portion, then Mr. Marsh
would be required to pay back all of the money.
essence he's paying twice.

So in

He's paying, if he were

required to pay some now, and then he lived to age sixty
and she was not available, he would still have to repay
the full amount, and then he would be paying it a second
time to the military.

The first time to her and the

second time to the military, and that's not fair or
equitable, either.
At any rate, Your Honor, it seems to me that
the way to deal with this matter is to let things be
what they are stated, which is in the decree of divorce,
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pension and retirement benefits when Mr. Marsh gets
them.

She gets her eleven fortieths, and Mr. Marsh

would stipulate that until the $30,000 sum was paid
back, this, court could order that Mrs. Marsh be entitled
to receive his full amount, as well as her full amount
from the $450 in the example I used.
And if the court were to do that, what that
would do is, until the $30,000 was repaid out of the
portion that would come from the military to these two
people, Mrs. Marsh, or Ms. Garner would receive within a
few dollars everything she would have received if she
received eleven fortieths of the full $1,800 a month.
And that's a way to ensure that she gets paid.
The plaintiff seems to make a big deal out of
the fact that there's a question about whether Mr. Marsh
will pay.

You know, Mr. Marsh deserves credibility in

this case, Your Honor.

He has been in here, and he has

paid a substantial sum of child support and alimony for
a lot of years, now, and he was current, in terms of his
mind, with Recovery Services up until the time of the
last hearing.

And then, since then, based upon the

orders of this court, he's had to go back and is working
out the payment of different amounts, but he's still
making those payments.
And Mr. Marsh does not deserve, in my view,

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

96

Your Honor, to be treated as though he is a credit risk
in this particular case, based upon his track record.
And, in fact, it doesn't really matter that much,
because there is going to be money coming from the
military as long as Ms. Garner's alive.
So under any circumstance, Your Honor, I
believe that we have to treat these things as they are.
It's separate property, separate pay, it's separation
pay.

It's not pension, it's not retirement.

statutes clearly hold that.

The

The only case that we can

find holds that, that it is a sole and separate asset.
And the very moneys that the plaintiff is asking for are
paid from an account that is not a retirement or pension
account with the U.S. Government.

It's from a different

account, not the retirement and pension account.
Based upon that, Your Honor, I believe that
Mr. Marsh's position that he did not have an obligation
to pay eleven fortieths to the plaintiff was a
well-founded, correct legal and factual position, that
he has therefore not damaged Ms. Garner in any fashion
by not paying that money to her.
That for those reasons, not only should there
be no judgment against him for monies, but there should
certainly be no interest of any kind on any judgment,
nor should there be any attorneys fees.
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the status of the facts and nature of this payment, that
is it's undisputed, it's separation pay, and not
retirement pay, that Mr. Marsh ought to be entitled to
his legal fees to which I've testified in reimbursing
him.
THE COURT:

The court finds that the

disbursement of $30,000 received by the defendant when
he was involuntarily separated from the Navy as a result
of being passed over for separation pay is either a
marital asset, as a matter of equity is going to be
divided equitably, or it is anticipatory retirement
allocation.

I think the expert witness referred to it

as an advance on retirement pay.
It seems to me that the expert in this case
was an extremely credible expert, there were no
objections to his qualifications or to the court finding
him to be an expert, and therefore his testimony is
given a lot of weight by this court as a person who has
expertise in this area.
bell.

His testimony is clear as a

Those, I believe, are his exact words.
He said it's clearly an advance on retirement

pay.

He also said it was a retirement benefit accrued

during marriage, and it fits squarely under Woodward V.
Woodward in that connection, and this court so finds.
This court finds that the W-2 form is
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consistent with that, showing it as retirement pay.
Therefore that money is to be split in the manner agreed
to by the parties at the time of the decree, and that is
the eleven fortieths allocation.
This court is concerned about whether to
allocate eleven fortieths of $30,000, or eleven
fortieths of some other sum.

I am not persuaded that

anyone has established that the defendant actually
received $24,000.

But what appears to me is that he did

receive less than $30,000 after taxes were taken out.
To require that he then gives the plaintiff
her full share of $30,000, when, in fact, he did not
receive $30,000, seems inequitable.

So what I'm going

to do is suggest that she's entitled to the
proportionate share that the parties agreed on of what
he actually received, and I am finding that it is no
less than $24,000, and no greater than $30,000, but in
all likelihood, somewhere in between, depending on what
his tax rate was at the time.
If counsel cannot agree on that, proof needs
to be furnished and an allocation made by Ms. Williams
based upon that information.

If information is not

provided by the defendant to allow that figure to be
determined, then it'll be based upon the $30,000.
This court finds that, based upon the
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credible testimony, this is a retirement-type benefit,
but as a matter of equity, it is also appropriate for it
to be awarded in the manner in dicated.

And for those

reasons the court has so indie ated.
As to the issue of interest, this court finds
that since the defendant has had the full benefit of
this money since receiving the same, and has made no
offers to plaintiff to let her share in any portion of
this, or even to set aside a p ortion of it in some kind
of escrow account that can be earning money, that he is
responsible for paying some interest on this.

I'm

inclined, instead of making it a 10 percent prejudgment
interest rate sought by the pi aintiff, to make it the
lesser amount consistent with judgment interest of 7.64
percent.

Although it was not reduced to a judgment, it

seems more appropriate to me to set it at the lower
amount.
It is also clear to this court that the
plaintiff is eligible for what has been termed the SVP
election, entitled to an order directed to the military
to send her her proportionate share of the retirement
income that comes due in the future consistent with the
decree and with equity.
It is clear to this court, in looking at this
disbursement of $30,000, that in calculating it based
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upon the y ears of service, specifically fifteen years of
service, a nd the fact that the defendant is fully
vested, ha s his twenty years in at this juncture, that
it would b e inequitable and wrong not to give her her
proportionate share of that sum.
As to the attorneys fees, that is a tougher
question, because I believe that the defendant, in
coming to court on this matter, had a good faith belief
that this was not a settled area.

I do not believe, as

often happ ens, that he came to court taking a shot at
prevailing , believing that in all likelihood he would
lose.
On the contrary, I think this is a legal
issue that was a bit of a conundrum, if you will, for
both sides , and not one that is as well settled as some,
and consequently I'm disinclined to award attorneys
fees.

Both sides are to pay their own.
But I will say this.

There is no reason,

Mr. Marsh, why you have not paid the pre-existing
attorneys fees that you were ordered to pay.

There's no

viable reason, and those need to be paid immediately.
There's no reason for those not to be paid.
Is there anything further at this point in
time that I have failed to address that we need to deal
with?
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MS. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

I'm going to ask, Ms. Williams,

that you prepare findings consistent with my ruling, but
not limit it to the same, consistent with the expert
witness 7 testimony.
I do find him to be a person with expertise
in this area, and a person who is credible as a witness.
And in spite of the fact that he was brought in by the
plaintiff, he appeared to me to be a person who
approached this as a disinterested individual with
expertise in military retirement benefits who had no
reason to testify for or against either party.

And

consequently I did give his testimony a great deal of
weight.

Is there anything further?
MS. WILLIAMS:
MR. BIGELOW:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
No, Your Honor.

I appreciate the high quality of

the argument today, and the research that went into it.
It's always a pleasure to have both counsel in court.
Best luck to the parties.

We're in recess.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARION MARSH,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
OF DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR
RELIEF

vs.
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894901070 DA
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Comm. Michael S. Evans

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel, Kellie F.
Williams, and moves and petitions the above-entitled court to
modify the parties' Decree of Divorce, and grant Plaintiff the
relief requested and, in support of said petition and motion,
states and alleges as follows:
1.

That a Decree of Divorce was entered

in the above

captioned matter on August 16, 1989. Within said Decree, Plaintiff
was awarded the primary physical care, custody and control of the
parties' four minor children.

Defendant was ordered to pay child

support to Plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month, per child. That
order of support was subsequently modified by an order dated

November 25, 1992, which ordered the Defendant to pay child support
at the rate of $680.00 per month for the four children.
2.

Since

circumstances

the
and

entry

of

situation

the
of

Decree
the

of

Divorce,

parties

has

the

changed

substantially and materially and as follows:
a.

Two of the children have become emancipated and

there remains two minor children who are in need of support.
Defendant is currently paying child support to Plaintiff at the
rate of $170.00 per child.
b.

Defendant's employment has changed and, to the

knowledge and

information of Plaintiff, Defendant

is earning

substantially greater income than at the time of the entry of the
Decree.
c.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the support

that would be paid under the current Utah Uniform Child Support
Guidelines would be 25% more than the Defendant is currently
obligated to pay under the existing order.
3.

It is reasonable, necessary and proper that this court

enter an order modifying the order of child support, so that the
support

is

consistent

with

the

Utah

Uniform

Child

Support

Guidelines, given the current incomes of the parties. Said support
increase should be retroactive to the date of Plaintiff's filing of
this Petition for Modification.

Further, said support should be
2

payable on or before the 1st day of each month in which the support
is due, and payable until each child attains the age of 18 years or
graduates

from high school

in due course, with their class,

whichever last occurs.
4.

That within the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was awarded

11/40 of all pension and retirement benefits that Defendant would
receive upon his retirement from military service with the United
States

Government

(See,

paragraph

7,

Decree

of

Divorce).

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree, the Defendant received a
lump sum payment from the United States Navy, of $33,149.40, which
payment was referred to, on Defendant's W-2, as "pension plan1', a
copy of which check is attached hereto, designated as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference.

After subsequent hearing,

and by an order dated November 25, 1992, Defendant was to provide
Plaintiff with the IRS publication relating to the Navy "severance
payment".

Plaintiff was given the right to assert issues related

to the Navy's severance payment at a later date.
verification

that

Plaintiff

has

received

is

a

The only

letter

dated

September 4, 1992, which letter was considered incomplete by the
court, and a copy of which letter is attached hereto, designated as
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.
5.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

further

verification

from

Defendant as to the nature of this payment and as to whether that
3

pay, which has been called "severance pay or involuntary separate
pay" should be considered

as "pension plan" for purposes of

division between the parties.
6.

The Plaintiff is in need of attorney's fees and costs in

bringing this matter before the court, it is reasonable, necessary
and proper that the Defendant be ordered to pay to Plaintiff her
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred.
DATED this

-LJ^^^J^-r^-^

^J>-^5ay Of

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff
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1994.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

MARION MARSH

ss

(GARNER), being first duly sworn upon oath,

deposes and states as follows:

That she is the Plaintiff in the

above-captioned matter; that she has read the foregoing PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION 0$
including

DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF,

attachments, and

that

she understands

the contents

thereof, and that the same is true of her own personal knowledge,
except as to those matters stated upon information and belief, and
as to those matters, she believes the same to be true.

ON THE

m

day of

^2&cuwx^

1994, personally

appeared before me, the undersigned notary, MARION MARSH (GARNER),
the signer of the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF, who duly acknowledged to
me that she signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose.

i

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Exp ires: Q\\

r

.** * *

NOTARY PUBLIC
W W ! (L. BfcCtfl LJftf
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Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARION MARSH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894901070 DA
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Comm. Michael S. Evans

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled court on April 17, 1997, at the hour of
9:30 a.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court
Judge, presiding, on

Plaintiff's

motions

and

petitions, and

Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by counsel,
Kellie F. Williams, and Defendant being present in person and being
represented by counsel, Richard Bigelow, and the parties having
testified and having presented exhibits to the court and Plaintiff
having called Neil B. Crist as an expert witness, and the court
having reviewed the file, the case law, and having considered the
exhibits and testimony, and the court having also considered

Defendant's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, and based
thereon, the court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced by this court on August 16,

1989, having been married for approximately 15 years.
2.

At the time of the divorce, there were four minor

children. Plaintiff had been a homemaker, primarily, and Defendant
had been the primary wage earner, having been engaged in the
military for a period of 14 years of the marriage.
3.

Within the parties' Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was

awarded ll/40ths of all pension and retirement benefits which
Plaintiff accrued through his service with the United States Navy.
4.

Subsequent to the parties' divorce, Defendant fell in

arrears in child support and, pursuant to a court order dated
November 25, 1992, Defendant was then in arrears in support of the
sum of $7,637.00 through November 1992.
5.

During the period that Defendant was in arrears in his

child support obligation, Plaintiff fell in arrears in the payment
of the mortgage owed on the former marital residence, as a result
of which the home was foreclosed.

The deficiency owed due to the

foreclosure, however, was waived and so Defendant has paid no
monies out of pocket due to the foreclosure.
foregoing

and

the

commissioner's

2
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previous

Based upon the
findings,

it

is

reasonable that Defendant's objection to the commissioner's ruling
on November 7, 1994 should be denied and overruled.
6.

Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce, Defendant separated

from the military.

The separation was involuntary and based upon

the Defendant being passed over for promotion on two occasions.
7.

Defendant was paid the sum of $30,000.00, gross, on

January 31, 1991, as a result of his separation from the U.S. Navy.
Taxes of $6,000.00 were withheld so that the net actually then
received by Defendant was $24,000.00 on January 31, 1991.
8.

Defendant received a 1991 W-2 Wage and Tax Statement from

the Navy Finance Center which designated the disbursement "pension
plan."
9.

Upon learning of the disbursement, Plaintiff made a claim

by motion and petition and asked the court for her ll/40ths of the
payment, based upon the fact that the disbursement was either part
of Defendant's pension plan or should be considered a marital asset
for purposes of division between the parties.
10.

Subsequent

to

his

involuntary

discharge,

Defendant

continued in the Naval Reserve and, at the time of trial in this
matter, had over 20 years of service for purposes of a reserve
retirement.
11.

The separation pay received by Defendant was computed

based upon Defendant's years of active service, including the years
3

of

service

Defendant
Defendant's

during
has

the marriage

qualified

retirement,

for

of

a

is he

Plaintiff

reserve

and Defendant.

retirement

survives, Defendant

and

upon

will

have

deducted from each payment of his retirement pay 75% of the monthly
benefit until the entire $30,000.00 disbursement was paid in full.
(10 U.S.C. §1174(h).) Neil B. Crist was called as an expert witness
and, given no objection by Defendant's counsel, was qualified by
this court

as an expert witness

relating to

separation and

retirement pay for members of the Armed Forces.

It was his

testimony that the disbursement was in the nature of an advance on
Defendant's

retirement.

Further,

Mr.

Crist

testified

that

Defendant's military retirement would be calculated by adding
points earned in both years of active military service and years of
service in the reserve.

Defendant would receive substantially

greater points for the years of active service versus his years as
a member of the Naval Reserve.

Therefore, upon receipt of his

reserve retirement, the majority of the monthly retirement or,
approximately, 90%, which was Mr. Crist's best guess, would be
attributable to the years of active service versus the reserve
service years. Therefore, when the monthly retirement payments are
reduced by 75%, and there is 25% remaining, Plaintiff would only be
entitled to a portion of ll/40ths of that 25% payment.

Upon

Defendant's retirement, it would be impossible for Plaintiff to be
4
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made whole and receive her ll/40ths of Defendant's retirement as
awarded to her at the time of the Decree.

Only after payment in

fullf by offset, of the entire $30,000.00, would Plaintiff then be
able to receive her ll/40ths of the retired pay.
12.

The court finds that the $30,000.00 disbursement made to

Plaintiff when he separated from the Navy is either a marital asset
or

in

anticipation

retirement."

of

retirement

and

therefore

"advance on

The court finds the expert witness, Mr. Crist to be

extremely credible and his testimony should be given a great deal
of weight.

Mr. Crist testified that the monies received were

clearly an advance on Defendant's retirement benefits that had
accrued and that the monies fit squarely under the holding of
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
13.

Plaintiff should be entitled to ll/40ths of the amount

actually received by Defendant, which sum shall be no less than the
$24,000.00 net paid to him on January 31, 1991.

Defendant shall

provide Plaintiff, immediately, with his 1991 tax return so that
Plaintiff can calculate Defendant's actual tax consequences of the
$30,000.00 gross disbursement.
ll/40ths of that actual sum.

Plaintiff

shall then receive

However, if Defendant does not

immediately provide that tax return to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff
will be awarded ll/40ths of the full gross sum of $30,000.00.

5

14.
February

Defendant has had the full benefit of the money since
1991.

It is reasonable, necessary and proper that

Defendant be ordered to pay interest to Plaintiff at judgment
interest rate of 7.64% on the amount that should have been paid to
Defendant, commencing February 1, 1991 and until paid in full.
15.

The court finds that Plaintiff is eligible for an SVP

election and is entitled to any necessary order to permit her make
that SVP election with the military.
16.

The court finds that Defendant had a good faith belief

that he was entitled to the funds that he had received.

The

disbursement received was one received in an area that is not
settled.

It is reasonable

that each

party bear their own

attorney's fees and court costs incurred in bringing this matter
before the court.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties to this

action and over the subject matter of this action.
2.

The

Defendant's

Objection

to

Commissioner's

Recommendation, dated November 7, 1994, should be denied and
overruled.

6

3.

Plaintiff should be entitled to an award of ll/40ths of

the disbursement received by Defendant in 1991, together with
interest thereon at 7.64%, from January 1, 1991 and pursuant to the
foregoing Findings of Fact.
4.

Each party should pay their-own attorney's fees and court

costs incurred in^this matter.
DATED THIS i/l 'xday of

LESttfE A. LEWIS
Third District Court Judge
APPROVED:

RICHARD BIGELOW
Attorney for Defendant
DATED:

Mli
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Bruce H. Shapiro (Bar No. 4761)
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 273-3314

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARION MARSH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

vs.
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894901070DA
Judge Leslie Lewis

STATE OF UTAH )
: ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned, Scott Allan Marsh, being duly sworn under oath, states
and represents to the court as follows:
1.

I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action.

2.

Pursuant to the Divorce Decree entered on august 16, 1989, Plaintiff

was ordered to assume, pay, and hold me harmless on the mortgage obligation secured by
real property located at 8966 South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah.

3.

On or about November 1, 1991, I received information from the

Veterans Administration that the mortgage was in arrears and that foreclosure proceedings
had been instituted.
4.

Subsequent to November, 1991, I received information that the

property had been foreclosed and that there was an arrearage amount due and owing of
$13,028.11. Exhibit " A \ CSC Credit Services, Inc., deposition of Marion Marsh, p.
49:13-15.
5-

I have since made demand upon the Plaintiff to pay off the arrearage

amount, but to date she refuses to make arrangements for payment thereon. Deposition of
Marion Marsh, p. 50:2-17.
6.

Because I was contractually obligated for the mortgage and the

Plaintiff did not assume, pay, or hold me harmless on the mortgage obligation, I have been
unable to obtain a loan through the Veterans Administration.
7.

I have been informed by the Veterans Administration that if I do not

pay off the arrearage amount, I will not be able to ever qualify for a Veterans
Administration loan and other GI benifits.
8.

The loan default has caused a cloud on my credit reporting.

DATED this , P /

day of September, 1994.

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH

ISO.

2

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Si

da^of Septe
•42-

LES F. EHGLAH3

!
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Sutherland h, c^..™ I
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fORWARDING AND ADDRESS
CORRECTION REQUESTED
COVEKNMENT S£RVIC£S OIVISION

CSC C r e d i t S e r v i c e s

Inc.

Collection Sorvicob Division
7909 Parkwood Circla
Sulto 250
Houston, Toxas 7 7 0 3 6

360-399264
SCOTT A MARSH
1 8 0 5 MILLBROOK RD
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 6

7 I J/995-3630

800/444-4965
Re: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Name: SCOTT A MARSH
Loan No: 54688591500SAMARSH21
Principal Amount:
12469.58
Interest Referred:
401.38
Interest Accrued:
157.15
Total Due:
13028.11

AUG 25 1993

Dear SCOTT A MARSH,
Your delinquent loan balance owed to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
has been placed with our office for immediate collection.
The serious delinquency of this loan necessitates that the total amount
due be sent immediately. Failure to respond will leave us no alternative
but to use all appropriate remedies we deem necessary to ensure
collection of this loan.
All funds should be made payable to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
and mailed in the enclosed envelope. Do not make your check payable to
lour organization; do not send cash or postage stamps as payment.
^11 inquiries concerning your loan should be made directly to our office
at the address and telephone number above.
Sincerely,
REBECCA JOHNSON
Office Manager
<c: file

PLEASE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

EXHIBIT "A

THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A
DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED
FOR THAT PURPOSE.
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN THIRTY (30)
DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE DEBT OR ANY PORTION
THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THIS DEBT IS
VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN WRITING
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM RECEIVING THIS NOTICE,
THIS OFFICE WILL OBTAIN VERIFICATION OF THE
DEBT OR OBTAIN A COPY OF A JUDGEMENT AND MAIL
YOU A COPY OF SUCH JUDGEMENT OR VERIFICATION.
IF YOU REQUEST THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, THIS
OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE NAME AND
ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF DIFFERENT
FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR.

EXHIBIT "B "

Most o f the times
2

watching

3

c o u o l e s do

4

T V

that h e ' s sleot

we have been

fallen asleeo.

1

as most

and I ' l l

How about when he s l e e o s

5

A

What do you mean7

6

Q

You t e s t i f i e d e a r l i e r

i n your bedroom?

rR

i n your

bedroom b e f o r e

SHAPIRO

Q
with r r

7

A

Garner?

/larch of

In March of

'91

A

res

8

9

0.

I n t h e l a s t s i x months?

9

A

Uh-huh.

10

A.

Yes

Q.

Have the kids ever sDent any summers at I V .

In

Q.

Were you s l e e o m g

110

12

A.

Yes.

|13

Q

Okay.

that's

i n t h e bedroom,

I have f a l l e n a s l e e o

|11

also?

i n t h e bedroom, t o o .

But you c a n ' t r e c a l l hou many

times

occurred?

A.

No.

I t ' s n o t been — i t ' s been v e r y

'91?

Garner's home?

|12

A.

|13

0

Christooher has?

14

A.

Summer of '93

0.

Have the kids ever soent Christmas over at ft*.

IS

feu times.

Christooher.

16

b u t I t does haooen on o c c a s i o n when I know h e ' s too

116

t i r e d to d r i v e .

I f a l l asleeo: he's f a l l e n asleeo.

117

A.

No.

18

Sometimes

asleeo

18

Q

Thanksgivings?

19

falling

Yes.

I fall

asleeo.

too.

talking

to h i m . and he ends up

Sometimes he g e t s uo and l e a v e s .

Q.

Where I s your T . V . l o c a t e d ?

A.

I n my bedroom.

Q.

Okay.

Have you e v e r s l e o t

i n h i s bedroom i n t h e

19

A.

E0

0.

Which Thanksgiving?

r

A.

*92.

Q.

Has Ana ever SDent any time at Mr. Garner's

B3

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Has he been I n t h e bedroom?

relatives?

24

A.

Yes.

Q.

When?
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What summers?

Garner's home?

E2

l a s t s i x months I n h i s home?

<S
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1

A.

Huh-uh.

I

A.

Summer o f ' 9 3 .

2

0.

Okay.

!

Q.

How l o n g ; f u l l

\

A.

No. i t was about two months.

3

Have you ever traveled to Washington D.C.

with Mr. Garner, or to the State of Washington?

I 4

A.

Huh-uh.

5

Q.

Have you ever t o l d any of your c h i l d r e n not to

6

t e l l ft*.

Jlarsh that you're engaged because he w i l l get

7

mad?

8

A.

Yes.

i

I told my daughter

that.

Q.

Two months?

A.

Uh-huh.

summer?

Q.

Why?

A.

Because she wanted to go down and s t a y

them.

She had made r e a l good f r i e n d s - w i t h h i s

9

Q.

When did you t e l l her that?

sister-in-law

10

A.

When [ told her that ue were g e t t i n g married,

they t o l d h e r she c o u l d work down

11

about two weeks or a month ago

|12

month

15

0

No. i t hasn't been a

0

I t ' s only been a few weeks.
With the exceotion of Sryana, are any of

the

other c h i l d r e n In counseling?
A

A

Uh-huh

Q

T e l l me about

A

there

So she s t a y e d w i t h the s i s t e r - i n - l a w ?

South 3860 West.

Yes

t h e home you l i v e d

O l d i t go i n t o

foreclosure?

Q

Who?

Q

Whose name was on the p r o m i s s o r y

A.

Ana

A

S c o t t ' s and mine

Q

Okay

0

What's she in counseling for?

19

A

Sexual problems that she had when she was at

21

Are you currently

in counseling?

12

A

I see the counselor

'3

0

Is rt

54
4
1
25
5

A

He s t a r t e d g o i n g w i t h us

1

rR

SHAPIRO

too. res

Gcr^er currently

Ckay

m course I i r g ?

I ' m going
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Were you o r d e r e d to assume. D a y . and h o l d

A

1 was o r d e r e d

Q

Okay

A

No

Q

Okay

as E x h i b l t No

yes
to t a k e a s n o r t b r e a k .

note?

S c o t t h a r m l e s s on t h e mortgage?

Scott' s house
Q

i n a t 8966

Yes.

16

18

with

and wanted to go s t a y w i t h h e r because

17

Efl

rind

When did you begin discussing marriage olans

6

0

[15

14

I'll

We re almost done

a

14

'l3

the record )

L e t ' s go back on the record

the rest of my notes

4
S

t h a t he has s l e o t

be back in a minute

(Whereuoon a discussion was held o f f

2
3

Q

7

there,

o r t a l k i n g and j u s t

£5

1

47 1

I

to pay the m o r t g a g e , y e s

Are you aware o f a d e f i c i e n c y 7

I'm g o i n g

to hand / c u u h a t ' s been marked

3

Have you ever r e c e i v e d any n o t i c e s

like

this?

49
INTERMCUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 2 6 3 - 1 3 9 6

(
COURT REPORTER PRO 1 08 bv E7S Ire

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIHS
Regional Office
125 South State Street
POBox 11500
Salt Lake City UT 84147

November 4, 199<±A
Marion Marsh Garner

41-41-2-0137885
8966 S 3860 W
West Jordan, UT

Dear Ms. Garner:
Per our telephone conversation yesterday, the records on the above subject loan,
which you were a co-obligor, indicate the foreclosure sale was held on March 10,
1992. There was a debt of $12,469.58 established against the veteran.
Scott Marsh requested a waiver of this debt and it was granted on December 13,
1993. He does not have to pay this debt unless he wants his VA entitlement
restored for future use.
If you have any further questions please contact me at 801-524-3411 ext. 2617.
Sincerely yours,

GREEN
iz.ii Service Representative

S««llo 2 3 0

360-399264
SCOTT A MARSH
1805 MILLBROOK RD
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106

Houston. Toxas
713/995-3630

7703G

800/444-4965
Re: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Name: SCOTT A MARSH
Loan No: 54688591500SAMARSH21
Principal Amount:
12469,58
Interest Referred:
401.38
Interest Accrued:
157.15
Total Due:
13028.11

AUG 25 1993

Dear SCOTT A MARSH,
Your delinquent loan balance owed to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
has been placed with our office for immediate collection.
The serious delinquency of this loan necessitates that the total amount
due be sent immediately. Failure to respond will leave us no alternative
but to use all appropriate remedies we deem necessary to ensure
collection of this loan.
All funds should be made payable to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
and mailed in the enclosed envelope. Do not make your check payable to
our organization; do not send cash or postage stamps as payment.
All inquiries concerning your loan should be made directly to our office
at the address and telephone number above.
Sincerely,
REBECCA JOHNSON
Office Manager
cc: file

PLEASE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

EXHIBIT "
%
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TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D. #6635
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARION MARSH,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 894901070 DA
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Judge: Leslie Lewis
Comm.: Michael S. Evans

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF, by and through counsel, Terry R. Spencer, hereby
responds to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as follows, based on
the affidavit of Plaintiff filed herewith:
1.

The

parties

are

formerly

husband

and

wife

and

were

divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about August
16, 1989, by Judge Raymond S. Uno of the above-entitled court.
2.

That the parties are the parents of four children, two of

which are still minors.
3.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was awarded

the physical custody of the parties' minor children, and Defendant

was ordered to pay $300.00 per month per child for child support
for a total of $1,200.00 per month, plus $468.00 per month in
alimony.

Plaintiff was also awarded the marital home located at

8966 South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah, subject to paying and
holding Defendant harmless on the mortgage thereon. A copy of the
Decree of Divorce is attached to Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit
"A" .
4.

Defendant failed and refused to pay the ordered child

support and alimony ordered by the court in the Decree of Divorce,
and by November 1992, the date the Decree of Divorce was last
modified, Defendant was in arrears for family support in the amount
of $7,63 7.00. A copy of the Order modifying the Decree of Divorce,
which identifies Defendant's arrearage amount, is attached to
Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "B".
5.

Because of Defendant's willful failure to pay the child

support and alimony ordered by this court, Plaintiff was unable to
maintain the mortgage on the real property located at 8966 South
3860 West, West Jordan, Utah.
6.

The subject real property was foreclosed on March 10,

1992, with an outstanding debt of $12,469.58 after the sale of the
house to cover loan arrearages, sale costs and attorney's fees.

2

See the Letter from the Veterans Administration, dated November 4,
1994, and attached to Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "C".
7.

As a result of a request by Defendant, the outstanding

debt on this property was waived by the Veterans Administration was
v/aived as of December 13, 1993, and there is nothing now due and
owing to the Veterans Administration.

See the Letter from the

Veterans Administration, dated November 4, 1994, and attached to
Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "C".
8.

Because: (1) there is now no debt due and owing to the

Veterans Administration, (2) if any amount had been due and owing,
tjhat amount would have been a direct result of Defendant's failure
to pay family support as required by the Decree of Divorce, and (3)
Defendant knew, at the time this Order to Show cause was filed,
that no money was due and owing to the Veterans Administration;
Defendant has brought this matter before the court with unclean
h&nds and in bad faith, and therefore, Defendant should be required
to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section

78-27-56

and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.

3

DATED this 4th day of November, 1994.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

TERRY p. SPENCER, Ph.D
Attorn'ey for Plaintiff

-Zo7
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J

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
MARSH, MARION
PLAINTIFF
VS
MARSH, SCOTT ALLAN

CASE NUMBER 894901070 DA
DATE 11/07/94
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS
COURT REPORTER TAPE-1-1500
COURT CLERK CPW

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. SPENCER, TERRY
D. ATTY. SHAPIRO, BRUCE H

COMM. RECOMMENDS:
1. DEFT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR DEFICIENCY AMOUNT REGARDING
THE HOME IS DENIED FOR REASONS NOTED ON THE RECORD.
2. FOR REASONS NOTED ON THE RECORD, COMMISSIONER WILL NOT RECOMMEND ISSUE OF PLTF'S CONTEMPT BE CERTIFIED FOR FURTHER
HEARING.
3. EACH PARTY BEAR THEIR OWN FEES AND COSTS FOR TODAY'S HEARING.
MR. SHAPIRO PREPARE ORDER
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RlShWrd Nr Bigelow (Bar No. 3991)
Attorney for Defendant
700 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6450

W OCT | 7 AM 8-- 5 5
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARION MARSH,
Plaintiff,

)I

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT A. MARSH

vs.
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,

i

Civil No. 894901070 DA

Defendant.

i

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

STATE OF UTAH

)

):ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW Defendant Scott Allan Marsh and hereby affirms as follows:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
2. I am the defendant in the above entitled matter.
3. I live in and am jointly purchasing a home in Salt Lake County with my wife,
Leslie Marsh, located at 10034 S. Jordan Crest Circle, South Jordan, Utah 84065.
4. My wife, three of her five children from a previous marriage, her mother and I
all reside in that home.
5. My wife did not receive support from her previous husband for several years
(although earlier this year she began to receive support from him) and so each month I

was required to spend monies from my paycheck to assist in providing support to the
children who reside with me.
6. My wife and I have each been employed in Salt Lake County for more than the
last five years, her children go to school in Salt Lake County. My minor daughter does live
and attend school in Weber County.
7. I have been current in the payment of my support obligations to Plaintiff since
1992 except when the Court has made a decision to order retroactive support, and then
I have quickly paid off any arrearages the Court determined were owed.
8. My employment is stable.
9. I do not have the lump sum amount owed Plaintiff from the most recent Court
Order.
10. I have filed a Declaration of Homestead regarding my property pursuant to Utah
Code Annotate Section 78-23-3 et. seq.
DATED this

day of

0Cfi?0&t-

, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,

^

^

Scott Allan Marsh

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

n

( d a y of October, 1997

ULJLJCQ.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Nrt^Pubnc""'"^

TRACI K. ROSS
2:534 Newtopta Circle
i
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 J
M>' Commission Expires •
October 10, 1999
I

My Commission expires:

- )

Kji/O/rfty

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT A.
MARSH was mailed, postage prepaid, on this /SHr^dav of
O^ts
, 1997 to:
Kellie F. Williams
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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